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Abstract
Maritime Extractive Reserves, a new type of government-community 
collaborative management regime, are being established in coastal areas of 
Brazil in order to protect natural resources while sustaining local 
livelihoods. The long-term participation of resource users provides the 
cornerstone of this conservation and development model. This approach to 
conservation is supported by common property theory that questions the 
inevitable destruction of collectively managed resources.
This thesis explores the relationship between Maritime Extractive Reserves 
in Brazil and the traditional coastal communities they are created to protect. 
Specifically, it investigates the quality of the institutions which have 
traditionally governed the beach seining community in Arraial do Cabo, Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil. It then analyses the levels and kinds of participation 
and perceptions of the newly created Extractive Reserve, which attempts to 
build upon these traditional relationships. Finally, the study identifies 
community level factors that constrain or provide potential for long-term 
participatory conservation in this area.
A case study approach is adopted, involving both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. Data were collected through a questionnaire, 
participant observation, formal and informal interviews, focus groups and 
document review. This hybrid approach enables contextual exploration for 
which qualitative methods are essential ensuring a higher degree of 
accuracy and reliability than either could offer in isolation.
The data reveal that, although local traditional resource management 
institutions have a long history and were once effective, they have 
weakened over time. The data also indicate that there are significant social 
barriers to collective action within this user group which have implications 
for the operational viability of the Extractive Reserve concept. These 
barriers include weak organization, hierarchical structures, high levels of 
intra-community conflict and mistrust of government. Consequently, both 
the quantity and quality of participation in the reserve is low and therefore, 
local fishers are not becoming decisive players in the decision-making 
process. The implications of these conclusions for future maritime 
conservation policy in Brazil are explored.
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Glossary of Terms
Artisanal/
Traditional
fisheries
Fishing characterised by the use of small crafts (such as 
rafts or dugout canoes), simple technology tha t often has 
not changed for some time. Artisanal/Traditional fishers 
often have intim ate knowledge of their ecological 
surroundings with belief systems often adapted to the 
conservation of special areas.
Baptizing fish Fish are baptized when the lookout announces his 
prediction of the type, size and quantity of fish passing.
Canoe A fishing method involving a large canoe and net and a
fishing/beach
seining
work team (companha) of between 9'12 people.
Caicaras Small fishing communities which developed in the 
southern coastal areas of Brazil.
Carioca A person from the state of Rio de Janeiro.
Companha Team of 9*12 men who work together in the beach seining 
tradition.
Extractive A direct use conservation category created by the Brazilian
Reserve Government in 1990.
Fluminense Anything from the state of Rio de Janeiro
Gill nets Nets on which the gills of fish get caught.
Lookout/Vigia Member of the work team who spots passing shoals and 
communicated through hand signals to the skipper in the 
canoe.
Muncoes Those climatic circumstances which affect the ability for 
beach seining to take place successfully.
Upwelling A natural phenomenon whereby deep, cold and fertile 
oceanic waters emerge near the coast and provide an 
important feeding ground for fish.
Flow Migratory patterns, flow of renewable resource
Stock Total numbers and availability of fish
Veranistas Brazilian tourists who own homes in small beach towns 
and visit every summer.
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Chapter 1 Sm all-Scale F ishers and 
Extractive Reserves
1.1 Introduction* purpose of the study
Small-scale fishing communities around the world are at serious risk from 
depleting fish stocks and other threats to the marine environment. There 
are an estimated 100 million people whose livelihoods depend on fishing 
(The Ecologist, 1995). The poorest two-thirds of the world's population 
obtain approximately forty percent of their protein from fish (The Economist, 
1994). Not only are the diets of these groups dependent on fish but many are 
employed in this sector. Significantly, artisanal fisheries employ twenty 
times as many people as the industrial fisheries that are replacing them. 
These facts indicate that fishery policies are an essential element in global 
poverty reduction strategies. This is particularly so for those countries with 
vast coastlines and river systems such as Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Brazil.
Often the strategies of small-scale fishers are congruent with conservation 
goals. Over time, many of these groups have developed locally appropriate 
resource management systems influenced by the characteristics of their
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natural resource base and their cultural context (Ostrom, 19901 Baland and 
Plateau, 1996; Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997aJ Diegues, 1994). Supporting 
these types of regimes may be relevant not only for strengthening local 
livelihoods but also for conserving marine resources.
There has been increasing concern about the future of the ecological systems 
that the world's oceans and rivers encompass. Many of the most threatened 
marine areas are found in the developing world. Conventional approaches to 
marine area management involve preservation of 'untouched' areas and are 
therefore questionable in terms of their appropriateness for the developing 
country context. Often, these strategies mean excluding traditional resource 
users from their fishing grounds. Conservation practitioners, social policy 
experts and fisheries managers have begun to develop alternatives to 
traditional conservation approaches.
This thesis explores alternative approaches to marine conservation that 
involve collaborative efforts between the State and communities. These 
innovative initiatives are commonly called collaborative management or co­
management regimes. Specifically, this thesis is based on case study 
research carried out in a small-scale fishing community in Arraial do Cabo 
in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This community is of particular 
relevance to the concept of participatory marine conservation as it is the 
first open-water area to be declared an Extractive Reserve (RESEX) within 
the 'direct use' conservation category in Brazil.1
One of the primary goals of Brazil's first Maritime Extractive Reserve is to 
protect the beach seining community that has traditionally fished in this 
municipality. The traditional fishing practices employed by this group 
along with the formal and informal institutions that support their activities 
were identified and subsequently targeted with this innovative conservation
1 Direct use conservation areas are those that allow individuals to benefit directly from the 
resources these areas encompass.
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and development regime in order to protect its cultural diversity. The 
creation of the Extractive Reserve was also seen as a vehicle for the long­
term protection of the area's natural resource base, nurtured by the up- 
welling phenomenon and intrinsically linked to these traditional activities. 
In part, protection of these aspects of the community is seen as important 
because local fishing activities are based on sustainable principals and local 
knowledge.
As a result of both internal and international pressure, the Brazilian 
Government has been expanding their protected area network over the last 
ten years. Although the Extractive Reserve conservation category was 
created in law in 1990, it was only in 1997 that this concept was applied to 
open water marine areas. There are future plans though, to create these 
direct use marine conservation areas along the coastline in order to protect 
the cultural and ecological diversity that exists in this area. This study is 
the first of its kind to evaluate the social sustainability of these types of 
initiatives in the Brazilian context. The results of this study will be useful 
within Brazil as well as internationally where collaborative management 
regimes are still young and learning from case studies which are emerging 
from around the world.
Because the Maritime Extractive Reserve of Arraial do Cabo (RESEX A.C.) 
is the first of its kind in Brazil, there is little prior experience of how 
traditional maritime fishing populations and their management systems 
interact with these initiatives and what role they play in them. The aim of 
this thesis is to-
1. Investigate the institutions which have traditionally governed beach 
seining activities and determine the state of these institutions 
(weak/robust)
2. Explore the levels of participation in the newly created reserve and 
perception of the reserve by this resource user group
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3. Analyse the community level factors that constrain or provide 
potential for long-term participatory conservation.
The conceptual analysis used in this study has been adapted from the 
framework used by Ostrom (1990), Oakerson (1992) and Berkes and Folke 
(1998) in their analyses of common property regimes. The framework is 
designed to help identify the characteristics of the ecosystem, people, 
technology, local knowledge and property rights institutions that 
characterise the case study as a strong or weak common property resource 
regime (CPR). Because this framework has been tested and tried in other 
cases, it makes the results of this study easier to compare to similar studies.
The methodological approach adopted in this thesis is based on the case 
study method. This approach involves the empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon (Maritime Extractive Reserves) 
within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence. This multi­
method approach increases the validity and reliability of data gathered 
through triangulation. Twelve months of fieldwork were conducted at the 
case study site living and working with the sample group. Methodological 
tools used to collect data for this thesis included document review, 
structured and unstructured interviews, focus groups and a questionnaire. 
Participant observation was particularly useful for gaining an 'insiders' 
understanding of the case study site. A more detailed account of the 
methodology employed and problems encountered can be found in Chapter 
five.
1.2 Thesis Structure
The first half of the thesis concentrates on the evolution of policy
approaches to biodiversity conservation. This policy analysis is followed by
a review of relevant theory including common property resource theory and
the related concepts of community, participation and social capital.
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Afterwards, this thesis explores how these theories have been translated 
into practice within innovative approaches to environmental management. 
Chapter five presents the methodology employed in collecting data and 
analysing the selected case study. The second half of the thesis presents the 
data related to the key research questions and analyses them using the 
theoretical framework presented in the first half. The following paragraphs 
detail the purpose and content of each chapter.
Chapter two provides an overview of the evolution of policies towards 
environmental conservation. This chapter is divided into three main 
sections. The first section reviews how the idea of people's participation in 
conservation has emerged as a central theme in global strategies to achieve 
sustainable development. It does this by reviewing the outcomes of the 
main conferences and documents that have addressed this issue over the 
last thirty years. Then it discusses some of the criticisms of conventional 
approaches to conservation and presents alternatives to these approaches. 
The second section of this chapter reviews the origins of conservation and 
the exploitation of natural resources within the Brazilian context. This 
section begins with the period of colonialism and commercial resource 
extraction of Pau Brasil and finishes with a description of the developments 
in Amazonia over the past thirty years. The chapter ends with a review of 
fisheries policy in Brazil and how this policy has recently merged with 
conservation policy through extending the Extractive Reserve conservation 
category to the realm of fishing communities and the natural resources upon 
which they depend.
Chapter three provides an overview of developments in social theory related 
to environmental management. It includes a discussion of factors that have 
influenced conventional environmental policies that tend to be socially 
exclusionary towards traditional resource users. The chapter then looks at 
the circumstances under which local communities have become active 
participants in the process of natural resource conservation. It also reviews
the factors identified thus far that are common to successful common 
property management regimes. Lastly, this chapter explores in depth some 
of the fundamental concepts associated with alternative strategies: 
community, social capital and participation.
Chapter four discusses recent attempts to operationalize collective resource 
management. It presents a hybrid approach to the management of common 
property resources where rural communities work in partnership with 
government, a process often referred to as collaborative or co-management 
or joint resource management. This chapter begins with a general 
discussion on collaborative management regimes including the different 
definitions, types and dimensions of these regimes. It also presents the 
design principals identified in the literature which are relevant to creating 
co-management arrangements involving long-term community participation. 
Afterwards, this chapter reviews collaborative management efforts in Brazil 
through a discussion of the Extractive Reserve conservation category. This 
section will briefly describe the factors that led to the creation of this 
collectively managed conservation unit. Lastly, this chapter reviews some 
of the characteristics of this type of reserve including the process of 
establishment and other legislative aspects.
Chapter five presents the methodology employed to collect and analyse the 
data used for this thesis. The methodology chapter is divided into three 
sub-sections. The first section defines the general approach to the research 
including the decision to follow a case study design as well as a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. The second section defends why 
certain methodological tools were selected over others. This section also 
describes how these tools were employed to gather the necessary data. The 
final section presents some of the site issues that complicated or contributed 
to the successful completion of the fieldwork.
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Chapter six builds on the background given on the social and environmental 
context of Arraial do Cabo, RJ, presented in the second half of Chapter one 
and provides a more specific breakdown of the characteristics of the fishing 
community itself. This is done initially by describing the different gear 
type groupings that exist among the fishers in the municipality. It then 
describes the organisations which have represented fishers over the years 
first, in a Colonia (fishermen's guild) and then with the onset of democracy 
and the opportunity for greater individual and collective expression into a 
number of 'free' associations. The last section of this chapter analyses the 
process that led to the establishment of Brazil's first open water Extractive 
Reserve as well as the Utilisation Plan that governs it.
The purpose of Chapter seven is to evaluate the strength of the common 
property resource regime which has developed over generations to regulate 
beach seining activities in Arraial do Cabo. This chapter begins with the 
presentation of data related to the physical attributes of the resources 
involved. It then describes the decision-making and institutional 
arrangements that regulate the access and use of these resources. 
Afterwards, it identifies some of the key characteristics of the beach seining 
community which effect opportunities for successful long-term collective 
action including the presence of deep divisions and conflict. Finally, this 
chapter analyses the resilience of this regime using Ostrom's (1990) design 
principals (presented in Chapter three) as a guide for evaluation.
Chapter eight analyses the way that the canoe fishers' institutions 
described in previous chapters were contemplated in the Utilisation Plan 
and looks at the articles in that plan that directly impact on their activities 
and their management arrangements. It also presents data related to the 
type and intensity of participation of this group in the reserve with a 
particular focus on their ability to influence management decisions. This 
chapter also analyses how different aspects of the reserve (management, 
monitoring, etc.) are perceived by fishers. The chapter will then conclude
with a discussion about the impacts of the reserve on the sustainability of 
the canoe fisher CPR and in achieving the primary social objective of the 
RESEX A.C.
Chapter nine is the concluding chapter of this thesis. It presents the 
conclusions drawn from this study along with the associated policy 
implications. The second half of Chapter one will describe the case study 
site and the relationship between natural resource use and social change in 
this area since before colonization began in 1503.
1.3 History and ecology of Arraial do Cabo
This background section is included in order to provide an overview of the 
social and ecological linkages that have characterised the case study site 
selected. The term socio-ecological is used to emphasise the integrated 
concept of humans-in-nature as opposed to the artificial distinctions often 
associated with distinctly separate notions of social and ecological systems 
(Berkes, 1989). This section begins with a description of the different 
ecological systems present in the municipality of Arraial do Cabo, located 
180 kilometres from the city of Rio de Janeiro in the state of Rio de Janeiro 
(See Maps A and B). Afterwards, a review of the current socio-ecological 
relationships is presented through a description of the most significant 
events that characterise the socio-economic development of the municipality. 
It will also show how these different phases of development have utilised 
local resources. This overview will set the stage for the presentation of data 
collected during the field study and its analysis.
Understanding current socio-ecological relationships within Arraial do Cabo
is impossible without a grasp of the main ecological systems that it houses
and of the evolution of strategies previously used to exploit these resources.
The natural resources in Arraial do Cabo have provided the basis for the
local economy for thousands of years and continue to do so. Although this
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study focuses mainly on the more recent phases of this resource use, a socio- 
ecological time line perspective is helpful in placing today's situation in the 
broader historical context. A brief description of the physical characteristics 
of the different ecosystems will be presented followed by an overview of the 
corresponding economic/livelihood strategies over time.
The physical characteristics of Arraial do Cabo's resources can be somewhat 
broadly if artificially separated into two overall systems' terrestrial and 
aquatic. Artificially in the sense that aquatic attributes are deeply 
intertwined with the terrestrial. Land formations are in part a result of 
distant ocean currents and the movements of sediments just as the 
migration of fish has been encouraged by favourable conditions for feeding 
related to the quiet bays surrounding the Cape. The use of these resources 
has never been limited to one or the other but instead, complement each 
other. Fishers have used materials from the forest and dunes for making 
their nets, while salt mined from nearby lagoons served to preserve fish 
before the arrival of industrial freezers. As we will see, approaches to 
resource use have rarely been restricted to one system or another but rather 
use the two systems as complementary.
Terrestrial ecosystems
The hills that today surround the dense urban centre of Arraial do Cabo 
once formed an archipelago of volcanic islands. Over time, winds and strong 
ocean currents deposited sand along the coast creating sandbanks. These 
sandbanks eventually linked the former islands together connecting them to 
the mainland and forming a cape extending 40 kilometres into the Atlantic 
Ocean (see Map B). This cape is surrounded by distinctive coastal 
formations ranging from protected coves and harbours to rough and rocky 
open ocean terrain. This process also created favourable conditions for a 
variety of different ecosystems to emerge all of which have at some point or 
another been utilised in supporting local livelihoods. Ecosystems
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represented in the municipality include sand dunes, restingas2, patches of 
the acutely threatened Atlantic Rainforest, salt lakes, coral reefs, lagoons 
and mangroves (FEEMA, 1988). Apart from the newly established reserve, 
there are a number of smaller municipal level conservation units that have 
been established to protect these resources with greater and lesser degrees 
of success.
Aquatic systems
The richness of the aquatic ecosystem surrounding the cape is due largely to 
the oceanic phenomenon referred to as 'upwelling'. Waters at depths of 120 
metres or more receive little sunlight essential for the survival of 
phytoplankton. The absence of these small creatures maintains a high 
nutrient density at this depth. In a few coastal areas around the world, due 
to oceanographic, geographic and meteorological factors, deep oceanic 
waters upwell bringing with them nitrates and phosphates that act as 
fertilisers for the more superficial coastal waters. The availability of these 
nutrients thereby attracts a high diversity of aquatic plants and animals 
and increases the richness of the ecosystem.
Approximately seven areas around the world are affected by this occurrence 
and all consequently have important fishing activities associated with them. 
These locations include Peru (home to the largest fishery in Latin America), 
South Africa/Namibia, and Southern California (Carson, 1950). Biologically, 
the up-welling phenomenon is very important, because the cold water is so 
rich in nutrients that it provides the base of the aquatic food chain. The 
result is an extremely diverse aquatic system which has sustained the 
livelihoods of the inhabitants of the cape over thousands of years (see Annex 
I).
2 Ecosystem characterised by sand dunes, cactus, and low-lying fruit bearing shrubs and 
trees.
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In the area surrounding the Cape, the body of water that upwells is called 
the Central Water of the South Atlantic (CWSA). This water body is the 
result of the meeting of the warmer Brazil Current with that of the Arctic 
Falkland Current. The principal cause of up-welling in the Brazilian 
Southeast is the constant north-eastern winds. These winds run parallel to 
the coast, pushing the superficial coastal waters farther out to sea and 
revealing the ice cold fertile waters emerging from a depth of over 200 
metres. With the CWSA nearby along with the north-easterly winds and 
the fact that the Cape's coast houses some of the deepest coastal waters 
along Brazil's 6,000 kilometre coastline, all the ingredients exist for this 
rare up-welling to occur.
In principal there are two main categories of fish that inhabit the region  ^
pelagic and migratory. Pelagic fish are those that stay on shore in coastal 
areas and not only feed off reefs but five for the majority of the year in the 
same area. Migratory fish are those that come in schools following certain 
water channels that flow along the coast in search of protected waters. 
Because of the rich nutrients available off the A.C. Cape and the inland 
bays and estuaries, many different fish species choose the Cape as a site to 
spawn. The principal commercialised species that follow these aquatic 
paths are- mullet (mugill spp.), bonito (Auxis sp.), blue fish (pomatomus 
saltatrix), and squid (Liligo sanpaulensis). As we will see later, these 
passing schools provide the basis for the traditional fishing methods 
practised.
1.4 Socicrecologial timeline
The history of Arraial do Cabo can be divided into four main socio-ecological 
phases. Although it is the dynamics of the last phase which are of most 
concern and have most relevance to the scope of the research, present day 
Arraial do Cabo is much influenced and affected by the other three phases.
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This information is therefore useful in understanding the roots of current 
social relations, and will be frequently referred to throughout the text.
Table 1.1 Four Phases of Development in A.C
Phase 1 Pre colonial 3,500 BC - 1503
Phase 2 Colonial 1503 • 1900
Phase 3 Modernization 1943 • 1988
Phase 4 Post Modern Transition 1980 - present
Phase I ' 3.500BC  -1503
The first development phase is defined as the period before European 
colonisation. This period is characterised by the presence of hunting and 
gathering populations, beginning with the shell collecting Sambaquis tribe. 
Later, there is evidence of the occupation in the region of tribes with highly 
developed fishing techniques tha t are often referred to as the Itaipu phase 
of Indian settlem ent in coastal regions of southeastern Brazil.
According to Dias (1977) these Indian communities selected geographical 
locations with specific ecological characteristics for their settlements. They 
were not nomadic but rather sought the long sandy stretches of the 
Flum inense3 coast particularly at locations where high hills approximated 
clear oceanic waters. Many of these locations are still valued by today's 
fishers who use them as the Indians did as lookout points for the arrival of 
migrating fish from southern waters. Archaeological digs in the area reveal 
the remains of populations tha t inhabited the cape and built their 
cemeteries or Sambaquinas (shell piles) in a variety of spots along the coast.
Phase IP  1503-1920
The second major shift occurred with the arrival of sea*faring Europeans in 
the New World. Amerigo Vespucci and his ships landed in the comfort of
3 Fluminense refers to anything belonging to the state of Rio de Janeiro.
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the deep and well-protected Baia dos Anjos (Angel Bay) and left twenty-four 
men to build a settlement and protect the area from foreign invaders. The 
community subsequently built is recognised as one of the very first 
European communities in the New World. Throughout this period, starting 
roughly in 1503 and lasting until the beginning of the 20th Century, 
Arraial's port was used to ship natural resources extracted from the region 
starting with Pau Brasil or Brazil wood, then salt, fish and other raw 
materials for export to European markets. It was also used as a point of 
entry for slaves brought to provide labour for these extractive industries.
The Cape itself marks a strategic point along the Brazilian coastline. It 
represents the geographical point where the continent changes direction, 
from Northeast to Southeast. For explorers, discoverers and traders during 
this period, the island of Cabo Frio was (and still is) the first land sighted 
after the long transatlantic trip from Europe and the first lighthouse in 
Latin America was built here in 1583. As a result, it was often used as a 
rest point for ships heading to the commercial centre of Rio de Janeiro.
Although the Baia dos Anjos provided an excellent environment in which to 
harbour transatlantic ships, the entry to the bay proved precarious through 
the small opening (misleadingly called Boqueirao - 'wide opening’) between 
the mainland and the island of Cabo Frio. Also, the builders of the 
lighthouse failed to take into account the constant cloud coverage over the 
island that constantly disrupted the lighthouses' beam. As a result, to this 
day there are eighty-eight shipwrecks documented in the waters and coast 
surrounding the Cape (Filho, 1993). These factors created an environment 
in which there were many new people on the Cape at any one time, adding 
to cultural diversity of the location that is still distinct and visible today.
13
Phase IIP  1920 -1988
The third phase in the history of the Cape's development can be described 
as a period of modernisation or industrialisation. This phase is epitomised 
by the establishment of the government owned Alkalis industrial plant. 
This phase is also characterised by changes in fishing activities as a result 
of the introduction new technologies such as motorised boats and icehouses. 
It was during this phase that industrial fishing fleets supported by 
government policies first appeared.
Due to the accessibility of salt, sand and calcium, obtained by mining shells 
from nearby lake beds, and the existence of a deep water port on Praia dos 
Anjos, Arraial was a prime site for the establishment of Brazil's barrila4 
industry formalised in 1943 as the National Company of Alkalis5. It is the 
only one of its kind in the country (in the U.S. the substance is mined and 
exists naturally, in Latin America its absence makes its creation though a 
chemical process necessary) and regionally continues to be the biggest 
industrial plant. Nationally, the creation of the Company was heralded as a 
step towards the country's industrialisation and modernisation. Like many 
other national strategies at the time, it assumed that the local population's 
'primitive' lifestyle would be transformed in the wake of modern industrial 
progress. According to many local inhabitants, it was during this period 
that Arraial do Cabo became 'civilised'.
This period brought waves of immigrants from other areas in Brazil and 
abroad. Some of these immigrants came from the poorer north-eastern 
states looking for work. Others were recruited as specialists and brought 
from around the country to run this strategic industry. At its peak, Alkalis 
employed a few thousand people living in its vicinity. These immigrants 
contributed to a skyrocketing of the local population. From 1955 to 1965 the
4 A material that occurs naturally and can be produced chemically from which a range of 
products are made including cosmetics and fertilisers.
5 Companhia Nacional de Alkalis
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Cape's population grew at three times the rate which existed before the 
arrival of Alkalis (Prado, 2000). Its creation also had important impacts on 
the local class structure through the introduction of wage labour and as a 
result of the hierarchical management structure introduced by the company. 
During this period, many fishers were employed in this industry, though 
never abandoning their fishing activities completely.
The Alkalis plant has since been privatised and is in a state of decline. 
With 720 employees, the once all-important local industry now employs only 
a fraction of that employed in past years. Of these, approximately 200 are 
native to the Cape and the rest have emigrated from other areas (Prado, 
2000). With the current total population of the municipality at 
approximately 26,000 inhabitants Alkalis' contribution to local employment 
has become much less significant (IBGE, 1996).
Other technological changes introduced during this period had important 
impacts on the Capes' socio-ecological systems. The availability of 
industrial nylon nets and other industrialised materials made fishers much 
less dependent on the terrestrial resources extracted from the restinga 
which had been utilised for making and dying nets. The availability of 
these products also increased the need for wages with which to buy them.
The introduction of freezing technologies through the establishment of 
icehouses in the municipality also had important impacts. Firstly, 
traditional salting and processing practices ceased. As it was mainly 
women who were responsible for these time-consuming tasks, their role in 
fishing was significantly reduced as a result. It was also during this period 
that motorised boats became a common sight in the municipal marina. 
Most importantly, it was a period during which government policy actively 
supported industrial fishing practices at the expense of small-scale fishers. 
Since 1967, industrial fishing has been encouraged in the country through 
tax incentives and the suspension of import tariffs on fishery technology
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(Diegues, 1992a). The result has been the widespread destruction of fish 
habitats, over-fishing and the marginalization of artisanal fishermen.
With the decline in production at Alkalis, coupled with reduced fishing 
catches, Arraial began to look at other possibilities of capitalising on its rich 
natural resource base. The next phase describes this process and how 
tourism, mining and other activities have interfaced with traditional fishing 
activities. This phase is characterised by the contradictions and conflicts 
that exist between the different local development strategies.
Phase IV ’ 1988 - present
Since the late 1980s, the economy of Arraial do Cabo has opened up to 
include an even wider array of economic activities. Outside of fishing and 
the downsizing of the Alkalis industrial plant, other opportunities for 
employment within the municipality include working with local commerce, 
increased opportunities in a growing tourism industry and its associated 
services, and one of the municipality’s biggest employers, the local 
government. With a fixed work force of approximately 1,000 (often doubling 
during election years), the local government plays an important role in 
generating employment opportunities.
This combination of economic activities has created an environment in 
which traditional and modern activities occur side by side. It is not 
uncommon for fishers to have jobs outside the fishing industry with the 
local government or other sector, or for wives to be working with computer 
technologies while their husbands earn a living by beach seining. While 
many of these outside activities complement fishing, others present serious 
threats to traditional practices.
Along with the uncertainty embedded in employment with the municipal 
government, work opportunities in the tourism industry are also precarious.
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Much of the available work is seasonal and contingent on the flux of tourism 
during the summer months. Unfortunately, the tourist season coincides 
with the most important fishing months from December to March, making it 
difficult for tourism to become a complementary activity to fishing activities. 
As most fish is sold to outside markets, local fishers do not benefit from this 
local market by negotiating higher prices for their catch.
The aesthetic value of the Cape's crystalline waters, secluded bays, long 
stretches of white sands and aquatic diversity has encouraged many 
different types of tourism to develop. Beginning in the 1970s, the main flux 
of tourism in Arraial was characterised by veranistas or summer 
vacationers who often own homes in the municipality and stayed for long 
periods during the summer. This type of tourism is still present and many 
local residents take this opportunity to earn extra income by renting out 
their homes and moving in with extended family during these periods. 
Recently, the profile of area tourism has broadened to include higher end 
tourism such as those coming for ecological dive holidays (spurred by the 
local governments' inauguration of Arraial as Brazil's Dive Capital). These 
developments have led to the construction of numerous hotels and SCUBA 
dive shops.
The growing popularity of the Cape has also attracted a much larger scale of 
tourism over recent years. During the high season summer months, it is not 
unusual for the population to triple in size (PMAC, 2000). There are also 
plans for developing mass tourism by receiving cruise ships in the harbour 
(Ribeiro, 1999). Tourists and the financial resources they bring to the 
municipality have had lasting affects on the local economy as well as 
traditional fishing practices.
This intense seasonal population flux has had serious impacts on fishers in 
the area. Among them is the increased boat traffic that is blamed for 
startling fish from their traditional feeding grounds and changing the
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course or flow of these resources. The physical presence of tourists on the 
beach is a particular problem for some beach seiners who require large 
amounts of beach space to pull in their huge nets. Furthermore, the 
uncertainty and seasonality of work in this sector reinforces the importance 
of fishing as a safety net for much of the community.
The riches of the municipalities' natural resources are not limited to the 
renewable resources. Others include such non-renewable resources as 
petroleum. Petroleum extraction has taken place off shore in the north of 
the state of Rio de Janeiro in what is called the 'Campos Basin.' Arraial do 
Cabo is an attractive place for this type of industry partly because of the 
accessibility of the existing harbour and proximity to oceanic wells (Ribeiro,
1999). Currently, the municipality's involvement in this industry is limited 
to carrying out mechanical and repair work on drilling platforms used in the 
region.
Apart from the impacts of tourism, other economic activities present 
important threats to the livelihoods of small-scale fishers in Arraial do 
Cabo. The continued presence of industrial fishers using predatory fishing 
techniques is cited as a source of the biggest threat to local fishing* the 
depletion of the fish stocks. Like the grounds of small-scale fishers around 
the world, the waters surrounding the Cape have fallen prey to industrial 
shrimp trawlers and gill nets since the 1970s.
Brazil's Environmental Protection Agency (IBAMA) classifies predatory 
fishing as the use of dragnets and gill nets with a weave span of less than 
seven centimetres. Although by law they are limited to trawling at a 
distance of 200 metres from shore, these fleets have historically disregarded 
these limitations and often trawl dangerously close to shore. These types of 
trawlers have the capacity to spend long periods at sea, as they have 
refrigeration facilities on board. Their threat lies not only in the quantities 
of fish that they can hold but the indiscriminate and wasteful processes
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used to fish (The Economist, 1994). To extract large quantities of 
commercially valuable fish, their huge nets drag along the sea bed and 
scoop up both desirable and undesirable catch which are separated on board 
the vessel, and the by-catch is then dumped overboard.
Unsuccessful isolated attempts to challenge these ships have occurred 
sporadically over the years. More recently, FIPAC6, the local government 
fishery institute, with support from local fishers, began a somewhat 
systematic effort to confiscate illegal gill nets left in nearby waters. These 
efforts have since lost steam and although temporarily revitalised by the 
creation of the Extractive Reserve, have not seemed to make a significant 
impact on the trawling activities threatening stocks around the Cape.
1.5 Description of A. C. Fishing Activities
‘Arraial do Cabo’ means literally ‘Hamlet of the Cape’. This was in all 
probability a name given to it by early Portuguese explorers and settlers 
new to the area as nowadays it ill represents the true make up of the 
community. In fact, Arraial do Cabo was not one hamlet but two (Praia dos 
Anjos and Praia Grande). Over time, it grew into four with the third 
developing after the abolition of slavery in the late 19th Century into an 
Afro-Brazilian neighbourhood and a fourth, Praia do Pontal, with the 
establishment of Alkalis and the housing for its employees. Today, although 
the municipality spans the four hamlets, these distinctions are still relevant 
(although more in terms of local identity as opposed to actual physical 
separation) and do not take long for a first-time visitor recognise.
At the beginning of the 20th Century, the deep soft sand and lack of 
transport separated these hamlets. Now, increased urbanisation and paved 
roads have merged them together transforming them from independent
6 Fundacao Institute de Pesca de Arraial do Cabo
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entities into neighbourhoods of the larger municipality. The four main 
neighbourhoods get their names from the beaches with which they are 
associated: Praia dos Anjos, Praia Grande, Prainha, and Praia do Pontal, 
indicating the importance of the beach in the lives of its residents.
Arraial presently has approximately 26,000 registered inhabitants (PMAC,
2000). An attempt was made to identify the number of fishers that reside 
and fish in the waters surrounding the Cape. As there are no official 
statistics available from the local government fishing institute (FIPAC) or 
from the state institute (FIPERJ), this information was gathered by 
comparing estimates from different local fishing organisations and fishers 
and triangulating them with the researcher's observations. Responses 
included numbers of fishers ranging from the hundreds to the thousands 
with some including the important, albeit unclear, distinction between the 
number of fishers and the number of people in the community who depend 
directly or indirectly on fishing for their livelihoods. What is clear is that 
fishing still makes an important contribution to the local economy and, 
more importantly, represents a significant part of the livelihoods of many 
Cape residents. The following section will provide a breakdown the 
estimate of the number and types of fishers used for the purposes of this 
study.
Fishing modalities in Arraial are divided (locally) into five main categories. 
These categories include trawling, boat/line fishing, SCUBA fishing, shell 
collecting and beach seining. For the most part, fishers do not engage in 
different modalities simultaneously. Over time, some switch from one to the 
other with older fishers often having experience of a diversity of strategies. 
The figure below illustrates the different fishing modalities, the number of 
fishers involved in each as well as the distribution of some of the different 
groups that participate in each.
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Figure 1.1 Group size and ethnic divisions among A.C. fishers
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Source- Author
Of these modalities, boat and line fishing have the most participants with 
numbers reaching approximately 1000. With approximately 300 motorised 
small boats in the harbour with crews of between two and three along with 
a scattered number of fishers who fish off rocks, this group accounts for the 
vast majority of fishers in the municipality. There are ten trawlers working 
locally using work teams consisting of eight persons each, suggesting an 
approximate number of eighty full time fishers involved in this modality. A 
rough estim ate of the number of beach seiners suggests th a t there are just 
over 150 people involved in this practice on all four beaches. With another 
20 partaking in SCUBA fishing, and at least 90 involved in shell collecting 
activities, this brings the grand total to an estim ated 1,340 fishers in the 
municipality.
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Table 1.2 Number of fishers in A.C.
Boat/ Line 1000
Trawler 80
SCUBA fishers 20
Shell Collecting 90
Beach Seine 150
Total 1,340
(Source ^ observations, interviews)
Although the species of fish and the strategies used by and within fisher 
groups using different modalities to catch them are different, the fishing 
cycles and periods remain similar throughout. For the most part, the 
summer months are the most fruitful and account for the majority of fish 
caught throughout the year.
Apart from the estim ated thirty  families involved in collecting and 
processing shellfish, the other modalities no longer include the direct 
participation of women and as we will see later on, the role of women in 
fishing in Arraial has all but dissapeared. Although many women were 
approached and provided useful and relevant information, as far as this 
study is concerned, it is the fisher m en  of Arraial do Cabo who have been at 
the forefront of the recent developments in local fishing organisations and 
institutions.
Beach Seining
The rede de arrasto or beach seining takes place on all four beaches with 
each beach having a corresponding residential neighbourhood community 
associated with it; Praia Grande, Praia dos Anjos, P rainha and Praia do 
Pontal. In principal, all beaches abide by a similar set of rules which define 
who is allowed to fish as well as when and how fishing activities take place. 
On all but one beach these activities take place during the day. It is only on 
Praia Grande tha t beach seining at night for squid has recently developed 
along with institutions to regulate it. Although some of the characteristics
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of this night fishing are different from its day counterpart, the regulatory 
systems are similar and governed by the same groups that control the day 
seining.
The basic strategy for day seining throughout the Cape is the same. The 
physical characteristics necessary for the success of this activity are the 
presence of clear placid water, high nearby hills and sandy coves in the 
coastline. There are approximately nine members of the work team or 
companha. Although all are important and necessary for the success of the 
activity, it is the lookout who forms the cornerstone for this type of beach 
seining. Because these fishers do not use bait nor do they move from 
location to location looking for schools, they must actually see the fish that 
they are attempting to catch before they can effectively 'fence' them in with 
their net.
The height of the hills is used for the lookout to get a bird’s-eye view of the 
incoming migratory schools of fish. The clarity of the water is also essential 
not only for the spotting of schools but also for the identification of the 
species, size and number present in the school, a process often referred to as 
'baptising.' It is the lookout who baptises the schools and decides whether 
they are worthy and well placed for the cerco or fencing in to be successful.
Another important resource for the success of beach seining is the 
availability of a large dugout canoe. These are fashioned from huge trees, 
formerly available regionally, and when finished are approximately one 
metre in diameter and seven to eight metres long. Four men manoeuvre the 
canoe (rowers), two men are responsible for placing the huge net in the 
water, and the skipper or mestre is responsible for co-ordinating this 
process by receiving hand signals from the distant lookout and relating 
them back to the rest of the team. The last member of the team stays on the 
beach throughout this process and is responsible for a rope connected to the 
net that he pulls when signalled. As soon as the signal is given and the net
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starts to go in the water, this person starts closing the sides of the net to 
prevent the fish from escaping. He is later joined by the rest of the crew 
and often by other participants who help in the lengthy affair of pulling the 
net on to shore (See Figure 1.2 below).
Figure 1.2 Fishers and community members pull in the net
Site Selection
Arraial was selected as a case study site for this research for one main 
reason. It is the site of the first Brazilian experience in fishery co­
management in an open marine environment. The legal term for this 
conservation initiative is Extractive Reserve (RESEX). The Extractive 
Reserve of Arraial do Cabo (RESEX A.C.) was created by presidential decree 
on January 3rd 1997. According to representatives of the Brazilian 
Government National Centre for Traditional Populations (CNPT) it will not 
be the last as there are plans to create many more over the next few years 
along Brazil's extensive coastline.
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This site is also of particular interest as it is the first Extractive Reserve7 to 
be created in an urban environment. The experience so far with with these 
conservation and development units has been in the North of the country 
managing forested tracts in fairly remote areas. The characteristics in 
Arraial do Cabo provide a challenging setting because of the diverse uses of 
aquatic space in the area; Navy frigates and submarines, to cargo ships, 
tour boats, divers, petroleum platforms just to name a few.
It was selected as a Brazil's first Maritime Extractive Reserve in part 
because of the presence of the beach seine fishers. Despite intense socio­
economic pressures the municipality has faced, this type of fishing continues 
today with much of the fervour of the past. For this reason, the Arraial do 
Cabo beach seiners have been the object of interest of many anthropologists 
and sociologists trying to understand why some communities have survived 
while others have not.
These fishers, more than other fishers in the community, represent the 
historical evolution of traditional fishing practices in the region. For the 
most part, their fishing methods have not changed for hundreds of years. 
They are also among the few fishers in the area who do not use bait to 
attract fish and they also do not move to pursue fish but rather wait for the 
fish to come to them in selected fishing spots. This practice makes them the 
most vulnerable to changes in local fish stocks and flows or migratory 
patterns. It also represents a truly sustainable fishing practice, embedded 
in the ecosystem that supports it. By studying the institutions and people 
which have sustained these organisations we hope to achieve a closer
7 Extractive reserve is one of the categories created by the 1988 Brazilian constitution for 
the creation of conservation units. It is a category that accepts direct use of the natural 
resources it harbours. Through a co-operative management approach, a management plan 
is created which defines the level and type of use, often restricted to traditional local 
resource users. This differs from other conservation categories such as Biological reserves 
and Ecological stations that are established for indirect use only. Indirect use refers to the 
benefits society receives indirectly from the establishment of such conservation areas such 
as the protection of biodiversity, climate stabilisation etc.
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understanding of the resilience of social organisations that support these 
processes along with insight into how resources can be managed 
successfully and sustainably.
Arraial is also an interesting case because of the existence of these rich 
informal institutions that have developed over time. These fishers have 
found themselves surrounded by threats to their livelihoods and it is 
interesting to see to what degree the newly created extractive reserve can 
serve as a vehicle for counteracting some of the processes which have 
undermined the state of their common property resource today.
For these reasons beach seiners were chosen as the primary focus of this 
study. It would be, though, impossible to isolate their experience from that 
of those participating in other fishing modalities that have developed over 
the last sixty years. For this reason, efforts were made to consult fishers 
from all modalities to place this experience in the broader context.
1.6 Conclusion
As we have seen in this chapter, ecology, history, culture and modernisation 
have deeply influenced the fishing community in Arraial do Cabo in 
different ways. Over the last 50 years, this group has struggled to maintain 
its traditional culture while adapting to these rapid changes. For the most 
part these influences have worked to destroy local culture and tradition 
rather than support it. The creation of Brazil's first Maritime Extractive 
Reserve in this municipality could mitigate against some of these 
destructive elements.
The following chapters will explore the relationship between this user group
community and the newly created extractive reserve. This process begins
with a review of conservation policies globally as well as in Brazil. Then,
the literature on common property resources is reviewed and elements of
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successful regimes are presented. Afterwards, collaborative management 
regimes are analysed and discussed in order to provide a solid theoretical 
foundation with which to analyse the Arraial do Cabo case study.
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Chapter 2 Conservation Policy in Brazil and 
Beyond- From Exclusion to Participation
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section will 
review how the idea of people's participation in conservation has emerged as 
a central theme in global strategies to achieve sustainable development. It 
will do this by reviewing the outcomes of the main conferences and 
documents that have addressed this issue over the last thirty years. It will 
then discuss some of the criticisms of conventional approaches to 
conservation, which exclude traditional resource users as well as describing 
some alternatives to these approaches. The second section of this chapter 
will review the origins of conservation and the exploitation of natural 
resources within the Brazilian context. This section will start with the 
period of colonialism and the extraction of Brasilwood and finish with a 
description of the developments in Amazonia over the past thirty years. 
The chapter will end with a review of fisheries policy in Brazil and how this 
policy has recently merged with conservation policy through the expansion 
of the applicability of the Extractive Reserve conservation category to the 
realm of fishing communities and the natural resources they depend on.
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2.1 Global Trends in Conservation
Over the last hundred years the world has experienced a dramatic shift in 
the way human beings perceive their relationship with Nature and how this 
relationship implies certain constraints for human development. Economic 
development has transformed the world economy and has created 
opportunities never before imagined for mankind. While impressive, these 
developments have not come without costs. For one, the benefits of this 
development have not been evenly distributed. Along with inequality, the 
market economy has resulted in massive environmental costs. Many of 
these costs are a consequence of the under-valuation of biological diversity 
and the environmental services Nature provides. The evolution of 
paradigms this century reflects the changing strategies which have been 
adopted to protect the natural resources upon which mankind depends. 
During the last forty years this relationship has been questioned in terms of 
its ability to be sustained and in terms of the Earth’s ability to endure 
increased pressures from those countries which have not nearly reached 
exploitation rates which push technological limits.
Until quite recently, Nature was seen as boundless. Endless expanses of 
forests, mountains, oceans and other biomes seemed to exist for the sole 
purpose of supporting economic development goals. In this paradigm often 
referred to as ‘frontier economics’, not only was nature seen as being able to 
provide an endless supply of raw materials to fuel development, but also as 
a limitless sink for its by-products (Daly and Cobb, 1990; Colby, 1990). In 
recent years, the scope and scale of Man’s dependence on these resources 
has also become alarmingly clear. Global climate change, accelerated 
species extinction rates, deforestation and desertification, among others, 
have provided tell-tale signs of the anthropogenic threats to the planet's 
resilience. Calls for action are often justified by the recognition that the 
worlds’ development must be both socially and environmentally sustainable. 
The protection of genetic and biological resources, along with the
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environmental functions that terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems provide, 
are fundamental in this search for sustainability. In addition, the 
importance of cultural diversity in this process is slowly becoming 
recognised. The close relationship that some societies have which their 
natural surroundings have in many cases protected them and in some even 
enhanced them through the creation of sacred groves or other locally 
designated 'protected areas' (Leach etal., 1996).
The emerging debate has resulted in some agreement that the world's 
resources are, in fact, finite. Suggestions, though, on how life on the planet 
will deal with these limitations have varied widely. Arguments sway 
between technocratic approaches which put faith in science to invent our 
way around these limits to those who argue that the man-environment 
interface must revert to a symbiotic relationship in which human activities 
enhance Nature’s resilience. Between these two extremes lies a plethora of 
views which have moulded contemporary environmental policy. Sustainable 
development has been heralded as the new development paradigm. 
Although policy makers disagree over the definition of the concept, several 
options emerge as elements of most initiatives to operationalize sustainable 
development.
Conferences and Conservation Strategies
The notion of sustainable development is quite new and the broad support it
now enjoys has developed over the last 20 years. The different conferences
that have been held (and their resulting documents) during this period
mark the evolution of ideas related to how to operationalize the concept.
The Bruntland Report boasts the most recognised definition. This well-
known report defines sustainable development as development that ‘meets
the needs of today without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). Suggestions as to how fife on the
planet will deal with these limitations have varied widely. Lele argues that
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the vagueness in the Bruntland definition is one of the strengths of the 
sustainable development debate (Lele, 1991). By not defining exactly what 
is to be sustained and for how long stakeholders from a range of 
backgrounds have found common ground in the concept.
The UN Conference on the Human Environment, which took place in 
Stockholm in 1972, was the first of the series of conferences that drew the 
world's attention to the environmental costs of industrialisation. Paul 
Erlich’s ‘Population Bomb’ and Rachel Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’ fuelled neo- 
Malthusian fears that provided impetus for the Stockholm conference. 
Focusing on a ‘global crisis’, this conference was widely criticised for its 
doomsday approach. Also, besides deliberate attempts to integrate 
international concerns into its agenda, the Conference was criticised for 
being embedded in a Western construct of environmental issues that had 
little relevance for developing countries (i.e. acid rain, pollution).
Although Stockholm is considered one of the key events in the emergence of 
global environmental concern, it was unable to ground these criticisms and 
fears into a practical guide for policy intervention and global action (Adams,
1990). There was little discussion on the links between poverty and 
environmental degradation nor were the more political aspects of these 
issues addressed. Besides drawing attention to (an albeit limited list of) 
global environmental concerns, Stockholm was also the birthplace for the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the first United Nations 
unit (not agency) created to deal solely with environmental issues. The 
World Conservation Strategy and later the Bruntland Report built on the 
strengths of the Stockholm conference but made some of the same mistakes.
The World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980) prepared by the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) followed eight 
years later and presented a slightly more balanced perspective than its 
predecessor. It intended to show governments, industry and commerce how
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conservation can contribute to development objectives (Adams, 1990). Its 
three main objectives were*
1. To maintain those ecosystems that are 'essential for food production, 
health, and other aspects of human survival and sustainable 
development' (para 2.1), also referred to as life support systems.
2. To preserve of genetic diversity.
3. The sustainable development of species and ecosystems.
These objectives were then broken down into a list of necessary 
requirements (Adams, 1990). Requirements were based on a 'no regrets' 
approach whereby the aim was to retain future options for the use of 
natural resources.
One important element of this document was the fact that it integrated the 
concept of conservation into all areas of the economy (health, energy, 
industry) whereas it had previously existed as a distinct entity divorced 
from reality. In this vein, the WCS focused not only on the ecological 
aspects of sustainability but also how these processes interfaced with 
economic development. In general, the WCS managed to reach a broader 
audience than the Stockholm conference had even though many of its 
fundamental principals were similar. Questions of social justice, inequality 
were touched upon but were deepened in later documents/conferences. The 
document is criticised for focusing on local scale development without giving 
proper weight to the political and economic systems that reinforce issues of 
inequality and environmental degradation. The WCS, though, did recognise 
the need for 'people-centred' development and a wider distribution of the 
benefits. Although the idea of ‘sustainable development’ was introduced in 
this document, it was not until the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) in 1987 that a multidisciplinary group gathered in an 
attempt to operationalize the concept.
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The Bruntland Report aimed to stimulate a multilateral impetus for 
addressing global environmental problems. This document was more 
successful than its predecessors in placing the sustainable development 
debate within the economic and political context of international 
development (Adams, 1990). 'Our Common Future' is often referred to as 
the marriage of environment and development. This was because one of the 
main premises of the document was that environment and development 
cannot be separated (Adams, 1990). Besides reconciling environment and 
development goals, the WCED conference is also known for putting the need 
for people’s participation on the agenda. The report argues that 
environmental concerns need to be seen in relation to the underlying roots 
of poverty and inequality. It was understood that environmental 
degradation was often caused by poverty and inequality but that it could 
also be the source of these problems as well. In this way, the Bruntland 
Report put people at the forefront of any strategy for sustainable 
development.
While the outcome of the WCED was significant because it enjoyed support 
from a wide audience (economists, sociologists, environmentalists, etc.) it 
was not clear how the proposed agenda for action would work in practice for 
achieving sustainable development goals. Its focus on economic growth as 
the solution to environmental degradation left many wondering how this 
could possibly be sustainable (Adams, 1990). Although a rough outline for 
action was defined, it was only later, as a result of the 'Earth Summit', that 
practical guidelines for achieving sustainable development were defined.
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), held in Rio in 1992, was a watershed event in the history of 
international negotiations, laying the foundation for a new global 
partnership to achieve sustainable development. The Earth Summit, as it 
was dubbed, resulted in a number of important conventions and documents 
related to this end, namely, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
33
Framework Convention on Climate Change and Agenda 21. Agenda 21 is 
the forty-chapter action plan emanating from UNCED which analyses and 
provides recommendations across the entire spectrum of environment, 
development and social issues.
Chapter 17 of this document is entirely dedicated to issues related to ocean 
and coastal resource conservation and is one of the longest and most 
complex (UNCED, 1992). This chapter does not however specifically 
address the needs of small-scale fishing communities or their need for and 
potential contribution to marine and coastal zone conservation. On the 
other hand, the chapters related to forest resources stress the need to 
recognise local organisations and their ability to manage their own 
resources. Importantly, these sections formally acknowledged the idea that 
collective ownership of natural resources would not inevitably lead to 
environmental degradation as previously thought. The UNCED meeting 
reinforced the global importance of biodiversity conservation and, for the 
first time, stressed the need to involve local people in conservation 
initiatives. The Earth Summit called for local-level solutions, participatory 
approaches and the development of national strategies that incorporated 
civil society into conservation approaches.
As the Conference proceedings took place in Rio de Janeiro, the Earth 
Summit was an important opportunity for Brazil to improve its 
'environmental' image. In fact, the purpose of hosting a global 
environmental conference in Brazil was, in part, to improve this image. 
During the years preceding the Conference, much attention had been drawn 
to the plight of Brazilian forests and indigenous groups that were paying 
the costs of destructive activities in the Amazon. As much pre-Conference 
attention was drawn to deforestation in Amazonia and its 'victims', the 
Brazilian Government was pressured to take action before the beginning of 
the Conference.
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The Sarney government began with the abolition of some of the subsidies 
and other regulations which encouraged deforestation as well as the 
suspension of large government projects (Kolk, 1998). Later, under the new 
leadership of Fernando Collor, policies towards the future of the Amazon 
region changed from renunciations of foreign interference to a more 
collaborative approach recognising the need for foreign assistance. In this 
vein, Collor signed a programme of co-operation with the G7 countries to 
promote the sustainable development of Amazonia, the Pilot Programme for 
the Protection of Brazilian Rainforests. This was to be the largest ever 
multilateral environmental fund ever granted to a single country. This 
agreement will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
2.2 Protected Areas
An element common to the debates, discussions and strategies for 
conservation (i.e.: Caring for the Earth, World Conservation Strategy) that 
have emerged, is the establishment of protected areas. It is argued that 
National Parks, nature reserves, and biosphere reserves, among other 
protected areas, are the cornerstone of any conservation strategy and a first 
step on the path to sustainable development (Brandon etal, 1998). National 
conservation strategies worldwide are being developed in order to increase 
the percentage of land under these types of arrangements.
Over the past century, conservation approaches have revolved around the 
creation of protected areas. What is expected of them and how they are seen, 
though, has changed greatly. The design of protected areas has evolved 
from the creation of small refuges for particular species to the protection of 
entire ecosystems that are large enough to maintain most, if not all their 
component species. New approaches also call for the need to connect 
isolated parks and reserves to create networks of interrelated conservation 
areas. While other strategies are being pursued simultaneously (agro­
forestry, organic farming, etc.), protected areas remain the cornerstone of all
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conservation strategies aimed at limiting the reduction of the planets 
biodiversity (e.g. World Conservation Strategy, 1980; Caring for the Earth,
1991).
In situ and ex situ conservation
Protected areas are an example of in situ  conservation whereby biological 
diversity is preserved within its natural habitats. It is possible to conserve 
some plants, animals and other genetic resources outside of their mother 
ecosystem. It has been done to a large extent in zoological parks and gene 
banks. This process is called ex situ  conservation. This high-technology 
approach, although useful, is criticised as a replacement for in situ  
conservation largely because of its exorbitant cost and the fact that these 
initiatives run a high risk of loss resulting from technical failure (Lipton, 
1989).
In situ  — or on-site conservation through protected areas such as national 
parks, sanctuaries and reserves has always played an integral part in 
strategies to conserve biodiversity and protect the environmental functions 
that these areas provide (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991; Glowka, 1994). The 
Convention on Biodiversity signed at the Earth Summit in 1992 recognises 
in situ conservation as the primary approach for the conservation of 
biological diversity. The 1980 World Conservation Strategy prescribed 
increasing the total coverage of these areas to ten percent (nearly doubling 
the current coverage) of the world’s land surface to mitigate the rate of 
biodiversity loss. This recommendation is particularly relevant for Brazil as 
their current coverage at approximately 3.8 percent is far below the Latin 
American average (Barbanti, 1994; IUCN etal., 1997).
In the last twenty years, the role of protected areas in conserving and 
protecting environmental services such as the stabilization of water flow 
patterns and climatic change, barriers against weather damage and the 
provision of nurseries for fisheries has grown in recognition. Most of the
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world’s wild plant and animal species depend on the remaining areas of 
land that have managed to avoid large-scale development. Habitat loss and 
degradation are the leading threats to biodiversity. These areas include 
different types of ecosystems such as tropical rainforests, tundras, coral 
reefs and savannahs. Usually species are found within a particular 
ecosystem and have limited geographic ranges. Therefore, the elimination 
of a unique habitat will lead to the irreversible loss of all species and genetic 
resources that are completely dependent on that habitat for their survival. 
Protected areas are seen as the most effective available method of 
maintaining large enough populations of species to ensure the genetic pool 
and physical range necessary for species survival.
Traditional approaches to conservation in the North have emphasised the 
establishment of protected areas that are independent of human 
interference, in the attempt to conserve examples of untouched ecosystems. 
The first formal protected area established, Yellowstone National Park in 
the United States, is often cited as the source of this trend (Diegues, 1998; 
Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997a; Brandon etal., 1998). Yellowstone was 
created in the late nineteenth century and along with others that followed 
in its example, such as game reserves in Africa, it was established mainly 
for recreational purposes (Munasinghe etal., 1994). US conservationists at 
the time maintained that the ‘primitive and natural’ wilderness should be 
preserved untouched (Kothari, 1995).
The 1964 Wilderness Act established a system of protected areas in the 
United States. This legislative framework defined wilderness as 'an area 
where the earth and its community of life are untrammelled by man, where 
man himself is a visitor who does not remain' (in Diegues, 1998- 15). In 
order to maintain this ideal, traditional protected area management 
systems, often dubbed ‘command and control style’ or ‘fences and fines’, 
have used negative incentives for border protection. As their nickname 
suggests, these management systems have gone to extremes to keep people
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separate from nature. By alienating local people, these strategies have 
turned residents into squatters, hunters into poachers, and gatherers into 
trespassers in newly established protected areas.
Interestingly, this 'people out' approach to conservation was not followed in 
Europe where there is a much higher percentage of people-inclusive 
protected areas. The landscape of densely populated Europe went through 
massive transformations centuries ago, leaving most of its larger species 
extinct. As a result, the European concept of a national park is strikingly 
different, including landscapes that have a much stronger human imprint 
and in many cases require human action to be maintained in their present 
shape (Kramer etal., 1997). Approaches to protected areas in the colonial 
world, though, did adhere to the restrictive principals applied to parks in 
the U.S. During the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th, game 
reserves were created in the colonies for the entertainment of European 
expatriates. These reserves excluded traditional African users, limiting the 
use of huge expanses of savannah to a small minority. In this vein, while 
white men were hunters, black men became poachers (Adams, 1990).
Today, there are approximately 8,500 protected areas throughout the world. 
Protected areas exist in 169 countries, covering approximately 7,734,900 
square kilometres or some 5.2 percent of the Earth’s land area. Strictly 
protected areas (national parks, strict nature reserves, natural monuments) 
cover three per cent of the Earth’s surface. Of these areas, 1508 are 
Yellowstone-style national parks (Pimbert, 1995). Of these, the majority 
involves terrestrial areas while marine conservation has lagged behind. 
Most of the world's biota is found in the sea and marine communities are 
subject to a number of potentially adverse influences, including over-fishing, 
habitat disruption and particularly pollution from land-based activities.
Following the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio and the ratification of the 
Biodiversity and Climate Change Convention, developing countries have
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come under increasing pressure to expand areas under protected regimes. 
Because much of the pristine landscape that once covered the West has now 
been commercially exploited, industrialized countries have come to 
recognise the importance of preserving these resources in developing areas. 
Today, most new protected areas are being created in developing countries 
(Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997b). Because of their slower rate of 
industrialisation, among other reasons, vast areas of relatively unexploited 
land still exist in the Southern Hemisphere.
The experience of the West, particularly that of the United States, has often 
been used as a blueprint for setting up protected areas in developing 
countries. It is often argued that, because the context, circumstances, 
resources, historical and cultural experience differ from their northern 
counterparts, this approach in inapplicable and inappropriate and often 
socially unjust when applied to developing countries (Ghimire and Pimbert, 
1997a). It is also argued that solutions require case and context specific 
approaches to protecting the natural capital in developing countries while 
simultaneously supporting and strengthening the ability of local level 
stakeholders to meet their needs now and in the future (Chambers, 1994; 
Diegues, 1999a).
Partly due to the assumption that conservation is the prerogative of natural 
scientists, theories in biological science have dominated the development of 
these types of conservation strategies. Island Biogeography Theory, for 
example, has justified the establishment of centrally planned, ‘people out’ 
parks. This theory contends that islands of representative ecosystems are 
sufficient to preserve viable populations of plant and animal species and 
protect ecosystems. This is because studies have shown that as the area 
involved increases, the number of species present within that area increases 
more slowly (Begon, 1996). This theory is based on the notion of Pleistocene 
refugia where islands of non-frozen habitat held many important species 
during the last ice age. But the reality of these inland or on-shore ‘islands’
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for protected areas negates the security that their oceanic analogy implies. 
Instead of warm tropical waters lapping around their edges, parks are faced 
with threats stemming from the economic, political and societal interactions 
occurring around and often within their borders. Dr. Russell Mittermier, 
president of Conservation International said at a recent meeting in Brazil 
that ‘The reality is that many parks and other protected areas have become 
isolated islands in an ocean of agricultural land or entirely degraded areas’ 
(http 7/forests.lic. wisc.edu/ gopher/brazil/).
2.3 Critique of the dominant paradigm
The characteristics of developing countries, including Brazil, complicate the 
usefulness of this approach even further. While governments do set aside 
areas for conservation, they are usually under tight financial constraints 
and protected areas most often have a tough time fighting for limited funds. 
Countries undergoing strict economic readjustment measures and external 
debt repayment do not place conservation high on the political agenda. 
Often, there are residents already living in areas set aside for conservation 
and there is insufficient funding to provide incentives for relocation or to 
finance resettlement schemes. Limited funds also make command and 
control style management prohibitive. Vast areas, often larger than entire 
countries, are impossible to manage using these traditional management 
strategies8 . Also, vested interests and high earnings from resource 
extraction can put protected area personal in a difficult position to fine 
illegal activities. Minimal technical capacity, weak management and limited 
funds result in isolated protected areas that exist on paper but have had 
little success in protecting natural resources.
It is widely argued that the negative social impacts of traditional 
conservation strategies are reason enough to change course (Chambers,
8 An example of this is the recent establishment of the Amana Reserve in Amazonia that covers 
2,350,000 hectares — 9,180 square miles in an area about the size of Belgium.
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1997; Kothari etal., 1996). As Kothari, a promoter of participatory 
conservation in India states, ‘A protection strategy with alienates local 
communities is unjust to them and disrespectful of their fundamental rights, 
as also short-sighted for conservation.’ Authors assert that while parks may 
see the socio-economic activities taking place in and around their borders as 
a threat to conservation goals, local people often regard the establishment of 
protected areas as a direct threat to their livelihoods.
When protected areas are established, local people are frequently removed 
from their settlements and provided with few or no alternative sources of 
employment or income. Where resettlement provisions are made, they are 
generally insufficient or inappropriate (Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997a). 
Forced resettlement of local residents and alienation from natural resources 
upon which local livelihoods depend are examples of how traditional 
approaches to conservation have been socially unsustainable and how 
protected area planners have ignored the rights of local people and their 
relationship with the resources surrounding them.
Examples of this social exclusion process begin with the alienation of Native 
Americans from their lands during the creation of Yellowstone National 
Park in the 1870s. But they do not stop there, for removing traditional 
residents from their land or restricting access without offering viable 
alternatives in order to create a reserve or park continues to be an 
important issue in protected area creation. Authors arguing for 
participatory conservation defend people’s involvement in conservation by 
saying that rural people deserve to have access to the resources required to 
meet their basic needs, economic safety and where possible, upward social 
mobility. In other words, conservation programmes are only valid and 
sustainable when they have the dual objective of protecting and improving 
local livelihoods and ecological conditions (Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997b).
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An emerging paradigm for conservation and development
Increasingly, conservation programmes are attempting to take an 
alternative approach to local-level conservation. Two broad characteristics 
are common to these initiatives. First, local people are not only considered 
throughout the process but they are often active participants contributing to 
the conservation effort. Second is the idea that conservation areas should 
not be isolated as was once thought essential, but should be interconnected 
with other areas under different management regimes creating a ‘mosaic’ of 
land-use in a given region, with each area contributing to biodiversity 
conservation in differing degrees.
The emerging paradigm seeks to integrate conservation and development 
goals. It is in part a reaction to the criticisms of past approaches and is 
supported by the development of new theories in both the social and natural 
sciences. It recognises that protected areas cannot single-handedly protect 
all the natural processes that they were designed to conserve. It is now 
widely believed that much larger areas are needed to insure a genetic pool 
for species large enough to ward off threats of extinction and for the 
maintenance of other ecological processes (IUCN, 1996,’ Mamiraua, 1996). 
This ‘landscape’ or ‘bio-regional’ approach to conservation depends on the 
involvement and support of the people living in these regions. This new 
paradigm emphasises the need to involve local resource users into 
conservation strategies reconciled with the livelihood strategies of local 
communities, a process labelled ‘productive conservation’ by Hall (1997a). It 
is the result of the recognition that the ability to preserve natural resources 
is inextricably linked to those people who interact with them (Caldecott, 
1996). That is, conservation success is dependent on the ability to meet the 
dual goals of conservation and development. While previous strategies have 
alienated local communities, the new paradigm sees sustainability 
embedded in partnerships with them.
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This is reflected in the policies of international environmental NGOs such 
as The Nature Conservancy (TNC), World Conservation Union (IUCN) and 
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) that have made working in 
partnership with local communities a top priority for biodiversity 
conservation (Brandon etal., 1998; IUCN, 1996).
‘One of the main challenges facing those responsible for protected 
areas is putting the planning and management of protected areas in 
their broader context of regional and environmental planning, in 
particular by looking beyond the boundaries to work with local 
people’ (IUCN, 1996: 3).
The last decade of conservation and social research has provided a number 
of examples of projects with such goals. Figure 2.1 presents examples of the 
different types of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects 
(ICDPs). These include biosphere reserves, multiple use areas, buffer zones 
and large scale planning units.
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects
The view that underlies Integrated Conservation and Development Projects 
was underscored at the 1982 World Parks Congress in Bali — that “protected 
areas in developing countries will survive only insofar that they address 
human concerns” (Western and Pearl, 1989:134). Underlying the Integrated 
Conservation and Development (ICDP) approach is the belief that unless 
resource holders perceive conservation to be in their interests, sustainable 
conservation cannot be achieved (Caldecott, 1996). The challenge is to 
establish a nexus between the interests of resource custodians and the 
objectives of conservation management. The idea is that this may be 
achieved by improving the welfare of resource users through the promotion 
of ecologically sustainable social and economic development. It is necessary 
under these regimes to demonstrate that specific ecosystems, and the fauna
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and flora they contain have tangible economic values that can be 
sustainably utilised to generate productive values for local resource owners. 
Such values will need to be comparable to the income available immediately 
from alternative development.
Clearly, successful examples of ICDPs are few and far between. This is 
partly because the field is relatively new and many projects are too young to 
be evaluated in these terms. Another reason is that ICDPs are intrinsically 
complicated and complex projects. A few examples do stand out in terms of 
their ability to create direct links and incentives for community involvement 
in conservation. They include CAMPFIRE from Zimbabwe where local 
residents co-manage wildlife tourism alongside NGOs and local government 
and share the revenue. Another is community eco-tourism in the 
Annapurna Conservation Area in Nepal where communities share in the 
benefits of conservation through tourism. A variety of projects is also 
emerging in the Brazilian Amazon and Atlantic Rainforest (see the 
following for more details Wells and Brandon, 1992; Lutz etal., 1996; 
Ghimire and Pimbert, 1997b, Hall 1997a).
Those theories that have influenced the development of ICDP initiatives at 
the local level have also put pressure on governments to create conservation 
polices which take the social impacts on conservation into consideration. 
The government of India, through its Joint Forest Management scheme, 
whereby communities share responsibility over forest resources with 
government, is an example of this (Kotari, 1998). Another example is the 
Extractive Reserve category in the Brazilian National System for 
Conservation (SNUC) that incorporates local resources into the design and 
management of these direct use reserves.
There are a number of different types of ICDPs emerging around the world. 
Although they share some characteristics they differ greatly in the degree to 
which communities actually keep or gain control over resources. Some
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ICDPs are often no more than charity given to communities living in or 
around protected areas in the hope that it will provide sufficient incentive 
for them to ‘follow the rules’. These are often unsuccessful and 
unsustainable. Others attempt to go much farther in empowering the 
community by giving control over resources to these groups. These 
collaborative or co-management arrangements are often complicated 
projects. For the most part, these initiatives are still in their early stages 
and there are still many challenges ahead. Some of the different types of 
ICDPs are reviewed in the box below-
Figure 2.1 Examples of integrated conservation and development 
projects
ICDPs are land uses, activities and projects whose primary aim is to 
foster conservation in parks by promoting socio-economic development to 
provide local people with livelihoods that do not threaten the protected 
areas resources. They are based on the premise that management of 
protected areas must reach beyond traditional conservation activities 
inside protected areas to address the needs of local communities outside 
the boundaries (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Some examples are given 
below.
Biosphere reserves first appeared in 1979. They have a protected ‘core 
area’ surrounded by a ‘buffer zone’ and then a ‘transition area.’ Buffer- 
zone uses are limited to activities compatible with the core area while 
development activities involving local communities are intended to take 
place in the transition area. There are approximately 350 biosphere 
reserves worldwide.
Multiple-use areas are intended to sustain the production of water, 
timber, wildlife, pasture, and outdoor recreation. The conservation of 
nature is oriented to supporting economic activities. In some cases, zones 
are delineated to achieve specific conservation objectives. When this 
occurs, multiple-use areas are virtually identical to biosphere reserves, 
except that they lack the official designation. The Annapurna 
Conservation Area in Nepal is such a multiple-use area.
Buffer zones are areas peripheral to a national park or equivalent 
reserve, where restrictions are placed upon resource use or special 
development measures are undertaken to enhance the conservation value 
of the area. In ecological terms, buffer zones promote land uses and 
practices that are compatible with contiguous protected areas.
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Large-scale planning units, such as regional conservation areas, attempt 
to link core protected areas, such as parks, with a progression of land 
uses. Uses compatible with biodiversity conservation, such as managed 
forests, are located next to parks, while less compatible activities (roads, 
dams, urban land uses) are located farther away. The CAMPFIRE project 
in Zimbabwe is an example of this type of initiative.
Source- adapted from (Brandon etal., 1998-94)
2.4 Brazilian Context
The magnitude of Brazilian biodiversity is difficult to grasp. This is true not 
only for those who set eyes upon it 500 years ago but also in modern times. 
With thirty-three eco-regions represented, Brazil is one of the most 
biologically diverse countries on the planet. It is often referred to as a 
country of ‘mega-diversity’. Coastal and Marine biomes alone cover an area 
of about 3.5 million km2, under Brazilian jurisdiction, with cold waters in 
the southern and south-eastern coasts (Argentine zone) and warm waters in 
the eastern, north-eastern and northern coasts. These biomes support a 
wide range of ecosystems that include coral reefs, dunes, wetlands, lagoons, 
estuaries and mangrove swamps. Clearly, with 8,174 km of coastline, 54,000 
km of navigable river systems, the sustainablity of coastal zone 
development is an issue of global importance.
Resource Exploitation in Brazil
With this wealth of natural capital, it is no surprise that, since the onset of 
colonisation over 500 years ago, the exploitation of Brazil’s natural 
resources has been at the forefront of international interest and to national 
development goals. Since the colonial period, these resources have been 
exploited for economic gain at huge environmental cost. The country’s 
colonial history is marked by a series of extractive practices beginning with 
the Pau Brazil or brazilwood trade followed by the extraction of gold, 
minerals and semi-precious stones. After independence, the focus was on 
the boom-and-bust cycles of a variety of mono-crops. With sugar-cane
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plantations in the northeast on a downswing during the late 19th century, 
sights were set on the coffee plantations in the south and southeast and the 
extraction of rubber from the North.
Initially, unrewarded with the precious metals found by the Spanish in 
other areas of the continent, early Portuguese colonisers were unsure of 
what Brazil had to offer the Crown. Brazil's coastal region was the sight of 
most early settlements, since formal development initiatives for Amazonia 
and the other northern states started only in the mid-nineteenth century. 
For the first few hundred years of occupation, brazil wood was the focus of 
extractive operations. The dyes extracted from this native species 
contributed to the riches of the Portuguese crown. In fact, because of its 
value, as well as the fear of French competition, in 1534 the crown declared 
all brazil wood trees royal property. This measure remained in effect for 
over three centuries, probably ending with near extinction of the species and 
the decimation of the Atlantic Rainforest in the process (Dean, 1995).9
Sugar plantations were the first attempt at large-scale agricultural 
production, as opposed to extraction, in the New World. Thanks to a virtual 
monopoly and increasing European demand, these plantations were highly 
profitable. The fertile coastal zone of the Northeast was the main site 
selected for this type of monocrop cultivation that resulted in high rates of 
deforestation in this area. These areas of the coastal zone possess some of 
the most degraded lands of what remains of the Atlantic Rainforest.
The eighteenth-century Brazilian gold and diamond strikes were the most 
important in the colonial New World. From 1700 to 1800 a million 
kilograms of gold were officially recorded along with the extraction of over 
2.4 million carats of diamonds (Dean, 1995). The impacts of these finds
9 It is estimated that only approximately 7% of the original Atlantic Rainforest biome still 
stands. Although the exploitation of brazilwood was not the only cause, it began a process 
that continues today.
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were not limited to the destructive mining activities themselves but, more 
importantly, contributed to the increase in population density. Successful 
mining attracted Portuguese immigrants in search of promised riches. This 
trade also increased the demand for African slave labour.
After Brazil gained independence from Portugal, the country's economy 
became dependent on the cultivation of crops for export to the West. During 
the coffee boom, much of the forested area in the Southeast of the country 
was decimated for the purpose of planting this crop. By the late 1800s 
coffee production provided two-thirds of the country's exports. With the 
abolition of slave labour, immigrants came from all over Europe to work 
these plantations. During this period, over 800,000 European immigrants, 
mostly of Italian decent, came to work on the coffee fazendas primarily in 
the south and southeast. With the onset of global economic decline in the 
post war era, coffee prices plummeted along with the industry.
Another economic boom followed as a result of the earlier discovery of the 
vulcanisation process that turned rubber into an important industrial 
material. Demand for Hevea brasiliensis, coming from estates in the 
Amazon region escalated with the invention of the pneumatic tyre and the 
expansion of the automobile industry in the U.S. during the late 19th and 
early 20th century. However, the rubber boom soon turned sour as cheaper 
and better sources of the material became available on the world market 
principally from estates in Malaysia. The colonial economy, constituted by 
boom-and-bust cycles of exports of agricultural products (especially sugar 
and later coffee and rubber), led to widespread devastation of the forests, 
and especially of the coastal forest. When international prices fell for one 
crop or resource, or if the resource was exhausted, efforts turned to other 
resources, leaving in their path a wake of environmental destruction.
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Resource conservation in Brazil
The question of resource conservation evolved during the post war period 
from utilitarian concerns for the continued viability of commercial 
extraction to preservationism and environmentalism. It was only during 
the first half of the nineteenth century that formal initiatives to regulate 
the exploitation of natural resources occurred. In 1934, Brazil's First 
Conference for the Protection of Nature was organised by the Sociedade dos 
Amigos das Arvores (Society of Friends of the Trees) (Dean, 1995). In the 
same year, the first Hunting and Fishing Law (Codigo de Caga e Pesca), the 
Mining Law (Codigo de Minas), the Waters Law (Codigo das Aguas) and the 
Forest Law (Codigo Florestal) appeared (Diegues, 1998).
At the time, environmental policy here (as abroad) was limited to the 
establishment of protected areas. Specifically, islands of biodiversity were 
‘preserved’ like museum pieces relying on command-and-control methods to 
protect their worth. These methods were characterized by strict vigilance 
and exclusion of human intervention in park areas as well as top-down 
decision-making arrangements. This approach was based to some degree on 
island biogeography theory that relates the abundance of species to the 
relative size of land masses (Dean, 1995). It was believed that by protecting 
these 'islands' a high percentage of the diversity present in the larger 
ecosystem would be preserved.
In this vein, in 1937, Itatiaia in the Serra da Mantiqueira in the
westernmost point of the State of Rio de Janeiro was decreed Brazil's first
national park. Modeled upon the U.S. interpretation of what a parks
purpose should be, Itatiaia was created to encourage scientific research and
offer leisure facilities to urban populations. This park was established by
Article 9 of the Forest Law, approved in 1934, which defined national parks
as 'natural public monuments that perpetuate the primitive forest
composition of those areas of the country which, because of their unique and
outstanding value, are worthy' (Quintao, 1983- 43). It was only fourteen
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years later in 1948 that a second park was created. In September 1944, the 
National Parks Section of the Forest Service was given the responsibility of 
directing, supervising and co-ordinating these parks. Also in this year, the 
objectives of national parks were established. These were to conserve the 
areas under their jurisdiction for scientific, educational, aesthetic and 
recreational ends; to promote the study of the flora, fauna and geology of the 
respective regions and to organise regional museums and herbariums 
(Diegues, 1998).
Most of the National Parks created during this period were established in 
the densely populated south and Southeast of the country. It was only later, 
after agricultural expansion had led to the destruction of large tracts of 
forestland in the North of the country, that protected areas were created 
here. As opposed to early protected areas created for aesthetic and scientific 
reasons, the proposals for the creation of conservation units in the Amazon 
were a reaction to the rapid deforestation in the region and the need for 
protection.
Amazonia
Much of the environmental destruction of the Amazon region during the 
period of military rule was the result of a series of centralised development 
initiatives which focused on the need to consolidate Brazil’s hold on this 
vast and sparsely populated frontier (Hall, 1989). Colonisation programmes 
were developed (and highly subsidised) in order to fulfil a variety of 
geopolitical objectives. Populating the region was seen as a method of 
protecting it from outside military aggression. These schemes were also 
seen as an opportunity to reduce the population pressures of the northeast 
of the country as well as to modernise the region. New technologies were to 
replace those that were regarded as ‘primitive and backwards’ (Hall, 1997a). 
By providing opportunities elsewhere, the government hoped to diffuse the 
agrarian tensions in the south of the country resulting from increased
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mechanization and fewer jobs. It was also believed that these schemes 
could provide a refuge for those fleeing the droughts that plagued the 
Brazilian northeast.
Basing their development approach for the region on ‘growth pole’ theory, it 
was thought that concentrating regional efforts into ‘development poles’ 
would increase employment opportunities and incomes. In 1970 the 
Programme of National Integration (PIN) proposed fifteen development 
poles in Amazonia, investing in a series of high cost road works such as the 
Trans‘Amazon Highway linking the nation’s new capital city Brasilia to the 
northeastern states and to the new frontier, Amazonia. Colonisation 
programmes were developed to attract small farmers searching for land and 
new opportunities. For the most part, settlers faired badly due a number of 
factors such as the poor soil quality of allocated tracts as well as the lack of 
technical and agricultural support as well as weak links to the marketplace 
(see Hall, 1989). The POLO AMAZONIA Programme was an example of this 
where billions of development dollars were spent subsidising highly 
unsustainable development practices such as cattle ranching and logging 
(cattle ranching alone received over $5 billion in subsidies) (Hall, 1997a). 
The combined impacts of unsustainable economic activities such as cattle 
ranching, highway construction as well as large-scale colonisation 
programmes were the driving factors of deforestation of Amazonia during 
the 1980s.
Amazonia reproduced Brazils heavily polarised land ownership structure as 
a result of this development pattern. Conflicts between peasant farmers, 
indigenous groups and cattle-ranchers generated poverty, violence and 
deforestation as well as rapid environmental degradation. Cattle ranching 
together with slash-and-burn agriculture were held responsible for more 
than 80 percent of deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, the remainder 
accounted for by logging and mining (Hall, 1997b).
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It was at the height of the military regime that most conservation areas in 
Brazil were created (Diegues, 1998). These initiatives were highly 
centralised and did not consider the welfare of people who lost access to 
important resources or were even expelled from areas designated for these 
purposes. During this period, protected areas were created by decree, 
leaving little room for civic participation in the process. In fact, government 
control over national territory was seen as a form of broader social control. 
The authoritarian characteristics of the military regime were an obstacle to 
class mobilisation in response to these initiatives as they were not tolerated.
At the time, outside pressure to create protected areas was also coming from 
international development banks (after being criticised themselves for their 
abominable environmental track record exemplified by their funding of 
environmentally destructive projects such as POLONOROESTE). In this 
process, the needs and welfare of local people living in and around these 
areas were not contemplated. In fact, local people were seen as having no 
constructive role to play. During this period, both local populations and the 
environment were seen as obstacles to national development.
Onset of Democracy
With Brazil's gradual return to democracy beginning in the mid-1980s, 
approaches to dealing with the relationship between conservation and 
development began to evolve for a number of reasons. Greater freedom of 
expression created space in civil society enabling the organisation of groups 
empowered with increased political freedom to articulate their demands. A 
critical factor at this point was the international outcry that resulted from 
the death of Chico Mendes. The appearance of socio-environmental 
movements, as we will see later in this section, has had an enormous impact 
on changing traditional assumptions about the role of local resource users in 
protected area planning and management. There has been growing 
international pressure on the Brazilian Government to make their
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conservation approaches more participatory. Much of this pressure 
originated in the debate and resulting documents signed at the 1992 Rio 
Summit which emphasised the importance of local participation in the 
conservation process.
In 1990, the National Environmental Programme was set up with support 
from the World Bank and aimed to strengthen IBAMA (Brazilian 
Environmental Protection Agency) as well as the new state environmental 
agencies. It was officially thought that the decentralisation of 
environmental control from federal to state level would make this process 
more effective. New policies officially recognised for the first time the need 
to promote sustainable forms of natural resource use to benefit local 
populations. Specifically, one type of federal conservation category created 
during this period, the Extractive Reserve category, allows not only for the 
presence of populations within the units boundaries but actually encourages 
permanent occupation by traditional populations. In fact, the creation of a 
protected area falling in this category is only warranted in areas where 
these groups are present.
Other than the extractive reserve category, the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve 
concept has been brought to Brazil providing other possibilities for 
heightened participation in the conservation process. The first created in 
Brazil stretches across a significant part of the Atlantic Rainforest. Because 
it covers such a large area, it requires the co-ordination of many states and 
many more municipalities in order to implement a comprehensive 
management plan. So far, this initiative has not been what many socio- 
environmentalists once hoped it might be as it does not provide for 
significant levels of participation in decision-making or in its management 
structure (Diegues, 1998).
The G7 Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforests (PPG7), 
launched in 1993 and operational in 1995, is providing an important
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impetus for the development of socially sustainable conservation initiatives. 
The specific objectives of the programme are-
'i) to demonstrate the feasibility of harmonising economic and 
environmental objectives in tropical rainforests; ii) to help preserve 
the huge genetic resources of the rainforest; iii) reduce the Amazon's 
contribution to global carbon emissions; and iv) to provide another 
example of co-operation between developed and developing countries 
on global environmental issues' (WB/CEC, 1991-3).
This initiative is embedded in the concept of sustainable development and 
therefore supports activities that aim at conserving the environment 
through development as well as development that does not threaten its 
natural resource base. An example of this effort is the proposal to set up 
five conservation 'corridors'; three in Amazonia and two in the Atlantic 
Rainforest. It is hoped that this bioregional strategy will help conserve 
larger areas under a wider variety of protected regimes.
Today, there are eighty-four federal indirect use10 conservation units in 
Brazil (national parks, biological reserves, ecological reserves and ecological 
stations), covering approximately 1.85 percent of the country. This 
represents a paltry figure in comparison with the world average of six 
percent. It is estimated that of these, 36 percent are occupied by humans 
(51 percent of National Parks, 26 percent of Biological Reserves and 28 
percent of Ecological Stations) (Barbanti, 1994). Most funding goes to the 
indirect use protected areas with direct use protected areas such as 
extractive reserves and APAs11 receiving very little. From 1989 to 1997, 
only two indirect use protected areas were created. During this period, the
10 Indirect use conservation units are those whose benefits (such as species conservation, 
watershed protection etc.) can only be consumed indirectly. This type of reserve differs 
from direct use conservation units. Direct use conservation units are those which allow for 
the sustainable use of resources within the reserve. For example, in the case of a marine 
reserve, direct use could allow for fishing to take place within the reserve boundaries.
11 Environmental Protection Area (Area de Protecao Ambiental)
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ability of the federal government to manage these areas has diminished. 
This is partly because of the lack of funds available for IBAMA to carry out 
its mission. With only one employee for each 370 km2 of protected area 
along with a general lack of infrastructure and equipment, IBAMA does not 
have the means to command and control the borders of its protected areas, 
much less build educational/informational centres and other necessary park 
infrastructure (Barbanti, 1994).
2.5 Emerging trends in conservation in Brazil
A new conservation paradigm is emerging in Brazil which goes beyond 
crude protectionism and which offers alternatives to past approaches. 
Command-and’control style monitoring is slowly being recognised as 
important but insufficient on its own for controlling environmental 
degradation (Hall, 1997a). It is also becoming clear that U.S.-style parks 
require U.S.-style budgets, something that developing countries, including 
Brazil, do not have. The environmental debate has broadened here to a 
large degree to include the potential for integrating local people into 
conservation planning. This controversial debate is beginning to bring in 
the experience of sociologists to a field that was monopolised by natural 
scientists.
Over the last ten years, there has been an increase in attention given to the 
social impacts of the creation of conservation units. This is partly a result of 
a process of mobilisation by forest dwellers to protect their livelihoods from 
predatorial encroachment as well as a realisation by parties interested in 
setting up conservation units that the financial costs of excluding local 
people are prohibitive and the resulting social costs unjustifiable. This is 
particularly so as local people, instead of being seen as the cause of 
environmental damage, are under certain circumstances being considered 
as potentially the best stewards of the environmental resources upon which 
their livelihoods depend.
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The rubber-tappers of Amazonia, for instance, are probably the best known 
example of environmental grassroots action in Brazil. During the 1980s, 
through peaceful means and through civil organisations, this group 
managed to draw international attention to destructive development 
policies that were not only environmentally unsound but also socially unjust. 
The result was the creation of a new category of conservation unit, the 
Extractive Reserve. Details of the evolution of this category and how it has 
developed and been adapted to different settings will be discussed in later 
sections.
Also in Amazonia is the Mamiraua Sustainable Development Reserve. 
Initially, those working towards the creation of this reserve thought that it 
should be categorised as a federal level Ecological Station. The implication 
of establishing a reserve under a category that does not allow direct use by 
local resource users would be that the area’s resident community would 
have to be resettled. After years of living and working in the area these 
same conservationists realised that if they were to remove all inhabitants, 
in a few years the conservation unit would be defunct. Not only did they 
consider resettlement to be socially unjust but also politically unfeasible 
(Mamiraua, 1996). As there were no suitable federal level conservation 
categories, they lobbied for the creation of a new state-level category called a 
‘Sustainable Development Reserve’. Both the battle of the rubber-tappers 
for legal protection of their lands and livelihoods, as well as the need for 
researchers setting up Mamiraua to create a new category to fit their needs, 
are clear examples of indicators that the old system was not effectively 
addressing the conservation needs of society.
SNUC
The issue of redesigning and consolidating the Brazilian protected area 
framework is extremely relevant today. The debate and discussion of what
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changes should be made and what form this new system would take has 
been on going since 1992. The process has culminated in the passing by 
Congress in July 2000 of the long awaited National System of Conservation 
Units (Law no. 2.892/92) that created the Sistema Nacional de Unidades de 
Conservagao (SNUC). This process was, in part, a reaction to the 
frustration felt by researchers, local communities and policy makers to the 
rigidity and top-down approach taken by the earlier framework. It was also 
a sign that the earlier model did not correspond to the complex and dynamic 
realities on the ground that refused to fit into the categories established 
under previous legislation.
Since 1992, policy makers, academics, representatives of non-governmental 
organisations and international donors have been debating what a new 
system should look like. Much of this debate has revolved around the issue 
of the presence of human populations living within the boarders of protected 
areas (BRAZIL, 1996). This issue is one that has been of increasing 
relevance to other developing countries grappling with the same U.S. policy 
legacy (i.e. Zimbabwe and India12) and was highlighted in the 1992 IUCN 
Conservation Congress appropriately titled 'People and Parks'. In both the 
Brazilian and international context, criticisms of approaches to conservation 
included being socially unsustainable, highly centralised and financially 
non-viable.
Although many of those who participated in the discussions leading up to 
the creation of the new framework did not feel that it went far enough, it is 
clear that the new SNUC does provide much greater opportunities for 
community involvement than before. One of its main objectives is its 
commitment to the protection of the resources upon which some
12 Both Zimbabwe and India's protected areas systems were criticised as been socially 
unjust and financially unfeasible. Recently, both have developed alternatives to 'people out' 
parks. In India, this takes the form of Joint Forest Management whereby villages co­
operate with forest police to manage forest resources. In Zimbabwe, the co-operative 
management of big game rangelands has contributed to the national income as well as to 
the local economy.
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communities depend. Specifically, this objective calls for the ‘protection of 
those natural resources necessary for the livelihoods of traditional 
populations, respecting and valuing their local knowledge and culture, 
promoting them socially and economically.’ Article 5 of the document 
underscores the importance of community participation on a number of line 
items. It calls for encouraging the involvement of NGOs in providing help 
and support to conservation units as well as providing incentives for local 
populations to manage reserves themselves. Article 25 addresses the need 
to create 'biological corridors' interconnecting the different reserves in the 
hopes of creating mosaics of different levels of protection as promoting 
community involvement in these initiatives.
The new SNUC divides the different categories of protected areas into two 
groups  ^‘total protection’ and ‘sustainable use’. The total protection grouping 
which does not permit direct use of the protected areas resources was not 
significantly altered in the new framework. The sustainable use group 
gained two new conservation categories: Sustainable Development Reserves 
(RDS) and Private Reserves of National Patrimony (RPPN). Both the new 
groups involve the decentralisation of conservation efforts. Also, because 
many of the total protection areas are occupied by human settlements, time 
limitations were given to managers of protected areas to either find ways of 
addressing this situation or changing the type of protection regime the area 
is under. For example, a National Park unable to accommodate local 
residents could be required to change its status to that of a Sustainable 
Development Reserve.
2.6 Brazilian Fisheries Policy
Brazil’s approach to coastal zone and marine conservation has many
parallels with their approach to forests and other terrestrial resources that
have been degraded in the wake of unsustainable economic development.
Brazilian fishery policy has consistently supported capital intensive
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industrial fishing fleets while overlooking the significant contribution that 
artisanal fishing provides. This contribution relates to their respective share 
of the total Brazilian catch, job creation, livelihood security and their role in 
protecting fish stocks. As a result of this lack of support, artisanal or small* 
scale fishers are less and less able to provide these goods in the face of 
growing threats to their well being. Specifically, industrial fishing, tourism 
development and accompanying land speculation along with pollution from 
heavy industry and the establishment of ‘people out’ protected areas have 
put the future of these traditional populations at risk.
Before colonisation, fishing had already been highly developed by 
indigenous populations. The shell piles of the sambaquiana communities13 
that dot the coastal zone in the south and south east, along with the dugout 
canoes and rafts (still) used in the north and Northeast are proof of these 
developments. In some areas, where indigenous populations still exist, 
these practices continue much in the way they did before the onset of 
colonization. The process of colonization that attracted immigrants from 
four continents resulted not only in the genetic miscegenation process Brazil 
is so famous for but also cultural miscegenation. Indigenous practices were, 
over time, complemented by or absorbed by the practices of migrant fishers 
(and non-fishers) from all over the world. Each of these groups adapted to 
different sets of environmental circumstances. Over time, these isolated 
communities developed into communities which no longer had distinctly 
European characteristics nor indigenous ones. Caicaras (of the south and 
south east) the jangadeiros (of the Northeast), the caboclos and ribeirinhos 
(of the inland river systems in the North) are examples of non*indigenous
13 Sambaquiana communities are some of the earliest recorded along the Brazilian 
coastline. Their livelihoods were based primarily on the collection of molluscs. Piles of 
shells found along the coast are all that remain of these groups that inhabited the region 
between 5520 and 120 BC (Moreira, 1992).
59
traditional fishing societies that have developed in Brazilian coastal zones 
over the last 500 years14 (Diegues, 1999b).
Traditional/Artisanal fishing
These indigenous and traditional communities make up a large portion of 
the artisanal or pre-industrial fishing practices. They have small crafts 
(such as rafts or dugout canoes), use simple technology that often has not 
changed for some time, and have intimate knowledge of their surroundings 
and seasonal changes with belief systems often adapted to the conservation 
of special areas. Frequently, they depend on forest resources to enable them 
to take advantage of those of the sea. Their simple boats, rods, masts, even 
nets are made from local terrestrial resources. It is not uncommon that over 
time, local management regimes have developed that dictate when, by 
whom and where both sea and terrestrial resources can be used (Diegues, 
1983).
Kinship ties and a sense of local identity are often important factors in the 
lives of these groups. They are not limited to hunting certain species and 
often change strategies throughout the year in order to benefit from the 
seasonal availability of different species. Another characteristic of these 
groups is their limited capital accumulation. Traditional fishing 
communities in Brazil are integrated into the market system to differing 
degrees. They are not necessarily subsistence fishers but their limited 
extraction methods and low population density make their practices 
generally sustainable. Their contribution to Brazil's production is significant. 
From the 1950s, artisanal fishing has provided between 40 and 70 percent 
of the country's total catch (Diegues, 1997).
14 Others include the Acorianos, descendants of the Portuguese fishers from the Azores 
islands that settled primarily in the South, the Pantaneiros that exploit the riches of 
Pantanal floodplains, the Varjeiros (non amazonian river people), and the Pescadores or 
fishers who use many different strategies to exploit marine resources in wetlands all over 
Brazil (Diegues, 1999a).
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Industrial Fishing
Industrial fishers differ greatly from their traditional counterparts in a 
number of ways. As their name suggests, they are dependent on much more 
capital-intensive technology. Their large refrigerated hulls can travel for 
weeks, sometimes months to waters far away from the home of the crew on 
board. They are usually after specific species (sardines, ocean shrimp) and 
often catch others in the process which are discarded as waste. Although 
they are criticised for their wasteful practices they have nevertheless 
received the lion's share of government support. Because of their need to be 
near the market place, this type of fishing is usually associated with urban 
areas that have the necessary infrastructure in place for processing and 
marketing. All their catch is commercialised and crew is usually paid in 
wages as opposed to a share of the catch.
2.7 Evolution of Policy Approaches
Until the beginning of the 20th century, fisheries policy in Brazil only 
addressed issues relating to industrial fishing activities, leaving artisanal 
fishers to fend for themselves. The evolution of fisheries policy in Brazil can 
be divided into three main phases,* the preindustrial phase (1500 - 1962), the 
industrial phase (1962 - 1990), and the regulated use phase (1990 - present). 
These phases represent not only technological changes which took place to 
exploit fishing resources but the policies which encouraged and supported 
those changes. The pre-industrial phase lasted until 1962 when SUDEPE15 
was created. For the most part, fishing activities during this period were 
characterised by subsistence fishers using low levels of technology to extract 
amounts that were largely uncommercialized. The earliest legal acts related 
to fishing appeared in the early 17th century. Fishing policy during this 
period focused on the whaling industry and the earliest laws passed in this 
sector are associated with it. The first of these appeared in 1602 providing
15 Superintendenia do Desenvolvimento da Pesca/Superintendency for Fishing 
Development
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whaling rights to the Portuguese (Menezes, nd). Other laws appeared only 
150 years later and were related to the importation of salt for the purpose of 
conserving fish for export.
Until the mid-1880s, the fishing industry was closely tied to Portugal. Most 
of the commercial fishers themselves were Portuguese as well as the fleet. 
Many came from fishing villages in the north of the country and from the 
Algarve with others coming from the Azores and Madeira archipelagos. The 
whaling industry is the oldest industrial fishing practice in Brazil and was 
the first to be regulated. Originating in the colonial period, whale fishing 
was dominated by Portuguese immigrants who brought their fishing 
techniques from the Azores, Madeira and the European continent. It was 
only in 1856 that the first steps were taken to nationalise the industry, 
when it became illegal for slaves or foreigners to make up more than one 
fifth of any crew (Menezes, nd). In 1897 law No. 478 nationalised all 
maritime activities in Brazilian waters.
Regulatory institutions for the newly nationalised fishing industry emerged 
much later. The Inspectoria de Pesca was created at the beginning of the 
century and during the same period, the Navy began its involvement with 
the nation's fishers and their crafts. Specifically, in this year, a programme 
called Pesca e Saneamento do Litoral (Fishing and Coastline Sanitation) 
was established by the Navy which required fishers to be registered with 
them as well as obliging them to participate in the national system of 
fishing Colonies (Guilietti and Assumpcao, 1995). This was the first 
attempt to organise Brazilian fishers, locally and nationally. Fishers 
working along the extensive Brazilian coastline, along with those living 
inland on the countries vast river networks, were seen as living on the 
periphery of national life. For the most part, they were thought of as 
disorganized groups which did not contribute much to the nation and were 
in need of being consolidated and controlled.
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The solution to this was to establish the Colonias or fishermen's guilds that 
would, through their multi-level network, organise and control the 
dispersed fishers. All fishers had to become members of their local chapter. 
The Colonias were created as the local chapters of the national fishermen's 
guild established by federal law just before World War I in 1912 (Breton, 
1994). They are administered at the state level by the Federagao de 
Pescadores (Federation of Fishermen) and at the national level by the 
Confederagao dos Pescadores (Confederation of Fishermen). The Colonias 
were created with the purpose 'of uniting fishers through fraternal 
solidarity promoting instruction, mutual aid and the prosperity of their 
associates and their families’ (Menezes, nd).
There was strong State intervention in the fisheries sector before the 
consolidation of capitalism. As in other sectors in Brazil, the motives 
behind the establishment of the Colonia were finked to political needs 
related to the protection of national territory, the reduction of class conflict 
and the consolidation of Brazilian nationalism. In other words, the Colonia 
system was more concerned with controlling people than with protecting 
coastal resources and the populations that depend on them. The 
centralising model of the time virtually excluded any possible participation 
of civil society (namely fishers and their local organisations), consolidating 
distortions and favouritism which still exist.
The Federal decree that created these guilds also states the importance of 
the fishers as the nations' coast guards, to help 'the marines during times of 
peace and war’ (Menezes, nd). Fishers were to make up a reserve army to 
be called upon to protect the national territory should it be attacked from 
the sea. By organising this group, the fishermen's guilds were also to serve 
as educational centres aiming at improving the sense of 'citizenship' among 
fishers and at making them participate more actively in national fife 
(Breton, 1994). Diegues and Silva (1992) suggest that these measures were 
also taken to control fishermen's rebellions sparked by the military draft. It
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was thought that by organising them into guilds, they would not be able to 
organise themselves against the government. It was only after the signing 
of the new Constitution of 1988 that fishers were allowed to organise their 
own free associations (Diegues, 1995).
During the next few decades, fisheries policy was tossed from one 
organisation to another. From 1933 to 1962, responsibility for fisheries 
went from the Inspectoria de Caga e Pesca (Hunting and Fishing 
Inspectorate) which was changed to the Servico de Caga e Pesca (Hunting 
and Fishing Service) and then to the Divisao de Caga e Pesca (Hunting and 
Fishing Division) within the newly created Department of Agriculture 
(Guilietti and Assumpcao, 1995). In 1962, SUDEPE (the Superintendencia 
do Desenvolvimento da Pesca)16 was created marking the beginning of the 
second phase of Brazilian fisheries policy. Although not a ministry in itself, 
during this period it was the institution responsible for planning and 
executing programmes for the development of the fisheries sector, as well as 
supervising, inspecting and controlling exploration and exploitation of 
resources. This phase was characterised by massive subsidies for industrial 
fishers and the marginalization of artisanal fishing groups.
The objectives of SUDEPE were to apply the Fishing Code and other 
legislation related to fishing activities or resources and to provide assistance 
to fishers in solving socio-economic problems (Menezes, nd). At this point, 
apart from a limited number of measures passed to control the whaling 
industry, fisheries policy still did not place any real emphasis on conserving 
fish stocks. Its main concern was short-term gain at whatever cost. The 
distribution of public resources spent in this sector illustrates the distorted 
policies of the time. From 1967 to 1972, 51 percent of resources were 
invested in the industry itself, 20 percent on the catch, seven percent on 
commercialisation and 13 percent on administration. During this period, no
16 Superintendency for Fisheries Development
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funds were allocated for research and data gathering of fish stocks (Giulietti 
and Assumpacao, 1995).
During the SUDEPE administration, the balance of power between 
commercial and artisanal fishers became even more distorted. Under this 
administration, the prevalent approach was to modernise the fishery sector 
by prioritising the development of the industrial sector. In fact, it was 
during this period that the industrial fishing sector expanded the most. 
SUDEPE was characterised by its highly centralised structure, lack of co­
ordination with other agencies and organisations working in this sector, 
along with its inefficiency in carrying out its mandate and its legacy of 
favouritism towards industrial fishing practices. During this period, 
industrial fishers gained access to loans through the BNDE, Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Economico (National Bank of Economic Development). 
Another boon to industrial fishing came in the form of government subsidies, 
including such measures as massive income and import tax breaks. In a 
short period, the balance of the contribution to total catch of artisanal to 
industrial fishing began to change.
In 1973, PESCART (Plan of Assistance for Artisanal Fisheries) was created 
to ‘compensate’ artisanal fishers for losses experienced during the previous 
decade. The plan was based on encouraging small-scale fishers to 
modernise their technology as well as to get them out of the grips of 
controlling middlemen. At the core of this new strategy was the 
introduction of technical assistance to fishers which was mainly comprised 
of new techniques for catching and processing the fish. Often, these 
techniques (along with the technical ’experts') were out of touch with the 
local situation and needs of small-scale fishers. Many were unnecessary or 
poorly designed since those providing technical assistance assumed that 
they had all the answers. Boats were built for fishers in inappropriate sizes 
based on loans that, given the potential earnings could never have been
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repaid. The policy failed to support artisanal fishers or to achieve its other 
goals.
In 1990, SUDEPE was closed down and the responsibility for fisheries 
resources was passed to the newly created IBAMA (Instituto Brasileiro do 
Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais e Renovaveis).17 This change-over 
of responsibility marked the first time that control over fisheries policy had 
been given to an agency whose primary stated objective was resource 
conservation and sustainable use of these resources as opposed to 
exploitation for short-term gain. In the second half of 1998, the Department 
of Fisheries and Aquaculture was created under the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Some functions such as monitoring and enforcement continue to be under 
the jurisdiction of IBAMA. This third phase, the phase that characterises 
Brazilian fisheries management today, faces many challenges. Financial 
limitations constrain the organisation’s activities while industrial fishers 
still receive the Ron’s share of government support and subsidies. It is also 
unclear was the strategy of the new ministry will be as it is still very young.
Coastal Zone Protected Areas
In the past, there was no attempt to approach ocean resources as whole 
systems. Marine resources were considered solely for their economic 
potential through the capture of specific species. Although there is now a 
greater consciousness that marine resource conservation cannot be looked at 
only in terms of the available stocks of a few commercialised species (such 
as whales, starting as far back as the 1930's, sardine, shrimp and lobster) 
protected areas in this sector are still seen as conflicting, even mutually 
exclusive with fisheries regulation. Marine conservation areas in Brazil 
have been built on these assumptions. In fact, coastal zone protected areas 
have some of the most rigid management regimes of all protected areas in
17 Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Resources
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the country. Many were created on sparsely inhabited islands for the 
purpose of preserving the area's natural beauty, the biodiversity and for 
encouraging scientific research. Other marine conservation initiatives focus 
on the protection of single species, usually aquatic mammals such as 
dolphins, whales and manatees.
Fernando de Noronha, an archipelago off Brazil’s northeastern coast, was 
one of the first marine areas to be transformed into a national park to serve 
these purposes. The archipelago has been a military base for the 
Portuguese, French, Dutch, and even the Americans. It was also a prison at 
one point. The management regime in place now in the area is not so 
different than in the past. The military helps to monitor the island, only a 
select few tourists are allowed to visit at any one time, and very few fishing 
activities are permitted for the small community living on the island. For 
its size, relative to the national average, it has an exceptional number of 
guards and IBAMA representatives as well as environmental education 
programmes funded by international NGOs to service the ecotourists, who 
pay an ‘environmental tax’ of 10 £ per day.
All too often, the first step in setting up National Parks is to expel fishers 
from their traditional fishing grounds. To non-fishers, open water is 
seamless. No 'land marks' or points of reference are visible, just open water. 
Small-scale fishers see these resources very differently. They often use 
underwater markings or triangulation with points on land to demarcate 
fishing grounds. When parks are created, these groups, along with this 
local knowledge, are left out of the process. Cordell (1983:11) argues that 
artisanal fishers are marginalized, isolated and powerless:
‘Marginality of the sort that plagues traditional small-boat fishing 
peoples in Brazil has its sources in more than spatial and cultural 
isolation, comparatively low earnings from less capital intensive 
fisheries and competing interests. It also stems from a whole
67
complex of prejudiced perceptions and classifications related to the 
nature of the fishery as a resource, inshore seas, tropics and perhaps 
the sea itself as contrasted with the land.’
Terrestrial conservation areas created to protect coastal ecosystems, such as 
the Atlantic Rainforest, have often limited the access of traditional fishing 
populations to important forest resources (Diegues, 1997). The coastal zone 
is the most populated region of Brazil. As a result, it is also the most 
degraded region in the country. Levels of depredation, though, vary 
throughout the coast with some areas being remarkably healthier than 
others. In many cases, this relative health is the result of the sustainable 
management of resources over time by local populations. Ironically, when 
protected area sites are chosen, it is often these areas that are selected and 
these social groups that are sidelined in the process.
Apart from falling prey to industrial fishers and the establishment of 
conservation areas, these villages and remote beaches that provide the basis 
for artisanal fishing activities are often degraded by the expansion of 
tourism. Until recently, coastal tourism was characterised by 
families/individuals who had homes in these villages and would come only 
during the summer months. Now, tourism includes people coming from 
greater distances, staying shorter periods and requiring temporary 
infrastructure (hotels, hostels, and restaurants) that the previous type of 
tourism did not demand. These activities have environmental, social and 
cultural impacts that are difficult to control.
Fishers movements and organisations
Small-scale fishers in Brazil have only recently begun to organise 
themselves in order to influence the policies and processes that affect their 
livelihoods. These struggles have largely come from fishers in the Brazilian 
Northeast in response to industrial pollution from sugarcane processing
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plants as well as industrial fishing activities invading traditional fishing 
grounds. In addition, fishers from the Northeast have also been struggling 
to regain control over the fishing guilds that were often controlled by 
businessmen, politicians and other powerful non-fishers (Diegues and Silva, 
1992).
These struggles contributed to the reversal of the legislation that restricted 
the free association of fishers in the 1988 constitution. They have also 
resulted, with the help of the Catholic Church, in the formation of the 
Pastoral dos Pescadores18, as well as the formation of the National 
Movement of Fishers (MONAPE ■ Movimento Nacional dos Pescadores). 
These efforts are intrinsically tied to conservation and the protection of the 
heath of ecosystems upon which artisanal fishers depend. A meeting of the 
MONAPE in Juazeiro in the state of Bahia in 1990 fuelled the creation of a 
series of statements, denouncements and demands that were subsequently 
sent with their representative to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. This 
document denounced the process of degradation taking place on the marine 
and inland water systems as a result of land speculation, industrial 
pollution, development projects and conservation areas. Specifically, the 
document asked that ‘artisanal fishers and their representatives participate 
in the elaboration of policies and monitoring activities as well as in the 
conservation of natural resources’ (in Diegues, 1992b: 27). MONAPE does 
not accept the premise that it is possible to protect the coastal environment 
without the participation of artisanal fishers.
As a result of the collective action of the rubber*tappers before them, 
coupled with demands from the fishers themselves, traditional fishing 
communities are now gaining the opportunity to collaboratively manage 
their resources with the help of IBAMA. After the extractive reserves were
18 Pastoral dos Pescadores is one of the many Pastorais which developed in the 70s and 80s 
based on Liberation Theology and Freirian principles of raising the awareness of 
marginalized groups.
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created in Amazonia, IBAMA established a department within the 
organisation dedicated to these direct use protected areas and to expand 
them into other regions. This arm of IBAMA is called CNPT (Centro 
Nacional para o Desenvolvimento Sustentado de Populates Traditionais) or 
Centre for the Sustainable Development of Traditional Populations. Along 
with extending areas under RESEX regimes to include other areas in the 
north of the country, new efforts include bringing the Extractive Reserve 
concept to aquatic areas.
In this vein, an Extractive Reserve was created in the state of Santa 
Catarina in the Pirajubae estuary followed by the first Maritime (open 
water) Extrative Reserve established in the state of Rio de Janeiro in the 
Municipality of Arraial do Caho (site selected as the case study used in this 
thesis). Apart from these, there are ambitious plans to extend the maritime 
reserve network throughout the Brazilian coastline. Although not yet 
formally established, many coastal communities are going through the 
initial steps of formalising their proposals to the government (with the 
encouragement of CNPT staff) to bring the concept to their areas. CNPT is 
still the black sheep in the IBAMA family as other departments within the 
organisation are not as convinced by the potential of the Extractive 
Reserves (RESEX).
2.8 Summary and conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the reader with a general
understanding of the evolution of policy approaches to conservation
internationally as well as in Brazil. The chapter was broken down into
three sections,* global conservation policy, Brazilian conservation policy and
finally Brazilian fisheries policy. The chapter began with a description of
some of the key conferences and documents that have influenced the global
trend towards more decentralised and participatory conservation efforts. It
also presented a brief history of conventional approaches to conservation
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with a critique of these approaches as well as examples of efforts that 
reconcile both nature conservation and livelihood maintenance. The chapter 
then brought the focus down to the national level and discussed the 
evolution of the man/environment nexus in Brazil. An element of this 
section concentrated on the events over the last thirty years in Amazonia in 
which grassroots environmental action successfully influenced government 
policy to make conservation and development efforts in Amazonia more 
socially sustainable.
The final section of this chapter discussed trends in Brazilian fisheries 
policy. Only in the last ten years have marine resources in Brazil been 
managed by an organisation whose officially stated aim is to conserve the 
natural environment (IBAMA). Prior to this, massive subsidies benefiting 
industrial fishers along with minimal regulation resulted in the 
marginalization of traditional fishing communities whose small-scale 
fishing activities have depended on these resources for centuries. Although 
many obstacles still exist, there is beginning to be some hope for 
government support for traditional fishing communities through the 
creation of Extractive Marine Reserves. These reserves are the focus of this 
thesis and will be described in more detail in later chapters. The following 
chapter on Social Theory and Environmental Management will discuss the 
theoretical underpinnings of conventional approaches to conservation 
discussed above.
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Chapter 3 Social Theory and Environm ental 
M anagem ent
This chapter will provide an overview of developments in several branches 
of social theory relevant to environmental management. It will include a 
discussion of factors that have influenced conventional environmental 
policies, which tend to be socially exclusionary towards traditional resource 
users. The chapter will then look at the circumstances under which local 
communities have become active participants in the process of natural 
resource conservation. It will also review the factors identified thus far that 
are common to successful common property management regimes. Lastly, 
this chapter will explore in depth some of the fundamental concepts 
associated with alternative strategies' community, social capital and 
participation.
Policy approaches to the management of natural resources, in Brazil and
beyond, have been based on either the privatisation of resources or
centralised management by government. These strategies have been
anchored in theories that have led policy-makers to believe that these are
the only options available for successful resource management. In practice,
the last decades of global environmental decay and growing social costs of
conventional approaches have demonstrated that alternatives must be
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sought. In terms of relevant theory, academics around the globe have 
documented a wealth of experiences that contest the fatalistic premises 
upon which most current strategies have been based. On-going analysis of 
these experiences have led to a growing belief that there are other policy 
and strategy options that may be more appropriate and effective, especially 
for the management of resources at the local or community level. These 
arrangements are often referred to as common property or common pool 
resource regimes.
3.1 Common Property (common-pool) Resources
Around the world, in almost every culture and context, there are examples 
of communities that collectively manage their natural resource base (Ghai 
and Vivian, 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Berkes and 
Folke, 1998; Folke etal., 1996). Traditional knowledge of local ecological 
systems coupled with appropriate social structures have resulted in a 
wealth of cases where communities conserve and in some cases enhance 
their local resource base (Leach etal., 1996). Examples of these can be found 
in the traditional raft fishing communities in the northeast of Brazil where 
these groups have created physical and social maps of their fishing grounds 
using triangulation and other novel techniques to ensure reliability (Kottak, 
1979). Such systems assist in the monitoring and management of these 
areas. These arrangements are not restricted to fishing though and can be 
found in the community management of forests in India and elsewhere. 
Some examples, like that of the Brazilian fisheries, are relatively new while 
others, such as the Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines which 
manage water resources are centuries old (Ostrom, 1990-82).
It is most often poorer groups in society that depend on communal resources
for their livelihoods. Some estimates suggest that in India, over thirty
percent of household resources come from these types of arrangements
(Chambers, 1997). Until recently, communal arrangements established over
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time for the purpose of defining access and use rights to property at the 
local level were largely ignored. In general, it can be said that little value 
has been placed on communities that have developed management systems 
embedded in their own environmental and social context.
Resources under collective use are referred to as common property or 
common-pool resources. The institutions that often manage these resources 
are called common property management regimes. Some trace their roots 
back a thousand years or more while others are relatively new. These 
communal management systems are distinct from conventional approaches 
not only in that they are indigenously defined and constructed but also 
because ownership, in most cases informal, is based on a group as opposed 
to individual or government control. Given the relative failure of 
conventional approaches along with the growing popularity of 'sustainable 
development', the recognition for the need of a more people-centred 
approach to conservation is drawing international attention to these locally 
developed management regimes.
The ‘tragedy of the commons’
The previous chapter presented the evolution of policy approaches for 
resource conservation. It reviewed the centralising nature of approaches 
used in the West as well as the influence of these models on conservation 
strategies used in Brazilian marine conservation. These policies are rooted 
in theories that rule out the possibility of successful group ownership and 
management and are highly pessimistic about the potential contribution of 
user group participation. Specifically, Garett Hardin's 1968 controversial 
article on the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ followed by Mancur Olsen’s ‘logic of 
collective action’ and the 'prisoners dilemma game' presented by Dawes 
(1977) have laid the foundation for serious scepticism about the capacity of 
groups to forgo short-term personal benefit to ensure long-term collective 
gain in resource management.
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The ’commons' comprise natural resources such as forests, flowing irrigation 
waters, pasturelands and fisheries. They can also be specific resources 
found within a given area such as lobsters or a specific type of tree. 
Common property resources can have a fixed location or they can be a 
'fugitive' resource such as fish (Oakerson, 1992). What differentiates them 
from other types of property is that they are not owned by individuals but 
rather by groups, such as fishers. Important distinctions exist between 
common property and open access. Common property is shared property 
(res communis) whereas open access refers to a situation in which there are 
no legal property rights (res nullius). A characteristic of these types of goods 
is that it is difficult in practice to exclude 'non-owners' from using them. The 
commons (shared property) has become synonymous with resource 
destruction. Based on the theories presented below, many policy-makers 
have come to believe that resources held in common are inevitably subject to 
over exploitation and degradation.
Hardin's article presents a scenario in which the rational actions of herders 
sharing a field ultimately leads to pasture degradation (through over 
grazing) and sub-optimal outcomes for all of those involved. ‘Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest 
in a society that believes in freedom in the commons...freedom in the 
commons brings ruin to all’ (Hardin, 1968- 1,244). Given this, Hardin 
predicts that a Leviathan or centralised management structure is necessary 
for groups to escape the 'tragedy'. This scenario was later formalised as the 
'prisoner’s dilemma game'. In this model, players are expressly prohibited 
from communicating and are unaware of how their counterparts will behave. 
Given this, the dominant or most likely results of the game will be sub- 
optimal (just like the fate of Hardin's herders). In fact, the 'rational' or 
dominant strategy (given the constraints) leads players to choose the third 
best possible outcome. ‘The logic of collective action', developed by Mancur 
Olsen (1965) is the third document which greatly influenced the depressing
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outlook adopted towards the feasibility of individuals achieving collective 
goals. Olsen was also convinced tha t 'rational, self interested individuals 
will not achieve their common or group interests,' (Olsen, 1965-2). In each 
of these models, individually rational decisions lead to collectively irrational 
outcomes.
At the root of all three models is what has come to be understood as the 'free 
rider' problem or the problem of excludability. This argum ent assumes tha t 
the rational choice of individuals who use a scarce resource in common will 
be to inevitably take advantage of the fact th a t they cannot be excluded 
from the public good and will benefit without participating or ‘free-ride’ 
(Hardin, 1968). In each model, there is an inherent incentive for 
participants to free-ride or benefit from the common good without 
contributing towards it. Logically, if all or most participants choose this 
path, then the ability of the group to achieve its goals is sabotaged. Given 
this inevitable course of action, it is assumed th a t a central force or 
Leviathan is necessary in order to keep these selfish actions in check. In 
practical terms, these models have lead to the widely accepted belief that 
resources m ust be put under one of two types of m anagem ent regimes' 
government control or privatisation.
Table 3.1 Types of Resource Regimes
Open Access The absence of well defined property rights. Access to
the resource is unregulated and free and open to 
anyone.
Private Property The rights to exclude others from using the resource
and to regulate the use of the resource are vested in an 
individual or group. The rights are usually recognised 
and enforced by the state and are usually exclusive 
and transferable.
Common Property The resource is held by an identifiable community of
interdependent users who may exclude outsiders while 
regulating use amongst members. The rights are 
unlikely to be exclusive or transferable and are often 
rights of equal access and use. These rights may be 
legally recognised or de facto.
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State Property Rights to the resource are vested exclusively in the
government which makes decisions concerning who 
should have access to the resource, the conditions and 
the level and nature of exploitation
(Source: ICLARM, 1998:2)
Government control and privatisation
Policy responses to these assumptions have been either to centralise 
authority over resources through the State or to privatise those resources. 
Both centralisation advocates and privatisation advocates accept as a 
central tenet tha t institutional change m ust come from outside and be 
imposed on the individuals affected (Ostrom, 1990). Both options have been 
questioned in terms of their ability to adequately protect resources. State 
control over natural resources, as was discussed in the previous chapter, is 
by no means a foolproof option for effective resource management. While 
arguably more effective in the West, governments of developing countries 
often do not have the resources needed to police vast areas. The social costs, 
not to mention the financial costs, of relocating resource users from 
protected areas also make these arrangem ents financially prohibitive and 
socially unsustainable. Political aims are also often incongruent with 
resource conservation. An example of this are the efforts made starting in 
the late 1960’s to ‘integrate’ Amazonia into the m ainstream  of Brazilian 
national development. These initiatives are often cited as the catalyst for 
unsustainable development in this region (Hall, 2000).
The argum ent for privatising resources is rooted in the assumption that 
individual users would have incentives to protect w hat they clearly own 
themselves (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). The market, though, ignores the 
full value of natural resources thereby creating perverse incentives for 
owners. Resource privatisation has not proved to be as effective as once 
thought and examples from around the world indicate this.
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Developments in Amazonia during the 1960s and 70s are a reminder that 
private ownership does not always provide the necessary incentives for land 
conservation. During this period, the military regime embarked on a series 
of initiatives that aimed to integrate Amazonia into the rest of the country 
as well as to modernise the region. In this vein, massive subsidies were 
provided for cattle ranching and logging activities. The Trans Amazonian 
highway was constructed in order to enable the gradual occupation of the 
region. Disastrous colonisation schemes such as POLONOROESTE which 
sought to relieve population pressures in the Northeast and Centre-South 
through large-scale resettlement resulted (Hall, 1997b). These economic and 
political incentives encouraged land concentration, pasture formation, 
logging and rural conflicts as well as consequent deforestation in one of the 
world’s most biodiverse regions containing approximately forty percent of 
the world’s remaining tropical rainforests (Laurance etal., 2001).
Critique of the Tragedy
Critics of these theories do not attempt to discredit conclusions drawn from 
these models altogether, but rather demand that the models and their 
outcomes not be generalised and indiscriminately applied to each scenario 
where the collective good is sought. Authors (notably Ostrom, Folke, Berkes, 
Baland and Platteau) argue that the assumptions drawn from these models 
only fit certain scenarios and that the constraints built into them do not 
always reflect reality. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there 
are instances in which communities do co-operate and manage resources 
sustainably. What this new field of study is trying to understand is why 
some communities are more likely than others to reach these long-term 
collective goals. This process has three dimensions' questioning the 
assumptions behind conventional models, consolidating experiences from 
around the world where communities have 'escaped1 the 'tragedy', and 
drawing from these experiences a set of factors or characteristics which they
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believe influence the ability of certain groups to overcome these 
overwhelming odds.
One of the most criticised aspects of the three theories presented above is 
their central assumption that 'players' (or community members, neighbours, 
etc.) cannot effectively communicate with one another. In real life this 
constraint does not always exist. Resource users often live in small 
geographical areas and have continued interactions with other resource 
users. The tragedy also emphasises the selfish, individualistic nature of 
resource users as utility maximizers, without taking into account other 
factors that link or bond groups together. Family ties, shared identity, or 
what has come to be known as ‘social capital’ is becoming widely accepted as 
one of the factors that 'rational' individuals take into account in decision­
making. This concept is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
Probably the most contested of the assumptions of the 'tragedy' is the idea 
that common property resources are always open and available to everyone. 
Even in Hardin's own example, it is pertinent to ask whether there are an 
infinite number of herders. Most resources are in practice shared by a 
limited number of users with some shared by more people than others. 
What has often been referred to as the problem of common property is more 
likely a problem of open access. If there is a defined set of resource users, 
the real problem is often the absence of or a weakened management regime.
Experience in various parts of the world has also shown that communities 
themselves are often capable of independently developing management 
systems for shared resources that do not depend on privatisation or 
centralised control (Ghai and Vivian, 1992). Examples where communities 
have collectively developed management schemes to govern natural 
resources and established incentives and sanctions for co-operation in the 
management of defined resources where the number and identity of users 
are known, have questioned the validity of past theories. The development
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of a counter-theory is helping to provide a more realistic picture of some of 
the reasons resource users decide to participate in collective action.
In seeking factors that determine the likelihood of the long-term viability of 
common property regimes, social scientists have cited the importance of the 
qualitative aspects of decision-making that involve relationships between 
resource users. It has become clearer that immediate personal gain is not 
always the only factor that influences decision-making. As will be discussed 
later in this chapter, utilitarian factors along with a shared identity can 
play an important role in providing incentives for collective environmental 
action. Trust and norms of reciprocity established over time are 
fundamental to the resilience of these regimes. This is particularly so when 
trying to overcome the subtractibility issues (or the 'freerider' problem) 
related to common property management. If resource users are expected to 
forgo short-term individual benefit for long-term collective gain, each must 
feel that s/he is a part of that collective. As Cohen points out, trust between 
resource users is a fundamental premise for long term co-operation, 'Before 
the recognition of a common identity by others and by the participants 
themselves is secured, before group solidarity is attained, representation, 
which presupposes trust, is not possible' (1985*692). Cohen goes on to say 
that the process leading up to the creation of a collective identity by a group 
'occurs through collective interaction itself, within and between groups.'
Small-scale fisheries have been the source of some of the richest examples of 
successful common property resource regimes. It has also been a field that 
has contributed to the continued development of common property resource 
theory. One of the most cited examples of CPRs originally included in 
Berkes (1986) and later in Ostrom (1990) describes a small fishing village 
where, over time, fishers developed a systematic approach to defining and 
distributing access rights to local fishing grounds. Faced with threats to the 
viability of their fishing grounds, fishers from Alanya, Turkey organised 
themselves to ensure the future of the local fishery along with their
80
livelihoods. This experience is not unique and many like it have since been 
documented. Because each case and context is different in terms of location, 
cultural and ecological factors, among others, it is not immediately clear 
what were the key conditions for their success. For this reason, academics 
have been collecting, publishing and systematically analysing these 
experiences in the hopes of defining a set of factors which are common to 
successful common property resource regimes. Arising out of case studies 
presented to the Conference on Common Property Resource Management in 
1985, two sets of factors were identified as potentially relevant to CPR 
success- those relating to the resource and its management and those 
related to the appropriators of the resource themselves.
Key design principles
Ostrom's ‘Governing the Commons’ (1990), describes some of the factors 
that were relevant to the case studies she analysed. In this work, she 
divides these into three groups: the resource itself, the existing management 
structure (organisations and institutions), and the characteristics of the 
community. The existence of a local management structure is crucial to the 
success of CPRs since disorganized appropriators would have a difficult time 
co-ordinating and monitoring their activities. Appropriators should be tied 
to this structure through some sort of binding contract including sanctions 
for those appropriators who do not adhere to it. The ability to define the 
boundaries of the resource in question (such as a field, fishing spot or other 
area) as well as having a distinct set of users is also important, as is the 
ability of the CPR to exclude non-members. It is also necessary for 
appropriators to monitor the health of the resource itself. Management 
characteristics common to institutionally robust CPRs include the existence 
of incentives for individuals to act toward the common good. These may 
entail coercive or more positive incentives. Other factors include the 
absence of free riders or resource users who benefit without contributing.
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Ostrom also identifies a set of community characteristics that would 
contribute to CPR success. Specifically, having a known number of users as 
well as a small population size is seen as an advantage as well as having a 
stable population. Group homogeneity and the absence of class or religious 
divisions are cited as common characteristics of robust CPRs. Vested 
interests can be an obstacle to community management especially where 
these individuals might gain from disorganisation. Historically, 
communities that have a history of collective action seem to be better placed 
than those that do not. Less tangible qualities presented by Ostrom include 
the existence of social capital and high levels of trust and shared values as 
well as a sense of a community or common future. She also cites the 
importance of appropriators gaining a major part of their economic return 
from the CPR thereby providing strong motivation to solve common 
problems to enhance or protect their own productivity over time (Ostrom, 
1990).
Ostrom (1992) identifies four essential elements that need to be present for 
a CPR to be managed successfully by an appropriators' organisation (AO):
1. Participants must have a common understanding that their 
independent strategies, if continued, will substantially damage a 
resource that they consider important for their livelihoods. The 
capacity to develop this perception is related to the size of the CPR (or 
number of resource users involved), the level of scientific 
understanding of the resource and the extent to which the 
appropriators recognise the interdependence of their offtakes. 
Communication among resource users is central in this process and 
this is more likely to occur in small, local settings.
2. Appropriators must share a view that co-operative strategies are 
possible that reduce the risk of serious harm to the resource on which 
they all depend. There needs to be an understanding that individual
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strategies are sub-optimal and that an alternative co-operative 
strategy can produce an improved result and can be made to work.
3. Appropriators must have confidence that most other appropriators 
from the CPR can be counted on to change strategies if they 
themselves promise to do so. This mutual trust and reciprocity tends 
to be easier the smaller and more intimate the group of appropriators 
and where peer monitoring is a practical option.
4. It must be reasonably clear that the cost of executing future co­
ordinated strategies is less than the benefits to be gained from the 
adoption of co-ordinated strategies. These costs are affected by 
characteristics of the group such as size and organisational 
experience.
Within the design principles put forward by Ostrom and other authors 
studying the collective management of common property resources there are 
a number of concepts that deserve deeper review. They are concepts that 
are used broadly throughout the literature which are often ill defined. The 
following section will discuss the concepts of community, social capital and 
participation. They are intrinsically interrelated concepts that form a 
cornerstone for understanding the diverse elements of community 
participation in these types of initiatives.
3.2 Community
With the failure of coercive conservation strategies, policy makers and 
academics have turned to rural communities to provide alternatives to 
conventional approaches (Wells and Brandon, 1992). The temptation is to 
assume that communities will always be better resource managers than 
either the State or the private sector (Argawal, 1999). Conservation 
initiatives based on such expectations may prove unsuccessful, as a deeper 
understanding of the social relationships and processes at work within 
communities has not been taken into account in project design.
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Assumptions about the ability of communities to manage resources 
effectively are commonly based on some misplaced assumptions about the 
nature of ‘communities’. The literature surrounding community resource 
management often refers to an idealised notion of community. Visions of 
community in the resource management literature generally characterise it 
as an 'organic whole'. Communities are seen as small organisational units 
comprised of individuals sharing similar norms and values codified in long 
standing institutions with which resources are managed effectively and 
sustainably (Agrawal, 1999). The reality, however, is that few communities 
are characterised by such functional uniformity. Understanding the 
differences and conflicts within the community is important as these 
processes have an impact on the ability of a community to reach 
conservation goals. The degree to which these differences define or affect 
interactions between resource users also has important design implications.
Collective management regimes deal with resource user communities, that 
is, groups of individuals who share access to a common pool resource. 
Resource user communities throughout the world differ from one another in 
their history, experience, physical setting and ecology. Relationships within 
communities are not static. They are often influenced by the economic or 
political changes taking place regionally or nationally and, especially for 
rural communities, by changes in the natural environment. For example, a 
community may consist of older and more recent residents. This is often the 
case in coastal Brazil where fishing communities attract immigrants as 
diverse as members of the middle class moving to escape their urban 
lifestyle to families coming to the coastline in order to escape the drought- 
prone interior (sertao). Another example from Brazil comes from Amazonia 
where river dwellers (ribeirinhos) living within the Mamiraua Sustainable 
Development Reserve are semi-permanent and move to other areas from 
time to time (DFID, 2000). Social ties are fluid as whole settlements move 
and new ones are founded. Some settlements last years and others just 
months. The result is that there is little in the way of long-term
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'communities' in the area covered by the reserve making the household the 
most important social unit.
These factors may strengthen the sense of identity shared by these groups 
or create deep divides among and within them. Crisis within the 
community can be a bonding factor where the community works together to 
overcome it, or it can reinforce the differences between members. The latter 
was recently illustrated by the conflict arising between different caste and 
religious groups in India during the earthquake. Muslims and poor Hindus 
accused dominant groups in earthquake stricken villages of monopolising 
the influx of aid (Harding, 2001). Communities are not static entities and 
most often are a dynamic combination of both factors that draw members 
together and others that divide them.
Individuals sharing resources may or may not experience a feeling of 
'community' as a result of sharing that resource. In fact, individuals sharing 
resources may in fact see other resource users as a threat to their 
livelihoods. In resource user communities, there are often conflicting 
desires and needs that put resource users at odds with each other. Both the 
literature on CPRs as well as co-management identify the absence of these 
conflicts and differences within communities as strengths contributing 
towards the success of such regimes (Ostrom, 1990). McCay and Jentoft 
(1998) points out that these differences are not necessarily a handicap for 
collective action but may actually reinforce interdependence. The authors 
note that 'competition and co-operation are not mutually exclusive' (McCay 
and Jentoft, 1998* 23), as competition requires some general understanding 
of what people are vying for and what are the rules of the game.
This optimistic outlook gives some hope for initiatives trying to construct a 
sense of shared purpose in order to achieve common goals. Hall (1997b) 
notes that the rubber tappers of Amazonia had a far from ideal sense of 
common past (as most were immigrants to the area) but felt in some way
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bound in terms of their future. Hall also notes that the physical distances 
between households both on the rubber tapping colocagoes and of the 
ribeirinhos in the Mamiraua Sustainable Development Reserve were 
challenges to collective action. What some academics and practitioners in 
the field are suggesting is not necessarily that communities with internal 
differences will not achieve collective goals, although in some cases this may 
very well be true (Jentoft, 1989; Agrawal, 1999). Rather, it is the 
recognition and understanding of these divisions that is essential in order to 
design projects which reflect local circumstances. In this way, policy 
interventions can be more strategic in attempting to construct co-operation 
at the local level.
Groups that are labelled ’communities' are very likely communities of 
communities. Within groups there exist sub-divisions such as age, race, 
gender, class and ethnicity within the broader resource 'community'. Other 
divisions include those related to the different ways resources are tapped 
into. In the case of fishing communities this could be manifested in the 
different strategies or gear types used for fishing. To compound these 
differences, power structures within communities can be both dividing and 
binding. These structures can be legitimate and supported by community 
members or they can often be the source of corruption and unequal 
distribution and access to resources (Leach etal., 1997). Care must be taken 
not to over-romanticise communities since their internal structures often 
mirror the inequalities existent in the wider society. Also, one must not 
exaggerate the traits of unity, homogeneity, coherence and stability within 
communities.
Communities are dynamic entities, changing over time and are often 
characterised by internal conflict (McCay and Jentoft, 1998, Schlager and 
Blomquist, (1998). Institutions which regulate resource use are therefore 
constantly being challenged and successfully or unsuccessfully deal with the 
changes that take place around them. Relationships among members
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change, people come and go, the resource itself is often the source of change 
within communities and their structures. Environmental changes, the 
effects of modernisation and globalization, political changes and technology 
changes all test the resilience of community solidarity. Some resource user 
communities have demonstrated a greater ability than others to endure 
alterations to the environment in which they exist. An example of this 
comes from Arraial do Cabo where although government policies such as the 
creation of Alkalis intended to provide incentives to ‘modernize’ the 
community, fishing practices have not ceased and are continuously 
revitalized (Britto, 1999).
Heterogeneity can exacerbate the commitment of individuals towards 
collective action in a number of ways. Individuals are more likely to remain 
committed to a common goal or set of common rules if they have faith that 
other users are committed as well (Schlager and Bloomquist, 1998). 
'Heterogeneity may affect the trust that individuals have in each other. For 
instance, cultural differences or resource differences may convince 
individuals that it is okay to break the rules because the only ones that 
would be hurt are those from a different group, or those who are wealthy' 
(ibid.: 7).
This is not to say that the notion of community is not useful at all. In fact, 
the evolving notion of common property is indeed a reaction to the absence 
of community in theories that support resource privatisation and 
government control. In Hardin's model, for example, there is no community. 
His herders are individuals who are not bound to any greater good other 
than what as individuals they can achieve for their own personal gain. 
While the concept of community is essential for critiquing the narrow view 
of human relationships put forward by Hardin, it is the disaggregation of 
these communities that will lead to a greater understanding of which types 
will avoid tragic end.
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What makes communities more than simply aggregates of individuals 
driven by self-centred utilitarian motives are the collaborative social 
qualities that some groups have. These social networks are systems of 
relationships rooted in kinship, culture and history. When these systems are 
present, resource users feel an important connection whereby they identify 
with the past and future of fellow resource users. Drawing from his 
research in Caribbean fisheries communities, Hakan Sandersen stresses the 
importance of a well functioning civil society as a necessary condition for co­
management (Sanderson, 1998). In the Caribbean, many communities are 
poorly organised beyond the household level. Kinship ties are strong but 
experiences in collective organisation are few and far between. Fishers and 
their families do not have a history of associations and institutions within 
the communities. They do not have a legacy of collective action to build on 
which might provide an important building block for introducing co­
management arrangements.
In recent years, academics and researchers have further developed the 
notion of community and contributed to an understanding of the links and 
processes that underlie them. This research explores what has come to be 
known as 'social capital'. The following section will discuss some of the 
outcomes of these developments along with their implications for 
collaborative management initiatives.
3.3 Social Capital
Wealth is most often defined in terms of stocks of financial and human
capital. In recent years, in the attempt to operationalize sustainable
development goals, other forms of wealth or capital are beginning to gain
recognition (See Table 3.2). Natural capital, the stock or flows of goods such
as mineral wealth, forests, marine resources or even sunlight, is being
recognised and valued as an importance aspect of human and economic
development (Costanza, 1997). Another type of capital has recently been
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identified as related to these other forms and an im portant asset for 
countries and communities alike. What makes communities more than  just 
an aggregate of their individual members has come to be known as 'social 
capital'.
D efinitions o f social capital
Social capital has become a concept widely used to describe interactions 
both within civil society and between civil society and government or other 
external actors. At its most basic, Robert Putnam  defines social capital as 
'trust, norms and networks' tha t facilitate social co-ordination and co­
operation for m utual benefit (Putnam, 1993:167). Social capital generally 
refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms th a t shape the quality 
and quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows 
th a t social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for 
development to be sustainable (Ostrom, 1990; Ghai and Vivian, 1992; Pretty 
and Ward, 2001). Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions or 
individuals which underpin a society, it is the 'glue' tha t holds them 
together.
Table 3.2 Types of Capital
Human made capital - generated through human ingenuity and technological 
change, the produced means of production
Natural capital - consists of non-renewable resource produced by the processes and 
functions of ecosystems and environmental services sustained by the workings of 
ecosystems.
Cultural capital - refers to the factors that provide human societies with the means 
and adaptations to deal with the natural environment and actively to modify it 
(Berkes and Folke, 1994).
Social capital - features of social organizations such as trust, norms of reciprocity 
and networks (Colman, 1990). Ostrom (1990, p. 190) expands this definition to 
include institutional capital to refer to the supply of organisational ability and 
social structures, literally the capital of institutions that society has at its disposal. 
Source: adapted from Berkes and Folke, 1998:6
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A narrow view of social capital regards it as a set of horizontal associations 
amongst people, consisting of social networks and associated norms that 
have an effect on community productivity and well-being. Social networks 
can increase productivity by reducing the costs of interactions between 
individuals. Coleman (1988) cites examples from the Jewish-run diamond 
industry in New York as well as the networks of co-operation present in 
Cairo's Kahn El Khalili market as examples of this. By building trust and 
networks of reciprocity between individuals and organisations, social capital 
facilitates co-ordination and co-operation.
A broader understanding of social capital accounts for both the positive and 
negative aspects by including vertical as well as horizontal associations 
among people, and includes behaviour within and among organisations. 
This view recognises that horizontal ties are needed to give communities a 
sense of identity and common purpose. It also stresses that without 
‘bridging’ ties that transcend various social divides (e.g. religion, ethnicity, 
socio-economic status), horizontal ties can become a basis for the pursuit of 
narrow interests. These ties can actively preclude access to information and 
material resources that would otherwise be of great assistance to the 
community.
Components o f social capital
The relationships described in the literature on social capital involve a 
number of different levels, intensities and directions. These relationships 
evolve at the local, regional and State levels and amongst these levels. 
Pretty and Ward (2001-212) identifies five groupings used to categorise 
these relationships: local connections involve relationships among
community members; local-local connections describe linkages between 
communities; local-external connections refer to the vertical connections 
between local groups and government agencies or organisations; external - 
external connections are horizontal relationships between government or 
other external agencies (i.e. partnerships); and the last category describes
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external connections as relationships amongst the individuals within these 
external agencies.
Strong networks of engagement at the local level can provide an important 
basis for successful co-operation between levels (Evans, 1997). Coleman 
(1988) argues that the potential of relationships between individuals or 
groups to result in effective norms of interaction is determined by the degree 
of 'closure' available between actors. Where actors are not familiar with 
each other (as, for example, in the case of a shop owner on a busy street and 
his/her clients - clients may have a relationship with the owner but not with 
each other) they are limited in their ability to combine forces and sanction 
(in this case) the shop owner. Coleman (in Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000: 
25) argues that, 'Closure of the social structure is important not only for the 
existence of effective norms but also for another form of social capital* the 
trustworthiness of social structures that allows the proliferation of 
obligations and expectations.'
Coleman (in Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2001) also distinguishes between 
depth and diversity within human relationships. In his work, he cites the 
distinction made by Max Gluckman (1967) between simplex and multiplex 
relations. Simplex relationships are those that are based on one level of 
interaction such as that of the actors in the example of the shop owner and 
his/her clients. Multiplex relationships refer to those that involve multiple 
types and levels of interactions whereby people are linked in more than one 
context (neighbours, colleagues, fellow parent, etc.). Coleman argues that in 
the later case, obligations developed in one context can be harnessed when 
one has problems in another, enriching the interaction.
As both Evans (1997) and Pretty and Ward (2001) argue, stocks or 
endowments of social capital at the local level are important but not 
necessarily the determining factor for successful collaboration between 
levels. ‘Effective states deliver rule-governed environments which
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strengthen and increase the efficiency of local organisations and 
institutions’ (Evans, 1997*1120). As Evans sees it, these synergistic 
relationships take on two different dimensions ■ 'complementarity' and 
'embeddedness'. Complementarity refers to the roles played by government 
and society in collaborative efforts. When they are complementary, each is 
contributing what comparatively they have the advantage to contribute. 
The opposite of complementarity is when government policies work against 
local development goals and aspirations (Evans, 1997-1126). Embeddedness 
describes the depth, frequency and richness of interaction between the two 
levels that build important elements of social capital such as trust.
The ability of communities to create strong institutions and organisations is 
influenced by the characteristics of the State. The State has a role in 
determining the degree to which societies interact and how they interact. 
Civic organisation is often contingent on an enabling environment created 
by the State. For example, during the military dictatorships of the 70s and 
80s in Brazil, free association was actively discouraged and illegal. In many 
cases, since the onset of formal democracy in the 1980s there has been a 
rapid growth in community action. In Sao Paulo alone there are over 1,300 
neighbourhood associations and there has been an overwhelming 
proliferation of organisations among the rural landless and land-poor as 
well as the emergence of numerous indigenous and environmental groups 
(Brohman, 1996). Fox (1996- 1120) 'underscores the centrality of simple 
legal norms such as freedom of assembly and association in making civic 
organisation possible...' Government can go beyond just allowing social 
capital to be created to actually encouraging its formation. Tendler (1997) 
describes how building trust between government service providers and 
communities in Ceara (Brazil) was a critical element in the success of recent 
health care initiatives in this state.
By finking communities with strong associations and a sense of solidarity 
with an effective government framework, communities will be better able to
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'scale up' their activities, increasing their impact. As Evans (1997:1122) 
reflects on the positive outcome of Grameen Bank-style microfinance 
projects in Vietnam he notes that, 'adding concrete ties across the State- 
society boundary to pre-existing kin and friendship ties helped transform 
traditional ties into developmentally effective social capital.' For those 
communities that are not endowed with high levels of social capital, it may 
be possible to create these relationships. Evans refers to this as the 
'constructibility' of social capital.
Pretty and Ward (2001) argue that government policies are often at the root 
of the disintegration of social capital at the local level with negative 
outcomes for natural resource conservation. Traditional ecological 
knowledge is an example of this type of social capital that is being quickly 
lost in the process of modernisation/globalization. Hall (1998) reminds us of 
the importance of local traditional ecological knowledge, and other informal 
institutions, in this matrix. He states that traditional ecological knowledge 
is an outcome and/or source of social capital and represents (another) strong 
reason for involving local resource users in project design and management. 
For Amazonia, the recent recognition of these community assets through 
supportive government policies (such as Extractive Reserves) is allowing 
significant innovations to be introduced in environmental management 
strategies.
Local institutions that provide equitable and sustainable solutions to 
resource issues in developing countries have developed over many years and 
are not easily replaceable. Evans (1997) warns of the little experience to 
date on constructing the necessary stocks of social capital that provide the 
foundations for these initiatives. Pretty and Ward (2001) cite the 
importance of distinguishing between the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of social capital. While Putnam (1993) counts the number of 
civil associations in Northern Italy in order to quantify stocks of social 
capital, Pretty and Ward (200L213) distinguish between 'social capital
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embodied in such groups as sports clubs, denominational churches...even 
bowling leagues, and that in resource-oriented groups concerned with 
watershed management, micro-finance, irrigation management, pest 
management and farmer research.'
We can call this qualification the 'leisure vs. livelihood' distinction in the 
social capital discourse. There is also a need to qualify these types of 
endowments in terms of their 'replaceability'. The former types of networks 
can and are being replaced. Although bowling leagues are losing popularity 
and membership, other group activities such as hiking clubs and adventure 
tours are on the rise. As many of these new organisations are related to 
more physical endurance as well as greater preorganization, one could 
argue that organisational membership (at least in the United States) is 
gaining strength from a more proactive membership base. Destruction of 
the latter type (associated with livelihoods) has serious consequences for the 
wider society such as increased poverty and environmental degradation and 
will be extremely difficult to rebuild or replace (ex- common property 
resource management regimes). They are also qualitatively different in the 
degree to which they actually empower individuals and communities and 
enable them to reach local development goals.
Pretty and Ward (2001) identify three stages in group formation and 
development; reactive-dependence, realisation-independence and 
awareness-interdependenee. Group formation is often the result of an 
external threat or encouragement from an external agency (ibid.). This 
initial reactive-dependence stage is characterised by a fear of change and 
desire to return things to their pre-crisis state. Communities with low levels 
of social capital may engage in group formation although there is little at 
this point to indicate whether robust institutions will develop later. The 
second stage, the realisation-independence stage, is defined by growing 
independence of the group. Norms and rules begin to develop as well as a 
growing capacity to develop solutions to existing problems. This is a tender
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period in group development and does not guarantee long-term viability. 
The awareness-interdependence stage is the third and final stage of group 
development. The quality of interaction at this stage will determine the 
sustainability of the group's activities. It is at this stage that groups might 
begin to scale up their activities and look upward and outward to become 
involved in regional efforts in order to achieve higher-level aims. Group 
maturity is defined by success at this stage.
Social capital and collective management
Social capital is relevant to the discussion of collaborative common property 
resource management as it is seen as an important factor determining their 
success. The current debate and discussion about social capital has led to 
the emergence of ideas about how and under what circumstances civic 
actors can engage more effectively with public institutions in the pursuit of 
development goals (Evans, 1997). Communities with high levels of social 
capital are seen as more likely to mobilise their collective resources for the 
common good. In collaborative management schemes, social capital is seen 
as equally important. Pre-existing social capital can make these regimes 
more efficient and effective. Where networks and norms of reciprocity exist, 
these social relationships and trust can provide for effective monitoring and 
rule compliance. It is also thought that networks of civic engagement may 
be a recipe for the robust collective life necessary to demand and ensure 
responsive leadership and governance (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000).
Ghai and Vivian (1992) also consider how social capital built in support of 
one issue is often harnessed or redirected to support another type of 
initiative. Putnam (1993- 169) seems to support this assertion, '...working 
together is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social 
capital'. Examples where communities have strong (horizontal) networks 
and informal or formal institutions which bind them together, whether or 
not these institutions are directly related to resource management, may
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create an environment where the community will have a stronger 
propensity to participate in natural resource management initiatives even if 
they are introduced from the outside.
Ostrom also identifies the degree of trust and sense of shared identity 
within a group as important ingredients for successful community resource 
management (Ostrom, 1990). Local level social capital facilitates common 
property management by providing the social relationships and trust upon 
which rules and monitoring can be based (World Bank, 1997a). 
Understanding the institutional dynamics within communities could be very 
relevant to understanding the potential for community contributions to the 
design and management of projects aimed at sustainable use of the local 
environment. High levels of social capital and strong local institutions can 
also provide an avenue for the agendas of otherwise excluded groups to be 
heard. This does not, however, take into account those individuals who are 
not ‘networked’ and are excluded from these groups and processes.
The ‘dark side’of social capital
The literature on social capital rarely specifies which aspects of this co­
operative history are more useful than others. Putnam (1993) does make a 
distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Here, he defends 
the promotion of the type of social capital that creates bridges to link 
otherwise separated groups. The creation of bonding social capital, which 
promotes group membership of like people, may on the other hand reinforce 
community differences. Whatever the case, social networks will have 
consequences for both those groups and individuals who may or may not be 
involved. The literature in this area also tends to over romanticise some of 
the characteristics of these communities and does not effectively deal with 
intra-community inequalities. Social capital is often as unequally 
distributed as other forms of capital. While it most certainly cannot be 
ignored, care must be taken in order to avoid reinforcing these inequalities.
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State intervention can erode social capital by creating individualistic 
incentives (Hanna, 1995). In fisheries management, examples abound of 
cases where the assumptions of individualistic behaviour, as in the Hardin 
model, lead to self-fulfilling expectations. Management based on individual 
allocations and incentives granted by government can erode the collective 
identity and interests which exist in fishing and other resource user 
communities. According to the logic of social capital, governments should 
avoid creating these types of entirely individual incentives and adopt 
designs which would restore or reinforce solidarity among user groups 
(Jentoft, 1999). Such systems could encourage co-operation, build networks 
and improve trust within and among communities.
Critics cite the ‘dark side’ of social capital as an essential element forgotten 
in the social capital literature. Putzel (1997) criticises the social capitalists 
for not recognising the negative aspects that often go hand in hand with 
groups and associations. He reminds us that not all groups and associations 
have such benevolent ends as the bowling leagues described by Putnam 
(1993). Mafias and drug cartels are examples of tightly bonded associations 
built on trust (and fear) that influence development processes. While these 
may be extreme examples, these negative elements can be found in almost 
any community where control over resources is concentrated in the hands of 
a few. Evans (1997) regards corruption as an inherent possibility in 
increased embeddedness (depth of interactions between communities and 
government).
Community-based resource management offers a more democratic option 
compared with traditional top-down strategies. Often though, internal 
power structures and differences in age, class, race and gender effect the 
distribution of the benefits of development projects and projects may also be 
adversely affected by the lack of participation of a particular group (Leach 
etal., 1997). Whether it is community-based natural resource management,
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or community participation or even the descriptions of grassroots 
environmental action, the literature rarely refer to who is participating or 
perhaps more importantly, who isn ’ft Overlooking existing power 
structures before implementing projects could result in reinforcing these 
structures (Guijt, 1998).
Social exclusion is used to describe poverty as a process whereby the poor 
are excluded from the benefits of development (Bhalla, 1995). Access to the 
benefits of group organisations and associations is often denied to already 
marginalized groups in communities. Individuals or groups within societies 
with little power can be sidelined by more powerful groups. Identifying who 
benefits from these initiatives is also a serious issue in determining which 
kind of incentives are being provided and whether these incentives create 
positive linkages with conservation goals. In other words, who ultimately 
takes part in decisions regarding project design and implementation will 
probably benefit as a result. Therefore, care must be taken to understand 
what the characteristics are of participants to understand their own 
incentives and relationship to the resource base to understand what the 
implications of this might be. 'Without attention to the analysis of resource 
use decisions, and the way these are influenced by structures of power and 
social relations at the community level within the South, we are unlikely to 
be able to influence the behaviour of people who cut down primary forests in 
order to make a living' (in Ghai and Vivian, 1992* 12). The following section 
will discuss the notion of participation in resource management.
3.4 Participation
Post-war strategies of modernisation and growth ignored the role of people’s
participation in directly addressing poverty. Alternative strategies were
conceived based on a more people-centred approach to development. One of
the central tenets of the Basic Human Needs approach that emerged in the
1970s was the need for peoples' participation in decisions that affect their
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lives (Brohman, 1996). In other words, 'social development goals can best be 
attained if ordinary people are mobilised to establish projects that serve 
their local communities and if they are actively involved in these projects' 
(Midgely, 1995- 60). Policy makers were beginning to embrace the idea that 
individuals and communities in developing countries can (and should) 
contribute directly to the development process.
Given the shortcomings of top-down development strategies, participation 
has come to be recognised as an absolute imperative in both alternative and 
mainstream development strategies. While widely accepted in theory, it has 
remained an elusive concept in practice with multiple meanings and 
methods of implementation associated with it. The process of participation 
is often questioned in terms of who participates (elite groups or broad based), 
what they participate in (limited or broad range decision-making), how they 
participate (passive or active), when they participate (in project 
identification or evaluation) and why they participate (Brohman, 1996).
Participation is a multidimensional concept and must be disaggregated in 
order to be clearly understood and effectively employed. This section will 
provide an overview of the different types and dimensions of participation. 
A solid understanding of the different elements of this concept is essential 
in the degree to which participation in the collective management of 
common property resources is a basic assumption as well as a fundamental 
aspect in the long-term viability of these initiatives. It is also an integral 
aspect of the analysis framework applied to the case study presented in this 
thesis.
Concern with community participation in development is not new. Starting 
with the community development initiatives of the 1940s and 1950s, the 
types and purposes for local-level participatory approach to development 
have been in constant flux. The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development stressed the importance of community participation for
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sustainable development. Agenda 21 highlights the need to decentralise and 
find local level solutions to environmental problems. As a result, many 
conservation initiatives now emphasise the importance of community 
participation. Projects, though, rarely define it or specify how community 
participation is going to create links between local socio-economic 
development and conservation goals.
The United Nations defined participation in 1981 as, ’The creation of 
opportunities to enable all members of a community and the larger society 
to actively contribute to and influence the development process and to share 
equitable in the fruits of development' (Midgley, 1986* 24). Hall (1986: 99) 
defines it as 'allowing freedom of decision-making and control over internal 
activities to those taking part in the development process.' Another 
definition put forth by the Overseas Development Administration is, ‘a 
process whereby stakeholders - those with rights (and therefore 
responsibilities) and/or interests - play an active role in decision-making and 
in the consequent activities which affect them’ (ODA, 1995:3).
Most definitions include in some measure the notions of contributing, 
influencing, sharing, or redistributing power and control of resources, 
benefits, knowledge and skills to be gained through beneficiary involvement 
in decision-making (Narayan-Parker, 1996). Other more instrumental 
reasons for encouraging participation include increasing project 
effectiveness and reducing project costs. Most would argue that the degree 
of involvement and control held by communities in this process falls within 
a spectrum with increased control or empowerment on one end and 
efficiency issues on the other.
Pretty (1995) widens this spectrum. He puts manipulative participation at 
one end of the spectrum, referring to a process in which participation is 
simply pretence where 'people’s' representatives have no power. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum he puts self-mobilisation, a process whereby
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communities participate independently of external institutions or influences 
(See Table 3.3). This category goes beyond the scope of participation in most 
development projects and programmes and involves actions initiated by 
communities themselves, as in the case of many social movements.
Table 3.3 Dimensions and intensities of community participation
Empowerment Proactive Early involvement Self mobilisation
Capacity building
Increased effectiveness
Increased equity
Efficiency
Cost sharing Passive Late involvement Manipulativeparticipation
Source- adapted from Hall (1997b-26) and Pretty (1995:5)
The literature often cites a distinction between passive  and proactive 
participation (Hall, 1997b; Paul, 1987; Wells and Brandon, 1992; Chambers, 
1994). The difference between the two lies largely in the degree to which 
outcomes are predetermined by ‘outsiders’, and also to what degree local 
people have the power to change the direction of interventions once they are 
underway (Hall, 1997b). Where external agents predefine project goals and 
design, the potential for participation to be 'empowering' is diminished. 
Ready-made, top down designs, where they include participation, normally 
do so for more instrum ental reasons such as cost-sharing or in order to 
increase project efficiency or effectiveness.
As many funding agencies require participation to be an element in project
design, participation may be given an im portant place in initial proposals
but not in practice. More often than  not, it is this form of token
participation that is prevalent in current development practice. For
example, in their 1992 evaluation of over twenty Integrated Conservation
and Development Projects, Wells and Brandon (1992) state tha t although all
of the cases reviewed were committed to participation in principle, most
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have treated local people as pissive beneficiaries of project activities and 
have failed to involve people in the process of change and their own 
development. None of the projects based on this beneficiary approach have 
demonstrated significant progress.
Proactive participation involves a much stronger role for communities 
throughout the project cycle, it best, beneficiaries are involved from the 
early stages of project ideitification through to project evaluation. 
Proactive participation in ievelopment initiatives entails a real 
commitment by external ageits to involve people in the development 
process. In many cases it invohes changing development workers’ attitudes 
about the communities in whici they work. This approach calls for outside 
'experts' to respect local people and the knowledge they hold and be willing 
to learn from them (Chambers, 1994). For the success of conservation 
initiatives in Brazil and elsevhere, the proactive involvement of local 
communities in this process is essential. This is so in terms long term 
sustainability as well as in terns of building a foundation for initiatives to 
be 'scaled up' in support of snall-scale producers or gathers regionally. 
Local people must be able to sistain and support the strategies developed 
for the conservation of resouices upon which their livelihoods depend. 
While it will not ensure the kng'term success of these initiatives, it will 
help build an important foundddon upon which these strategies are based. 
This is true not only in terms )f creating systems which are relevant and 
appropriate for local users but ilso involves building up the self confidence 
and other capabilities needed todevelop and maintain them.
Categorising participation as either passive or proactive is highly dependent 
on the timing of community involvement. Early involvement can provide 
communities with a greater chince of influencing objectives and outcomes 
as opposed to their being enticly predetermined by outsiders. Early and 
continued participation is oftenmore proactive. Late involvement limits the 
depth and quality of the particbatory process. Involvement at later stages
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usually means th a t project identification and design issues have been 
decided from the outside and the involvement of local people is limited to 
implementation issues. Later involvement is usually associated with 
passive participation as well as the more instrum ental objectives (i.e.- 
efficiency or effectiveness).
Table 3.4 Typology of Participation in development programmes 
and projects
Typology Characteristics of Each
1. Manipulative Participation Participation is simply a pretence, whereby local 
people may have token representaition but no 
decision making power.
2. Passive Participation People participate by being told what has been 
decided or has already happened. It involves 
unilateral announcements by an administration or 
project management without listening to peoples 
responses. The information being shared belongs 
only to external professionals.
3. Participation by 
Consultation
People participate by being consulted or by 
answering questions. External agents define 
problems and information gathering processes, and 
so control analysis. Such a consultative process 
does not concede a share in decision-making, and 
professionals are under no obligation to take on 
board people's views.
4. Participation for Material 
Incentives
People participate by contributing resources, for 
example labour, in return for food, cash or other 
material incentives. Farmers may provide the 
fields and labour, but are involved in neither 
experimentation nor the process of learning. It is 
very common to see this called participation, yet 
people have no stake in prolonging technologies or 
practices when the incentives end.
5. Functional Participation Participation seen by external agencies as a means 
to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. 
People may participate by forming groups to meet 
predetermined objectives related to the project. 
Such involvement may be interactive and involve 
shared decision-making, but tends to arise only 
after major decisions have already been made by 
external agents. At worst, local people may still 
only be co-opted to serve external goals.
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6. Interactive Participation People participate in joint analysis, development of
action plans and formation of strengthening of local 
institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not 
just the means to achieve project goals. The 
process involves interdisciplinary methodologies 
that seek multiple perspectives and make use of 
systemic and structured learning processes. As 
groups take control of local decisions and determine 
how available resources are used, so they have a 
stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7. Self-Mobilisation People participate by taking initiatives
independently of external institutions to change 
systems. They develop contacts with external 
institutions for resource and technical advice they 
need, but retain control over how resources are 
used. Self-mobilisation can spread if governments 
and NGO's provide an enabling framework of 
support. Such self-initiated mobilisation may or 
may not challenge existing distributions of wealth 
and power.
Source- Pretty (1995)
The reasons why a participatory approach is employed in a development 
project or programme is often related to the type of participation achieved. 
Paul (1987) identifies five main areas in which local people can participate 
in rural development projects'
❖ Information-gathering: information exchange between stakeholders 
(can be one way or two way).
❖ Consultation: local resource users have the opportunity to intervene 
and effect the direction of project design and implementation.
❖ Decision-making: implies a greater degree of control and
responsibility than the passive acceptance of possibly unwanted 
benefits.
❖ Initiating action: If groups see gaps between project design and their 
needs, they have the potential to respond to these needs by taking 
action themselves.
❖ Evaluation: Participatory evaluation by beneficiaries can provide 
valuable insights and lessons for project design and implementation,
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information that otherwise may have been overlooked or unnoticed. 
Evaluation often occurs only at the end of the project cycle, too late 
for lessons learned to be reintegrated into the project.
Paul helps us characterise these different purposes by separating them into 
five main groupings which can be placed on the passive ■ proactive 
continuum: a) empowerment, b) building beneficiary capacity, c) increasing 
project effectiveness, d) improving project efficiency, and e) project cost 
sharing. Narayan-Parker (1996) cites one more objective, that of increased 
equity. All these objectives are seen to contribute to project sustainability. 
They are not necessarily cumulative or sequential. For example, efficiency 
can be achieved without community empowerment. While they have been 
presented as distinct categories, these objectives often overlap or occur 
simultaneously. These objectives are detailed below'
Empowerment ■ The notion of power, its use and its distribution is central 
to any understanding of social transformation. Power is, in most contexts, 
the basis of wealth, while powerlessness is the basis of poverty (Chambers, 
1994). Both the 'powerful' and the 'powerless' are categories of actors 
fundamental to understanding the dynamics of any development process. 
Power can be seen as an asset controlled by the State or by elite groups. 
Power operates on many different levels and is manifested in the conflicting 
interests of different groups within any particular context. Empowerment is 
essentially a political concept that means more equitable sharing (or 
redistribution) of power and resources with those who previously lacked 
power. It is the empowerment objective which has been the most 
controversial element of participatory development but also perhaps the 
most important. Empowerment is often seen as the goal of ‘real’ 
participation.
As an element in proactive participation, participation that is empowering 
involves the transfer of decision-making to local people and implies that
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they will have more control over the design and implementation of local 
development strategies. It does not specifically indicate how, but it implies 
that power should be transferred to those who voices were not traditionally 
heard. Friedmann (1992: 20) offers insight into some of the goals of 
empowerment, '...alternative development involves a process of social and 
political empowerment whose long term objective is to rebalance the 
structure of power within society by making state action more accountable, 
strengthening the powers of civil society in the management of their own 
affairs.’
Although widely accepted as an important goal in social development, 
empowerment is difficult to measure. Recently though, the concept of 
empowerment has been translated into observable and measurable actions. 
INTRAC (1999) identifies three broad areas in which people's empowerment 
can manifest itself.
❖ Power through greater confidence in one’s ability to successfully 
undertake some form of action.
❖ Power in terms of increasing relations which people establish with 
other organisations.
❖ Power as a result of increasing (or securing) access to economic 
resources.
Another key indicator of increased power is the ability of local actors to 
influence the wider policy process, beyond the project level in order to bring 
about more fundamental changes.
The literature on empowerment often neglects the complexities and 
difficulties of not further empowering the already powerful but rather 
incorporating a more democratic or equitable distribution of power. There is 
always a danger that the use of empowerment in the context of development 
interventions may be based on a superficial understanding of local relations
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of power. It is the marginalized that should be targeted by these initiatives. 
This is certainly an element in Paulo Freire’s ‘concientization’ of the poor. 
Poverty and underdevelopment have been said to be exacerbated by a state 
of mind, defined by Freire (1972), with no voice, no access, and no 
participation which perpetuates people’s powerlessness, isolation or lack of 
involvement in the development process. In this sense, participation seeks 
to reverse barriers to development (Oakley and Marsden, 1990).
Capacity building - Capacity-building involves a learning process in which 
individuals who participate gain a greater understanding of the process by 
which goals were reached. This is particularly true when community 
involvement starts early. Early involvement will not only increase
management capacity but also lead to a feeling of confidence and ownership 
of the process. Like many of the other objectives, it is related to long-term 
project success. This is especially so for natural resource management 
initiatives where sustainability is dependent on a communities management 
capacity and their ability to continue the initiative even after external 
support has diminished.
Increasing project efficiency - Project efficiency is closely related to project 
effectiveness. While an effective project will ultimately achieve its goals, an 
efficient project will do so in less time with fewer resources. Participation 
can contribute to project efficiency in the sense that, by being more locally 
appropriate, they can avoid costly errors. This would also fall under 
Pretty's 'functional participation' category (See Table 4). Although critics 
would argue that this objective is a manipulative one, there can also be 
community benefits that result from it. An example of these benefits is the 
more timely provision of goods and services to communities.
Increasing equity - It is well established that development gains are often 
sequestered by local elites or others who are relatively better off (Chambers 
1997, Narayan-Parker, 1996). One of the results of community
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participation can be the more equitable distribution of the benefits of 
development interventions. Participation can promote greater
transparency in decision-making as well as increased accountability. It is 
believed that these factors can contribute to more equitable access to 
resources. This is a controversial objective since participatory processes can 
also be 'hijacked' by the local elite. Who participates often mirrors internal 
power structures and divisions unless explicit efforts are made to include 
marginalized community members. For example, women and the elderly (or 
children) may not even be included or encouraged to participate in these 
processes. Collective efforts require collective support and this is much more 
likely to come from a group that feels that the benefits (whether from 
increased power over or access to resources) are equitably distributed. 
Rules and regulatory instruments developed collectively are also much more 
likely to be equitable in that they will better reflect the needs of diverse 
resource users and therefore enjoy broader support.
Improving project effectiveness' Project effectiveness can be defined as the 
degree to which stated project objectives are in fact achieved. Participation 
can lead to greater project effectiveness in a number of ways. Community 
involvement in initiatives can encourage more appropriate designs based on 
local realities, local resources and knowledge. While participatory 
approaches generally lead to more time-consuming interventions and 
perhaps higher costs, in the long run more appropriate projects should be 
more sustainable and therefore worth the initial increased time investment. 
This is particularly true for resource management projects where 
sustainability is ultimately dependent on community acceptance and 
ownership of interventions.
Cost-sharing - Cost sharing specifically refers to cash or in kind (such as 
labour, materials) contributions by individuals or communities which help 
support conservation initiatives. These in kind contributions can be 
towards immediate project needs or for long-term project support. In
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Pretty's categories, cost sharing would be associated with 'functional 
participation' whereby participation is seen as a 'means of achieving project 
goals to meet predetermined objectives related to the project' (See Table 3.4).
At first, it may appear that this objective is an inherently manipulative one 
with the community a passive actor. However, this is not necessarily true 
since cost sharing may have positive benefits for all parties involved. 
Benefits of cost-sharing in development initiatives can include an increased 
sense of ownership of the process and outcome of the initiative. It is also a 
way of obtaining a serious commitment to the development process by 
communities as opposed to more paternalistic relationships where 
communities are 'recipients' or 'beneficiaries'. In kind cost-sharing can also 
encourage complementarity between communities and external agents 
whereby communities carry out functions that would be highly inefficient 
for outsiders to attempt.
3.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has described the theories upon which conventional
approaches have been based. It then presented a critique of these
approaches by describing the limited applicability of models to real life
situations. This argument was illustrated through a series of examples of
groups that have over time forgone individual short-term benefit for the
sake of long-term collective gain. This chapter then presented an alternative
view to past approaches to conservation that depends on the active
participation of local resource users for its success. Common property
resource theory places resource users at the centre of the conservation
debate. It also reinforces the social nature of conservation where it has
largely been seen as the domain of natural scientists. Examples of
successful common property resource regimes can be drawn from both
developed and developing countries although it is in the latter that these
regimes often contribute substantially to local livelihood maintenance. This
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fact makes support for these regimes where they exist all the more 
important.
This chapter went on to describe some of the key elements of successful or 
robust common property regimes. An in-depth discussion was presented 
about some of the key theoretical factors which are essential to the success 
of these regimes. The existence of a shared identity and sense of community, 
stocks of social capital in facilitating collective efforts and making them 
more effective were also discussed along with the different dimensions and 
degrees of local participation in these regimes which often dictate their 
success. This discussion is relevant here as it will help identify the social 
characteristics of the fishing community in Arraial do Cabo, RJ that will 
provide both potential and challenges for collective action in designing and 
sustaining an extractive marine reserve.
Although the alternatives discussed are still being documented and the 
theory developed, this area of research has had important policy 
implications. Analysis of common property resource regimes has helped put 
local resource users at the centre of the conservation debate. It has 
highlighted the potential and the relevance of building management 
regimes from the bottom up. Another implication of this line of research is 
its contribution to a growing field of policy approaches that involve the 
collaborative management of resources between communities and 
government. Co-managment approaches are currently being developed on a 
variety of scales and contexts world-wide. The following chapter on 
Collaborative Management and Extractive Reserves will discuss how 
communities and governments can work together to support the 
development or maintenance of common property resource regimes. Where 
this chapter aimed to show that alternatives exist and should be pursued, 
the following chapter attempts to operationalize the concept and show how 
governments and communities can share responsibility for conservation at 
the local level.
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Chapter 4 Collaborative M anagement and 
Extractive Reserves
This chapter will discuss attempts to operationalize collective resource 
management. It will discuss a hybrid approach to the management of 
common property resources in which rural communities work in partnership 
with government, a process often referred to as collaborative or co­
management. This chapter will begin with a general discussion on 
collaborative management regimes including the different definitions, types 
and dimensions of these regimes. It will also present the design principals 
identified in the literature which are relevant to creating co-management 
arrangements with the goal of enhancing long-term community 
participation. Afterwards, this chapter will review collaborative 
management efforts in Brazil through a discussion of the Extractive Reserve 
conservation category. This section will briefly describe the factors that led 
to the creation of this collectively managed conservation unit. Then, it will 
review some of the characteristics of this type of reserve including the 
process of establishment and other legislative aspects.
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4.1 Collaborative Management
The recognition of the value of local resource users in the process of resource 
conservation and management has led to formalised policy initiatives which 
are based on shared responsibility over resources between communities and 
government. Participatory management, community based management, 
collaborative management or co-management are all terms used to describe 
these arrangements.
In the collaborative management model, the focus is no longer placed on the 
need for a ‘Leviathan’ or centralised control. Instead, new approaches stress 
the importance of decentralised governance and user participation in the 
management process. In these arrangements, local resource users play a 
pivotal role in decision-making, implementation and enforcement. Jentoft 
(1998* 425) notes that this approach is supported by two main premises. 
First, the knowledge accumulated over time by resource users is often 
complementary to more formal scientific knowledge producing more 
‘enlightened, effective and equitable remedies and solutions to management 
challenges.’ Second, the participation of resource users in the various 
management stages legitimises these arrangements, thereby contributing to 
their compliance and resulting in more effective conservation strategies.
Co-management is often described as a middle course between pure State 
management and pure communal property regimes. It involves the 
recognition and legitimisation of traditional or informal local-level 
management systems. Authors warn that experiences in co-management 
are still at an incipient stage and, due to this, along with a variety of 
contextual factors identified as necessary for their success, these innovative 
approaches should not be regarded as a panacea for halting resource 
depletion.
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4.2 Definitions of co-management
Definitions of co-management vary but, as we can see through some of the 
most accepted definitions, there are important common features. Sen and 
Nielson (1996: 406) define co-management as 'an arrangement where 
responsibility for resource management is shared between the government 
and user groups.' As much of the experience to date in co-management is 
emerging from the field of fisheries, one of the most useful definitions of this 
concept is offered by the International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources 
Management. They define collaborative management as 'a dynamic 
partnership where the capacities and interests of local resource users and 
communities are complemented by the ability of the State to provide 
enabling policies and legislation as well as enforcement and other 
assistance' (ICLARM, 1998: 2).
Berkes and Pomeroy (1997: 446) relate co-management directly to fisheries 
development where co-management entails the ‘sharing of responsibility 
and authority between the government and the community of local fishers 
to manage a fishery.’ Jentoft (1989: 144) defines it as ‘placing management 
part way between government regulation and community self-management.’ 
West and Brechin (1991:25) see co-management as ‘the substantial sharing 
of protected areas management responsibility and authority among 
government officials and local people.’ Probably the most comprehensive 
definition of these types of regimes came from the October 1996 World 
Conservation Congress in Montreal which defined co-management as 'a 
partnership in which government agencies, local communities and resource 
users, non governmental organisations and other stakeholders share, as 
appropriate to each context, the authority and responsibility for the 
management of a specific territory or a set of resources' (McNeeley 1996: 96). 
Although many of the experiences in co-management have taken place in 
fisheries development, these arrangements are not limited to this field and 
can be applied to a diversity of contexts. They are often developed within
113
the framework of protected area management but are not limited to these 
areas as demonstrated by experiences in Norwegian and Japanese fisheries 
(see Baland and Platteau, 1996).
Common to most definitions is the sharing of power between governments 
and communities. The benefits sought by all actors in co-management 
consist of more appropriate, more efficient and more equitable management. 
These experiences are often evaluated in terms of increased equity, reduced 
administrative and enforcement costs, a change in the sense of ownership 
by appropriators, a higher degree of acceptability and rule compliance, 
improved information about the resource, improved social cohesion in the 
community, and more participation (Pomeroy and Williams, 1994). The 
processes by which these goals are achieved through co-management 
include economic and social development, the decentralisation of resource 
management decisions as well as using co-management as a mechanism for 
reducing conflict through a process of participatory democracy. In co­
management, resource users benefit from participating in management 
decisions that affect their welfare; government has the benefit of a reduced 
challenge to its authority. In the Brazilian context, these arrangements are 
also being sought as a method of protecting traditional societies, such as 
artisanal fishers or gatherers, from the growing pressures arising from 
unsustainable development practices.
Types of co-management
Sen and Neilson (1996) argue that a broad spectrum of co-management 
arrangements exists, varying significantly in terms of the balance between 
community and government involvement. What dictates the balance of 
power between the two groups should be their comparative advantage in 
offering different elements essential to any collaborative management 
regime. Baland and Platteau (1996) disaggregate what governments and 
communities can offer to this process. The author argues that local resource
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users can offer local ecological knowledge as well as an insider 
understanding of the socio-cultural context. Often, local groups have self­
monitoring systems that can be significantly less costly than centralised 
control. Conflict resolution mechanisms through traditional techniques to 
minimise the incidence of interpersonal conflicts are also often available.
Baland and Platteau (1996) argue that while communities have much to 
offer the collaborative management process, government can and should 
support communities in areas that complement capabilities at the local level. 
Such areas include providing a legal framework which legitimises local 
identity and rights over certain resources. The State can provide technical 
assistance or guidance to user groups or communities. Where relevant, the 
State can also provide (or help attract external agents that can provide) 
economic incentives for participation and rule compliance. Finally, the 
State can play an important role in monitoring functions where 
decentralised monitoring needs external support. Although the 
relationship between the State and resource users or community in 
collaborative management should be based on the concept of 
complementarity, there are often other factors that influence the 
distribution of responsibility. For example, the State may not be willing to 
decentralise decision-making power to the community. The following 
section presents the different variations of collaborative management 
followed by examples.
Collaborative management arrangements include a wide range of 
combinations of community self-management and centralised control. At 
one end of the range is the 'instructive' version, where the State creates 
mechanisms for dialogue with users and informs them of government 
management decisions. At the other end are 'informative' arrangements, 
where the user group informs government of decisions made at the local 
level. Where co-management is 'informative' the role of the State is reduced.
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Sen and Nielson offer five generalised types of arrangements in their 
classification of twenty-two co-management case studies. Building on 
earlier work by McCay and Jentoft (1995), they establish the classifications 
presented graphically below-
Figure 4.1 Spectrum of co-management arrangements
informative.
Government based management advisory
co-operative
consultative
instructive
Community based management
(Source: Sen and Neilson, 1996-405)
Spectrum of co-management arrangements
Where co-management is instructive, there is only a minimal exchange of 
information between government and users. This type of co-management 
regime is only different from centralised management in the sense that the 
mechanisms exist for dialogue with users, but the process itself tends to 
comprise government informing users on the decisions they plan to make.
Consultative co-management is characterised by the existence of 
mechanisms for governments to consult with users, although under these 
arrangements all final decisions are taken by government. Co-operative co­
management is the variation that exemplifies best the goals of co­
management. Ideally, under these arrangements, government and users co­
operate together as equal partners in decision-making. It is often referred 
to as the 'truest' form of co-managment. Another variation of the co­
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m anagement concept is characterised by the advisory role th a t governments 
play in management decisions. Under these arrangem ents, local 
communities have the primary responsibility for management. Only under 
inform ative  arrangem ents do local communities shoulder more 
responsibility in management decisions, implementation and enforcement. 
Under these arrangements, the government has delegated and 
decentralised decision-making to user groups who, in return, inform 
government of decisions made at this level. In their review of co­
management case studies, Sen and Nielson (1996-410) categorise twenty- 
two cases in term s of the balance of power between communities and the 
State. Examples drawn from this document are presented in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 Examples of different types of co-management 
Instructional
Inland waters, Bangladesh. In 1986, the government of Bangladesh initiated 
a New Fisheries management Policy aimed at improving and sustaining 
open inland water fisheries as well as promoting greater equity in the 
distribution of benefits of the fishery. The main policy instrum ent was to 
discontinue the leasing of public water bodies to middlemen and replace this 
system with direct access rights to fishermen. The government hoped for a 
partnership between themselves and fisher communities. One of the most 
notable features of the new fisheries management regimes th a t came into 
operation following the introduction of this new policy was the active 
participation of NGOs as intermediaries between fisheries and government. 
One NGO took over the management of over 800 water-bodies, obtaining 
long term  leases and entering into a co-operative arrangem ent with landless 
people to fish the water-bodies. However, the NGO made all financial and 
management decisions and group members (fishers) are only responsible for 
labour inputs. Limited input by fishermen in the process makes the 
classification of these arrangem ents as instructional.
Co-operative
Customary Fishing Rights Areas, Fiji. The fisheries co-management regime 
in the fishing rights areas of Fiji is, in general, a co-operative effort between 
national government and resource users. The fishing rights areas (qoliqoli), 
officially term ed Customary Fishing Rights Areas, are under the control of 
clan chiefs and recognised by government. Management of the subsistence 
fishery is decided upon and controlled by the traditional authorities but 
resnonsibilitv for the management of the small scale commercial fisherv is
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shared between the traditional clan chiefs and government in a complex 
arrangem ent. Licenses for commercial fishing are issued by the fisheries 
Division but before applying, fishermen m ust first obtain a perm it from the 
social unit in whose area he intends to operate. This is issued by the 
District Commissioner, if the tribal group consents. Thus, the traditional 
authority determines whether commercial fishing can occur and the 
conditions on the license concerning target species, perm itted gear, areas of 
exclusion and conservation rules. As m anagem ent control is equally shared 
by the community and national government, th is case is classified as co­
operative management.
Informative
Mechanised beach seine fishery, Mozambique. In 1981, the beach seine 
fishermen were organised into a Fishermen's Association. This enabled the 
District Adm inistrator to discuss and negotiate with one group. The 
Association regulates fishing activities, calls meetings which local 
government officials attend and makes decisions concerning the opening and 
closure of the fishery. The government officials do not interfere in the 
decisions th a t are taken. A letter (also signed by the District 
Administration) is then sent to Provincial authorities informing them of the 
decisions taken. This is submitted in proposal form to central government 
for authorisation. As the administrative approval process takes a long time, 
many of the decisions proceed without formal government authorisation. In 
effect, the authorisation procedure informs government of the decisions 
taken by the Association.
Source: (Sen and Nielson, 1996: 410)
The degree of responsibility and/or authority th a t government and local
resource users command differ between cases and depends upon country
and site specific conditions (ICLARM, 1998). The categories presented above
are clearly a simplification of how co-management arrangem ents function in
practice. Most of these arrangem ents are combinations of these five types
and it is not uncommon for the balance of power and involvement to change
over time. Some would argue tha t the instructive  type presented above
represents a top-down model which should not be considered a valid type of
co-management due to the lack of partnership between government and the
community. For this same reason the inform ative  type is often associated
with self-governance and as the balance of power is unequal, this category
also falls short of ideal forms of co-management (ICLARM, 1998). While
there is little agreement on which of these is most effective, most would
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agree that the success of each approach is dependent on a series of 
contextual factors.
4.3 Conditions for successful co-management
The analysis of thriving co-management case studies has resulted in a wide 
consensus that these arrangements may only work effectively under a 
limited range of conditions. Baland and Platteau (1996) warn of the danger 
of putting too much reliance on co-management and user involvement as the 
solution to management problems. After a review of the classic co­
management case studies they note that,
'Unfortunately, there is presently no conclusive evidence that user 
communities can be 'the solution1 to problems of resource depletion 
and ecological destruction, even within a co-management framework, 
and that the best documented case illustrating such an approach, 
that of Japanese fisheries, only shows that user communities can be 
made effective partners for resource management in certain 
circumstances’ (Baland and Platteau, 1996:351).
Using the key principals and conditions for successful CPRs initially 
developed by Ostrom, ICLARM (1998) has developed an expanded list based 
in their review of co-management experiences in Asia. From their work, 
certain pre-conditions are emerging which appear to be central to the 
chances of developing and sustaining successful co-management 
arrangements. These conditions should not be taken as complete since 
continued research is needed to reveal more about co-management 
arrangements and the factors leading to successful performance.
Apart from those put forward by Ostrom (1990, 1992) as key principals for 
long enduring and robust CPRs, ICLARM (1998), has contributed a number
of new and innovative factors relevant to collaborative management regimes.
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Their study highlights the importance of participation since successful co­
management cases were characterised by the fact that most of the 
individuals affected by the management arrangements were included in the 
group (through membership and voting rights) responsible for making and 
changing the rules. Early and continuous participation of partners in 
planning and implementation of co-management was also related to their 
success (Pomeroy and Katon, nd). Participation is related to other key 
factors that this study identified. For example, a sense of ownership of the 
process is identified as important. Active participation of partners is 
directly related to their sense of ownership and commitment to the co­
management process.
Another key factor identified is the importance of congruence between the 
co-management structure and existing traditional social and cultural 
institutions. When a co-management approach is being implemented where 
common property resource regimes already exist, these traditional 
institutions should be respected (Pomeroy and Katon, nd). Co-management 
should strengthen and revitalise these structures where they exist. As 
discussed in the previous section, these traditional systems have often 
worked well at meeting community management objectives along with 
ecological sustainability, social equity and economic efficiency.
Another factor the Pomeroy study expanded on is how the scale of co­
management initiatives can dictate their effectiveness. Scale is 
fundamental in most co-management initiatives (ICLARM, 1998). 
Appropriate scale depends on the area’s ecology, people and level of 
management. In terms of its members, Pomeroy, like Ostrom, observes that 
smaller groups are more manageable than larger groups. Where a large 
number of people are involved, they suggest sub-dividing them into smaller 
groups in order to facilitate supervision, control and management.
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An interesting factor not mentioned by Ostrom is the need for a process of 
social preparation and value formation to take place prior to the planning 
and implementation of a co-management process. This process may involve 
a variety of elements including building or strengthening the institutions 
that will later take on management responsibilities. Recommendations 
from a recent study of CARICOM19 fisheries highlight the importance of this. 
'Fishers will need to be organised and existing organisations strengthened 
to participate in and undertake management. Fishers will also need 
training on resource planning and management, participation and 
leadership, among other topics' (Pomeroy and Brown, 1999:567). The 
inability to sustain co-management may be partly finked to insufficient time 
dedicated to this process. An indicator of 'good social preparation' for this 
type of initiative can be demonstrated by positive attitudes towards 
collective action and the readiness for community members to take on 
responsibility for resource management and decision-making.
Because collaborative management approaches are new to both 
communities and government, changes in attitudes must accompany 
decentralised policy approaches to fisheries management. Brown stresses 
that the effectiveness of co-management is largely dependent on the ability 
of government structures to adapt to these changing approaches. He states 
that 'the building and strengthening of institutional structures [at the local 
and State level] are essential ingredients for the operation of co­
management regimes' (Brown, undated: 10). Drawing from his experience 
reviewing the opportunities and constraints for co-management in the 
CARICOM region he warns that 'Old attitudes which cling to the fishing 
effort expansion and the transfer of technology mode, will take sometime to 
give way to the order of the day' (Brown, undated: 10). Public awareness 
and education programmes for resource user groups as well as for fisheries
19Caribbean Community
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department staff can be important in preparing all parties for effective 
participation in fisheries resource management.
In the framework from Oakerson (1992) to analyse the key factors in the 
success (or failure) of co-management regimes, ICLARM identifies a series 
of contextual variables that require consideration in order to understand the 
positive or negative outcomes of co-management regimes (ICLARM, 
1998:10) or, to put in other words, to understand why, under certain 
conditions communities are willing to engage and participate in co­
management regimes. Not every design principle is relevant or applicable 
to every case study. The contextual factors presented below are of differing 
importance depending on the ecological and social context. These factors 
are organised into four categories with three of the four occurring at the 
community (fisher) level and the fourth external to the community. A 
discussion of these variables follows.
Contextual variables
It is often the recognition of resource depletion by a community that 
provides the necessary incentive for collective action to protect this resource. 
This depletion could be the result of an increase or change in technology 
within the user community itself, natural changes in stock or depredation of 
local resources by outside users (industrial fishers, pollution, etc.). The fact 
that communities mobilise in self-defence against threats to their resource 
base does not ensure that they will maintain these efforts over time. The 
likelihood of this taking place rests on other qualities. Jentoft (1999:53) 
asserts that not only do viable fishing communities require viable fish 
stocks but the reverse is also true, Viable fish stocks require viable 
communities.' He states that communities with robust local institutions for 
resource management along with a strong community are an important 
factor in the appropriate management of fisheries and therefore in the 
maintenance of viable stocks.
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According to Oakerson's (1992) framework, the market attributes of a 
community fishery are also an important factor influencing the behaviour of 
fishers. Resource problems are often market-based. Market attributes can 
affect the incentives for resource use and effort levels along with rule 
compliance. Depending on whether fisheries are commercial, recreational or 
subsistence, user groups will be affected differently by market changes. 
These attributes also include those related to the operation and function of 
the market along with the characteristics of the relationships between 
fishers and fish traders or middlemen. There are often power relations 
between buyers and suppliers that constrain fishers’ participation. 
Important factors related to the local market context can also include 
variables such as the availability of credit for investment purposes.
Socio-economic and socio-cultural variables are often the source of positive 
and negative incentives for communities to engage in collaborative 
management. These variables include religious beliefs and practices, 
traditions and customs, a shared historical legacy, economic heterogeneity 
or homogeneity, race and others. These factors can result in a strong 
community identity or they can often divide communities, complicating the 
process of co-management.
As discussed in the previous chapter, communities are usually seen from the 
outside as homogenous entities. ICLARM (1998) reinforces the importance 
of understanding difference and diversity in these settings as they can 
create both challenges and opportunities for the resource management 
process. Some authors suggest another key socio-cultural attribute that 
often leads to incentives to co-operate (Ostrom, 1990; Runge 1986). 
Homogeneity within a community is viewed as a key design principle in 
both CPR regimes and co-management arrangements. The more a 
community exhibits a high degree of social, cultural and economic 
homogeneity in terms of kinship, ethnicity, religion, livelihood strategies etc. 
the higher the likelihood of co-operation. This discussion of homogeneity is
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often associated with that of social capital or social cohesion within the 
community. Heterogeneity within the community can often be the source of 
conflict and disunion.
The degree to which fishers or other resource users have developed an 
understanding over time of the ecological systems upon which they depend 
is also seen as important. Often communities have developed an insider’s 
understanding of these resources such as the location of certain plants and 
animals, and their habitats. Sensitivity to these biological systems can 
strengthen the understanding of the need for conservation. There is a 
generally accepted assumption that the higher the degree of dependence (or 
at least perceived dependence) on a particular resource the more likely it is 
for resource appropriators to engage in activities to protect these resources. 
This is especially true if alternative sources of livelihood within the 
community are scarce.
The institutional and organisational arrangements at the community level 
are also important in creating a viable environment for successful co­
management. Institutional arrangements involve the rights and rules 
which regulate the use of the resources in question. The existence of 
traditional institutions often provides an important building block for 
successful co-management regimes. Long-term experience in managing 
common property can make the transition to collaborative management 
more efficient and effective. How community members participate in these 
regimes is also relevant since a history of collective action and mobilisation 
in the administration of these resources can contribute to the social cohesion 
and sense of individual responsibility necessary for the success of 
collaborative management regimes.
Organisational arrangements refer to the characteristics of these 
institutions such as issues of representation and decision-making 
procedures. They also refer to who participates in these structures and who
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does not. An analysis of these arrangements also involves the identification 
of community power structures, both traditional and new, within the 
community. Essential to the success of both organisational and institutional 
arrangements is their legitimacy and the degree to which resource 
appropriators comply with management rules.
External Variables
Institutional and organisational arrangements external to the community 
can also affect the degree to which user groups co-operate in co-management. 
The effectiveness of the national institutions which will support these 
arrangements such as environmental ministries or fisheries agencies can be 
an important factor in determining the success of these regimes. Although 
embarking on co-management as an alternative to past polices, the agencies 
may not yet be ready to pursue such initiatives. Co-management requires 
government agencies to deal with local communities as partners. This 
approach is relatively new and many agencies and their representatives are 
often still stuck in their top-down legacy.
Requirements and objectives at the national level may be incongruent with 
those at the local level. National organisations may not respect local 
communities in terms of their potential to be effective partners in the 
conservation process. The legitimacy and effectiveness of these 
organisations is also essential. They will provide the anchor for co­
management arrangements especially when the idea for creating these 
arrangements comes from them and not from the community itself. This is 
especially important for developing countries where co-management is seen 
to be attractive for its cost saving characteristics. For co-management to 
work, government must hold to its promises.
Factors exogenous to the resource-base and local community level can also 
influence the outcomes of co-management regimes. These factors are 
usually beyond the control of local resource users but may nevertheless have
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important impacts. These factors include policy changes at the national 
level or political and macro-economic changes. They may also include 
changes in the natural environment (hurricanes, natural stock fluctuations) 
which can effect decisions made at the local level. These types of changes 
effect the broader environment within which these exist. For this reason, it 
is important that any analysis of these regimes takes a historical and 
dynamic perspective.
The environment that the combination of these contextual factors creates 
influences the likelihood that fishers (or other resource users) will co­
operate and contribute to the co-management process. The degree to which 
appropriators participate is an essential element in measuring regime 
success. The outcomes of these initiatives will be dependent on these factors 
as well as the interaction between user groups and other partners such as 
government in the co-management process. According to ICLARM (1998), 
the performance of co-management can be evaluated at two levels. The first 
is whether the process is advantageous in comparison with other types of 
management arrangements. These advantages include equity, greater cost 
effectiveness, an increased sense of ownership by resource users, a higher 
degree of acceptability and rule compliance, improved social cohesion in the 
community and more participation (Pomeroy and Williams, 1994). The 
second level of evaluation is related to the meeting of specific management 
objectives. This level of evaluation centres on performance as well as 
measuring the impacts of these activities on both the human and 
biophysical environment.
As we have seen in this section, there are many variations of co­
management arrangements. Their classification is in part dependent on the 
balance of responsibility between government and resource user 
communities. They are also dependent on certain endowments or 
characteristics that influence the type of co-management as well as their 
potential for success. These include both internal factors such as the socio-
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economic characteristics of the community as well as characteristics of the 
resource itself. Internal factors include the size and make-up of the resource 
user group as well as their connection and traditional knowledge of the 
resource in question. External factors involve the readiness and willingness 
of government to get involved in co-management. Both sets of factors 
influence the relationship between resource users and their environment 
which provides the basis for building co-management arrangements.
The following section will review a relatively new approach to resource 
management adopted as a policy instrument by the Brazilian Government 
in 1990 in response to deforestation and pressures on traditional resource 
user groups in Amazonia. It is a type of collaborative management 
arrangement called an Extractive Reserve. This section will describe some 
of the events which led to the creation of this innovative conservation 
category as well as some of its major features.
4.4 Extractive Reserves
There is growing official recognition in Brazil of the role of traditional 
resource users and their management systems in environmental 
conservation. Extractive Reserves are being used as an increasingly 
important policy instrument by the Brazilian Government, particularly 
through the Centre for Traditional Populations (CNPT) within IBAMA. 
Since their introduction in 1990, Extractive Reserves have focused on 
protecting terrestrial and other inland ecological systems and populations. 
From 1989 to 1996 there were only two reserves created which focused on 
aquatic resources; Pirajubae in Santa Catarina and the case study for this 
thesis, Arraial do Cabo in the state of Rio de Janeiro (See Table 4.1.)
A list made available by CNPT indicates an increasing trend towards the
establishment of Marine reserves. Of 22 reserves currently being set up, 18
focus on water resources with the majority (13) encompassing open water
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marine environments in coastal areas (See Table 4.2). This policy trend is 
significant in tha t it represents the first government-sponsored effort to 
protect the common property resources upon which small-scale fishers 
depend. Interestingly, these developments have been initiated not through 
a departm ent of fisheries but through the CNPT, a branch of the Brazilian 
environmental control agency (IBAMA) th a t focuses on the sustainable 
development of traditional populations.
Table 4.1 Extractive Reserves in Brazil
Name State Decree # Area (ha) Pop. Activities
Practised
Alto Jurua Acre 98,863/90 506,186 5,821 Rubber
tapping
Chico Mendes Acre 99,144/90 970,570 12,017 Brazil nuts, 
copaiba, 
rubber 
tapping
Rio Cajari Amapa 99,145/90 481,650 3,639 Brazil nuts, 
copaiba, 
rubber 
tapping, acai
Rio Ouro 
Preto
Rondonia 533/92 204,583 775 Brazil nuts, 
copaiba, 
rubber 
tapping
Pirajubae S. Catarina 534/92 1,444 690 shell fish 
gathering
Cfiriaco Maranhao 535/92 7,050 844 Babassu,
subsistence
agriculture
Norte de 
Tocantins
Tocantins 532/92 9,280 320 Babassu,
subsistence
agriculture
Quilombo do 
Freixal
Maranhao 536/92 9,542 1,080 Babassu,
subsistence
agriculture,
fishing
Mata Grande Maranhao 92 10,450 776 Babassu,
subsistence
agriculture
Arraial do 
Cabo
Rio de 
Janeiro
96 56,769 1,500 Fishing, shell 
collecting
(Source- Rueda and Murrieta, 1995; Hall, 1997b- 104; Cardoso, 1999:153)
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Table 4.2 Plans for Future Extractive Reserves
Name State Disrict Area
(ha)
# of
Famili
es
RESEX Auati-Parana AM Fonte
Boa/Japuri
90,000 178
RESEX do Baizo Jurui AM Jurui/Uarini 188.000
RESEX do Lago do Tucuru PA Tucuru/Breu
Branco/Novo
Repartimento
290,000 1000
RESEX do Rio Jutas AM Jutas 250,630 116
RESEX do Riozinho da 
Liberdade
AC Cruzeiro do Sul 400,000 178
RESEX do Lago do Catui AM Tefe
RESEX Marinha do Batoque CE Aquiraz 6,678 135
RESEX Marinha do Delta do 
Parnaiba
PI/MA Ilha Grande (PI)/ 
Araioses (MA)
27,560 3600
RESEX Marinha do Soure PA Soure 128,000 278
RESEX Marinha de Itacare BA Itacare
RESEX Marinha da Mata Norte PE Igarassu/Goiana 420
RESEX de Arumanduba PA Arumanduba/Al
meirim
100
RESEX Marinha do Sucuriju AP Amapa 10,400 68
RESEX Marinha de Alcobaca BA Alcobaca
RESEX do Pimental PA Curralinho
RESEX do Lago do 
Capananzinho
AM Manicore
RESEX Marinha de Augusto 
Correia
PA Augusto Correia
RESEX Marinha de Braganca PA Braganca
RESEX Marinha de Curuci PA Curuci
RESEX Marinha de Maracani PA Maracani
RESEX Marinha de Santarem 
Novo
PA
RESEX Marinha de Sao Joao da 
Ponta
PA Sao Joao da 
Ponta
(Source- www.ibama.org.br)
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Brazilian fisheries management, discussed in depth in Chapter 2, has 
largely consisted of the transfer of approaches used in developed countries 
(such as quotas and licensing) to an ecological and social context which is 
radically different. Efforts have also focused primarily on large-scale 
fishing activities by offering generous financial incentives along with tax 
concessions and cheap credit. Recently though, environmental concerns 
such as marine and coastal zone degradation along with social concerns 
such as employment generation and food security, have led policy makers to 
seek alternatives to the status quo.
Extractive reserves are a type of collaborative management regime where 
government works in partnership with local communities towards the 
sustainable use of resources. Until the establishment of the Extractive 
Reserve in Arraial do Cabo, RJ, the concept and discussion surrounding 
their creation was always associated with inland or terrestrial resources. 
This is apparent in the definition presented in Decree no. 98.897 that 
created the extractive reserve (RESEX) conservation category on January 
30, 1990. Article I of this decree states that, ‘Extractive reserves are 
territorial spaces designated for the self-sustaining use and conservation of 
renewable natural resources by extractivist populations’ (author’s emphasis) 
(Rueda and Murrieta, 1995). It is likely that this land bias exists because 
the struggles that led to the creation of these categories took place far from 
the Brazilian coastline. In fact, the earliest reserves established were 
located in the north of the country and only later applied to areas outside of 
Amazonia (See Table 4.2).
History of Extractive Reserves
It was largely the years of struggle and collective action of the rubber 
tappers in Amazonia that provided the historical underpinning for the 
creation Extractive Reserves. As previously mentioned, until the 1960s 
Amazonia was seen by the Brazilian military regime as a vast and empty
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territory in need of conquest and integration. Developing Amazonia was 
considered the missing link for achieving Brazil's economic potential. 
During this period, significant financial incentives were put in place which 
supported environmentally destructive activities such as mining, 
commercial logging, cattle ranching and poorly planned resettlement 
projects. Political and economic goals behind these programmes resulted in 
major changes in practices in rural areas previously used primarily by 
traditional extractivist populations. As approximately half of the rural 
population of this region is at least partially dependent on terrestrial and 
aquatic extractive activities in order to meet their basic livelihood needs, 
these land use changes have had important livelihood impacts (Hall, 1997b).
The rubber boom in the second half of the 19th century, propelled by the 
invention of the pneumatic tire in 1888 brought workers from the drought- 
prone Northeast of the country to work on rubber estates (seringais) in 
Amazonia. These estates were managed by a system of debt bondage in 
which workers unable to accumulate the necessary resources to leave the 
seringal were effectively slaves. With the crash of international prices after 
1912, many large plantation owners abandoned their estates leaving many 
seringeiros to fend for themselves. But although relieved of the oppressive 
system imposed by the rubber estates, they still face many challenges. 
Living in remote areas and largely isolated, they are still heavily dependant 
on middlemen who control their access to the market place. Also, pressures 
on their lands resulting from encroaching cattle ranchers and loggers 
created an environment of growing conflict and tension during the 1970s.
Allegretti (1994-22) identifies four periods that define the process that led to 
the creation of Extractive Reserves. The first period (1973-1976) is 
characterised by the empates or stand-offs that the rubber tappers 
employed to defend their territory in the face of encroachment from Paulista 
cattle ranchers and loggers benefiting from Sudam tax incentives. These 
stand-offs often involved men, women and children who would physically
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block deforestation activities. The first empate took place in the 
municipality of Brasileia in Acre in 1973. By 1988, some 40 had taken place 
throughout the region. Using this strategy, the rubber tappers made 
significant strides in their fight against these groups. Led by Chico Mendes 
and Wilson Pinheiro, both rural union leaders who were eventually 
murdered as a result of their involvement, the rubber tappers’ movement 
gained momentum. Support for the rubber tappers movement also came 
from interested academics and international NGOs such as OXFAM.
The second period (1976-1980) in this process was characterised by the 
recognition by the State that the rubber tappers had legal rights over their 
areas. This implied that compensation would have to be paid to those 
tappers that were forced to leave their plots. Also, some of the rubber 
tappers, represented by the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers 
(Contag), managed to make agreements with the fazendeiro or large land 
owner whereby tappers would be allotted small plots and the fazendeiro 
would be left with a larger one which could be used for taking advantage of 
the cattle ranching subsidies available. During this period, while some 
rubber tappers left with minimal monetary compensation, others remained 
farming small plots allocated to them.
During the third period (1980-1985) the federal government encouraged 
colonisation programmes for both small farmers from the South as well as 
for the rubber tappers of the region. Each family was allocated up to 100 
hectares. It was thought that by resettling the rubber tappers, they could 
be transformed in to more conventional types of agricultural production. 
The result, often, was the opposite. Where small farmers faced problems 
with agricultural production, they often learned from the tappers how to 
benefit from forest resources (Anderson and Allegretti, 1994).
The final period (1985-1990) saw the culmination of a process that led up to 
the legislation creating Extractive Reserves. The effects of the changing
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Brazilian political climate, with the hand over to civilian leadership in 1985, 
only served to further strengthen the rubber tappers resolve to protect their 
livelihoods. This was manifested in part by scaling up the struggle to the 
national level with the formation of lobbying groups, notably the National 
Council for Rubber tappers (CNS) in 1985. Regional organisation helped to 
bring the struggle of the rubber tappers to international media attention 
which portrayed the movement as a critical defender of the environment in 
Amazonia (Hall, 1991). Other factors that drew attention toward Amazonia 
during this period were increasing criticisms of World Bank-sponsored 
resettlement programmes, such as POLONORESTE. Another key 
occurrence was the death in 1988 of Chico Mendes, the father of the rubber 
tappers' movement, who was murdered by a local rancher. His death 
attracted world*wide attention and highlighted the rubber-tappers' struggle. 
With the worlds' attention focused on environmental problems in Amazonia, 
the country’s new constitution, ratified in 1988, was pressured to provide for 
increased environmental protection.
In 1989, the concept of the Extractive Reserves was formally included as one 
of the direct use conservation categories in Brazilian conservation 
legislation. Since 1990, ten federal extractive reserves have been created 
and many more are at early stages of development (See Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
4.5 Creation and Development
There are three phases in the establishment of both terrestrial and aquatic
Extractive Reserves. The first entails a formal request developed by the
traditional extractivists in a given area that describes the (socio-economic,
demographic, etc.) setting in which the reserve will function along with
arguments in support of their proposal. If approved (by IBAMA/CNPT and
then signed by the President of the Republic), the implementation stage
follows. This stage involves the development of a utilisation plan which
defines who, when and how resources can be used, in essence the social
contract between users. This plan must then approved by IBAMA/CNPT
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thereby defining and codifying the rights and responsibilities of government, 
the representative resource user association as well as those of the resource 
users themselves.
The third stage begins with the successful termination of the second and is 
by far the longest and most challenging stage. During this phase the 
Utilization Plan is operationalized and strengthened to increase its long­
term resilience. In the following section, these phases will be explored in 
more detail. They are included here for the reader to have a clearer idea of 
the relationship between the theory surrounding common property regimes 
and the links between this theory and environmental management practices 
in Brazil.
Article 1 of Decree no. 98.897 created the Extractive Reserve (RESEX) 
conservation category on January 30, 1990. This document defines them as, 
'...territorial spaces destined for the purpose of sustainable use and the 
conservation of natural renewable resources, by extractive populations 
(Felippe, nd* 16 author’s translation).’20 Article 2 of the same document 
declares that 'The State will create extractive reserves in territorial spaces 
of social and ecological interest. Areas considered of ecological and social 
interest are those that have natural characteristics which enable their 
sustainable use without jeopardising its conservation' (ibid: 26).
IBAMA's internal decree, the Manual for the Creation and Legalisation of 
Extractive Reserves outlines three main phases in establishing extractive 
reserves. The decree specifies the process by which extractive reserves are 
approved and legally created (Initial Request and Legal Creation Phase). It 
defines the procedures for the development of a Utilisation Plan which will 
outline the collaborative management arrangements created amongst the
20 Art 1 - As Reservas Extrativistas sao espagos territoriais destinados a exploragao auto- 
sustentavel e conservagao dos recursos naturais renovaveis por populagao extrativista.
Art 2 - O Poder Executivo criara reservas extrativistas em espagos territoriais considerados 
de interesse ecologico e social.
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State, resources users and wider community (Implementation Phase). It 
also describes the support that should be provided by IBAMA over the long 
term to ensure sustainability of the initiative (Consolidation and 
Development Phase).
Phase 1 - Initial Request and Legal Creation
An Extractive Reserve is created when a presidential decree declaring the 
reserve is published. In order to reach this point, extractivists in 
collaboration with NGOs, local universities or IBAMA itself, submit a 
proposal requesting its creation to CNPT/IBAMA which, once approved, is 
forwarded to the President of the Republic. This proposal must include 
arguments supporting the creation of the reserve (Exposigao de Motivos) 
(Allegretti, 1994). It must also include a technical report (Relatorio Tecnico) 
summarising the social, environmental, economic, and any land tenure 
issues concerning the site in question.
There are three components which must be present in order for the initial 
application to be approved. These relate to the physical area, the economic 
activities in which local populations engage and the characteristics of the 
population itself. In terms of physical characteristics, extractive reserves 
were initially conceptualised as terrestrial spaces. With the creation of the 
Pirajudae reserve (located in a closed estuary) in the state of Santa 
Catarina and now the Arraial do Cabo RESEX, representing the first open 
water RESEX, the definition of extractive reserves is broadening. Despite 
these changes, the essence remains the same. For an extractive reserve to 
be set up, the resource in question (whether terrestrial or aquatic) must be 
able to be sustainably used.
If the first factor is that a renewable resource exists, the second factor 
demands that these resources are being used in a way that does not 
threaten the resource base. Although the rubber tappers do not five from
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rubber alone and also practice small-scale agriculture, this is done at a scale 
that is considered sustainable. For the fishers in Pirajudae, molluscs 
provide the renewable resource upon which their livelihoods depend and in 
Arraial do Cabo it is the fish that guarantee their livelihoods. Although 
there is no specific mention of common property regimes per se, the 
application should provide proof that historically, the resources in question 
have been managed sustainably. The third element is related to who is 
using these resources, the resident population. Those individuals living off 
the resources must be traditional users of those resources, such as 
seringueiros (rubber tappers), castanheiros (nut gatherers), jangadeiros 
(raft fishers) etc. What is and is not considered traditional is not clearly 
defined and varies from case to case. For the extractivists of Arraial do 
Cabo, as will be discussed later in this thesis, defining who are and who are 
not traditional users of the areas renewable resources drew out deeply 
rooted feelings about local identity and culture.
Having fulfilled the three fundamental prerequisites does not guarantee 
that an Extractive Reserve will be created. The government agency 
responsible for these initiatives, IBAMA, must be able to respond to these 
demands. Conservation priorities at the national level are also a factor in 
determining where scare resources will be allocated (Anderson and 
Allegretti, 1994).
Phase II ~ Implementation
Once a project is approved and the presidential decree published in the 
federal public registry {Diario Oficial), a number of steps need to be taken in 
order to begin the implementation process of the reserve. First, the land 
tenure situation needs to be legalised. Where land is privately owned this 
means expropriation by the State. Where the area is already under State 
control, this process is considerably easier and consists of merely changing 
the area’s legal status. In the case of marine reserves, beaches and aquatic
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areas in Brazil are already controlled by the federal government, which 
simplifies this process. As we will see later, even though aquatic areas are 
not owned by individuals, they are used by groups that may or may not live 
near these areas and excluding some users inevitably causes conflict. In the 
case of Arraial do Cabo, RJ, there were many small-scale fishers from 
nearby municipalities whose access to these resources was threatened by 
the creation of the RESEX A.C.
One of the requirements at the implementation stage is that the community 
be organised in an association which will act as the intermediary between 
the State (IBAMA) and resource users. In most cases, these associations do 
not already exist and must be created. Once an officially registered 
association has been established, a contract is signed between IBAMA and 
the Association giving usufruct rights (Concessao de Direito Real de Usd) for 
a minimum of sixty years (Hall, 1997bl Anderson and Allegretti, 1994). This 
process of ownership distribution and/or recognition effectively creates a 
legalised unit of collective private property or common property. This 
lengthy commitment is included so as to secure user rights over the long­
term and avoid incentives for degrading them in the short-term. Both the 
distribution of ownership rights and access to resources along with the 
creation of an association to manage the RESEX are all measures taken to 
create incentives for long term participation as well as to ensure the 
feasibility of collective management.
It is also at this stage that a Utilisation Plan (Plano de Utilizagao) is 
developed to determine who can use the resources in question and how they 
will be used. In essence this is the social contract, binding the resource 
users to a mutually agreed set of operating rules. Examples of such rules 
could include such issues as required catch size or technology used or they 
could restrict access to important breeding grounds. It is essential that 
these rules are case-specific and reflect the different environmental and 
social scenarios peculiar to each reserve. Decisions over what the rules
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should be are defined by the resource users themselves in a public forum 
where they have the right to vote on decisions made. It is essential that 
resources users participate in this stage since the adherence to rules 
depends to a large degree on their wide spread understanding and prior 
approval.
The Utilisation Plan, along with the process leading to its creation, is also 
important for resolving (or at least revealing) conflicts amongst resource 
users as well as conflicts between resource users and the wider community. 
It also presents the monitoring mechanisms which will be employed to 
ensure conservation of the resource base. Generally speaking, monitoring is 
the combined responsibility of the resource users themselves along with the 
association representing the inhabitants of the reserve and at a higher and 
more formal level, of IBAMA (Anderson and Allegretti, 1994). In the 
RESEX at Arraial do Cabo, there is a fourth component, the voluntary 
environmental monitors (fiscais colab or a dores), which has been added. 
These voluntary monitors are trained by IBAMA, may or may not be 
resource users themselves but have agreed to take on a broader set of 
responsibilities and greater powers related to monitoring.
This utilisation plan must be approved by IBAMA/CNPT. Once the rules 
are established, co-owners can change them but the minimum number of 
inhabitants required to propose a change should also be stated in the 
management plan (Rueda and Murrieta, 1995). Although the State 
maintains ownership of the physical area, individuals granted usufruct 
rights by the management plan will be issued Titulos de Autorizacao de Uso, 
a document which formalises this relationship. Rights to access of reserve 
resources may not be traded or sold between living people {intervivos) and 
can only be passed on through inheritance (Hall, 1997b). This measure 
could also provide increased incentive for sustainable resource use. If 
activities deviate from the Utilisation Plan in a way that causes
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environmental degradation, and therefore unsustainable use, the contract 
can be cancelled (Cardoso, 1999).
In essence, what this process does is create a common property resource 
regime, whether or not it existed previously on an informal basis. The 
Titulos de Autorizacao de Uso codify the fact that each of the resource users 
is a co-owner of the resources in question. The association, in collaboration 
with IBAMA, serves as the conflict resolution and monitoring mechanism in 
order to manage the day-to-day activities and changes that take place 
within the RESEX. It also serves as a centralising force which brings 
resource users together for meetings on rule changes or even as a source of 
information. Allegretti (in Anderson and Allegretti, 1994:41) aptly notes 
that the creation an Extractive Reserve is not neutral and can abruptly 
interrupt existing traditional management systems as well as economic and 
social relations thereby leaving the community in an extremely fragile and 
vulnerable state.
Phase III - Consolidation and Development
The sustainability of any Extractive Reserve is indicated by its performance 
in phase three. Phase three of the process involves the consolidation and 
development of the RESEX. It is not enough just to plant the seed. That 
seed will need to be nurtured over time in order to ensure its long-term 
viability. Phases one and two are just the very beginning of this process. 
Given the long-term nature of these initiatives and the limited experience of 
sustaining these over time, it is still unclear whether economic, social and 
ecological sustainability can be achieved in the long run.
What is clear is that, at the local level, successful outcomes are dependent 
on the long-term participation of resource users in the planning and 
management of the resources upon which their livelihoods depend. 
Resource users must feel that it is in their interest to participate in and
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support these systems over time. This will depend on having incentives in 
place to encourage participation. These can take a variety of forms such as 
financial incentives coming from increasing stocks resulting from better 
conservation measures. Incentives can also emerge from a sense of 
ownership over resources or a strong sense of collective identity.
The ability of collaborative management arrangements, including 
Extractive Reserves, to achieve long-term goals is dependent on many 
factors which were reviewed in the co-management section of this chapter 
and in the preceding chapter on common property resource regimes. These 
factors include internal variables such as the history, culture and shared 
experience of the local community. External factors are also relevant for 
promoting social and economic sustainablity without degrading the resource 
base. These regimes are also susceptible to outside market fluctuations and 
environmental change, factors beyond the control of resource users. In 
Arraial for example, deep-sea drilling platforms are still being serviced 
within the reserve limits and recently the largest type of off shore rig sank 
just outside of the reserves limits, giving rise to serious concerns about 
pollution dangers.
The process which led to the creation of this conservation category has 
influenced the direction of future conservation initiatives. The introduction 
of the Extractive Reserves conservation and development category provided 
an important impetus for the development of a new National System of 
Conservation Units (SNUC). SNUC provides for much greater civic 
participation in the creation and management of these and other units. It 
also puts a stronger emphasis on the social dimensions of biodiverisity 
conservation. After eight years of debate, this law was finally passed in 
July, 2000. If successful over the long term, given the large areas already 
under these regimes, extractive reserves could have a significant nation­
wide impact in terms of meeting sustainable development goals. As Hall 
(1997b) notes, lessons learned from Brazils experience in creating,
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developing and sustaining these initiatives could have an even broader 
relevance in terms of addressing environmental problems in other parts of 
the developing world.
The G 7 - Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforests 
(PPG7)
Since 1990, a multilateral fund supported by the G 7 countries has been 
developed to support sustainable development in Brazil’s Amazon and 
Atlantic rainforests. It aims to conserve the environment through 
development without destroying the natural resource base. Although 
initially earmarked to provide over a billion dollars towards environmental 
initiatives in Brazil, the final budget stood at $350 million (Hall, 1997b). Its 
funding lines are divided into four main areas’ Natural resource policy, 
creation and support for conservation and natural resource management 
units, natural resource management and demonstration projects (Cardoso, 
1999). Within the objectives of the second category, creation and support for 
conservation and natural resource management units, Extractive Reserves 
are an important element. Even though total funds were not as much as 
was originally expected, these funds have been important for supporting the 
creation and development of the four main federal Extractive Reserves in 
Amazonia and will probably play a similar role in future Extractive Reserve 
development. In fact, Extractive Reserves which have benefited from this 
fund remain heavily dependent on this external funding. This brings to 
question the financial sustainability of these initiatives. Although this 
funding is important during incipient stages of creation and development it 
raises concern over the long-term feasibility of these initiatives.
4.6 Summary & Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to provide the reader with an 
understanding of how new approaches to environmental management are
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operationalizing common property resource management. In the past, State 
control and private ownership were the only policy guidelines for 
conservation strategies. The recognition of the important role that resource 
users and local communities can play in conservation has broadened the 
options available to policy makers. Collaborative management is a process 
whereby the State and local communities or resource users share in varying 
degrees responsibility for the management of natural resources. Although 
the idea is relatively new, there are some key preconditions for success that 
are already apparent. Some of these conditions are drawn from experiences 
with common property resources and others have been added as they refer 
to the dynamic relationship between community and the State throughout 
this process as well as to the role of the State.
Key conditions internal to the community include small group size, a history 
of collective action, and respected local leadership with a commitment to the 
process amongst others. Important characteristics at the State level include 
a willingness to decentralise control to the community as well as positive 
attitudes towards the partnership. Other factors external to the community 
that can affect the success of collaborative management arrangements 
include natural changes in resource stocks and flows as well as market 
fluctuations that may influence resource user attitudes and behaviour. A 
fundamental precondition for successful co-management is the active 
participation of the resource users involved.
The second half of this chapter reviewed the concept of Extractive Reserves, 
an approach to conservation and development in Brazil that involves a 
partnership between the State and resource users. Until recently, 
approaches to conservation in Brazil have not involved the participation of 
local resource users in their design or management. In the developing model, 
these populations are at the centre of the process. It presented a brief 
history of how the struggle of the rubber tapper's in Amazonia influenced 
the creation of this conservation category. It also reviewed the three phases
142
involved in the creation and development of Extractive Reserves: Initial 
Request and Legal Creation, Implementation and Consolidation and 
Development. Lastly, this chapter explained how in recent years this model, 
initially developed for the protection of livelihoods and resources in 
terrestrial areas, has been applied to the protection of aquatic resources.
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Chapter 5 M ethodological Approach
This chapter is divided into four sub-sections. The first section defines the 
aims of the study and the framework for analysis that was utilised. It also 
presents the main research question along with subquestions. The second 
presents the general methodological approach to the fieldwork and resulting 
data including the decision to follow a case study design as well as a 
mixture qualitative and quantitative approaches. The third section explains 
why certain methodological tools were selected over others and this section 
also describes how these tools were employed to gather the necessary data. 
The final section presents some of the opportunities and constraints 
encountered during the process of data collection.
5.1 Aims of the study
In order to analyse the potential for Extractive Reserves to encourage 
resource user participation in long-term collective resource conservation in 
Arraial do Cabo, it was necessary to focus on different aspects of the local 
context. This study concentrated on the relationship between the 
traditional resource governing institutions and the newly created Extractive 
Reserve. The aims of this study were to*
144
1. Investigate the resource governing institutions which have 
traditionally governed beach seining activities and determine the 
state of these institutions (weak/robust).
2. Explore the levels of participation in the newly created reserve and 
perception of the reserve by this resource user group.
3. Analyse the community level factors that constrain or provide
potential for long-term participatory conservation.
Overall Research Question/Goal
Are the Maritime Extractive Reserves socially sustainable?
Research Sub - Questions
The following sub-questions were used as a general guide for collecting data 
in the four main areas associated with the analysis framework:
Nature/Ecosystem, Resource Governing Institutions, Politics and Policy, 
People Technology & Culture (See Figure 5.1). The analysis framework was 
adapted from Oakerson (1992) and Berkes and Folke (1994).
Na ture/Ecosvstem
1. What terrestrial and aquatic resources are utilised to support local 
livelihoods?
2. What are the characteristics of these systems?
3. WTiat is the current condition of the natural resources utilised by
fishers?
4. What are the threats to the resource stock and flow?
5. How has the use of natural resources changed over time?
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6. How do fishers perceive and relate/interact w ith their environment?
Traditional Resource Governing Institutions
1. What informal/formal institutions exist to govern local resources?
2. How do canoe fishers participate in these institutions? (level/type)
3. How have these institutions changed over time?
4. What state are they in now? That is, are they robust? Weakened?
Extractive Reserve
1. What is the relationship between the RESEX and traditional resource 
governing institutions?
2. How do canoe fishers participate in this organisation?
3. How do fishers perceive this organisation?
4. What sanctions exist for users to comply with the rules of these 
organisations?
5. What monitoring arrangements exist (on paper/ in practice)?
6. What are the sources of conflict in this organisation?
Peonle/Technolosrv/Culture
1. How are fishers grouped? By gear group? Ethnicity? Physical 
location?
2. What are the cultural and social qualities that exist in this 
community and strengthen or create obstacles for collective action 
and co-operation?
3. What are the sources of conflict that exist within among groups?
4. What changes have taken place that have impacted the local social 
structure?
5. What new technology if any has changed their lives in the recent 
past?
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P olitics and Policy
1. Historically, what role has artisanal fishing played in national level 
fishing policies?
2. What are the objectives of the extractive reserve policy?
3. How did it evolve to include coastal fishing communities?
Patterns of interaction
1. How do these factors interact to create obstacles to and opportunities 
for the long-term collaborative management of local marine 
resources?
Figure 5.1 Framework for Analysis
Regional National and Global Influences
Politics and Policy
People/Technology/
Culture
Nature/Ecosystem 
Physical attributes
Local resource 
governing
Long term 
sustainability 
for RESEX
Patterns of
Interaction/
Institutional
change
Local community
(Adapted from Oakerson (1992) and Berkes and Folke (1998))
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5.2 Research Methods
Qualitative vs. Quantitative tools
The nature of the research questions guided the researcher in the direction 
of a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods. This 
hybrid research approach allows for the contextual exploration where 
qualitative methods are essential, but firmly grounded in the quantitative 
methods employed. This methodological integration also ensures a higher 
degree of accuracy and reliability than either in isolation could offer (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). Another advantage to this approach is that it helps 
capture existing variability within a given community.
Creswell (1994) states that the choice of a qualitative research design rests 
on the lack of theory and previous research on the area in general, the need 
to explore a new area (community perspectives in Brazilian fishery co­
management), and the focus on the process and not only the outcomes. 
Qualitative research is understood as being more concerned with describing 
the characteristics and properties of a process like participation over a 
period of time, than with interpreting the data and information available in 
order to make statements concerning the nature and extent of the process 
which has occurred (Oakley and Marsden, 1990).
Precisely because it is the experience of those people in the field that was of 
relevance to this research, daily interaction was fundamental in gathering 
the necessary data. Gilbert (2001) argues that human behaviour is 
significantly influenced by the setting in which it occurs, and one must 
study that behaviour in situations. The author goes on to say that research 
should be conducted in the setting where all the contextual variables are 
operating. ‘Qualitative evaluation, by its very nature, implies a continuous 
and close contact with the participants of a programme in their own
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environment. The qualitative approach emphasises the importance of 
getting close to project participants in order to understand more 
authentically their realities and the details of their everyday lives (Oakley 
and Marsden, 1990).
The context and setting are of great value especially in terms of 
understanding how the sample community has been affected by the creation 
of the Extractive Reserve and how they in turn affect it. This is especially 
so in terms of the research selected as the lessons learned at this early stage 
of Extractive Marine Reserve establishment along the Brazilian coastline 
can contribute to the creation of future reserves involved in co-operative 
conservation where informal institutions for managing common property 
resources are already in place. Qualitative methods according to Marshall 
and Rossman (1995) can offer the quality, richness and depth of analysis 
which is often absent in quantitative approaches. These indicators guided 
the selection of a hybrid approach to the empirical element of this thesis. 
Where at all possible and appropriate, qualitative methods were 
complemented by quantitative ones. The next section will review the type of 
research design selected.
5.3 Case study research
‘If your main concern is understanding what is happening in a specific 
context, and if you can get access to and co-operation from the people 
involved -  then do a case study’ (Robson, 1993: 143 emphasis omitted). 
Each research strategy has its advantages and disadvantages. Strategies 
should be chosen in terms of their applicability to one's research (Yin, 1994). 
The case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical 
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context using multiple sources of evidence (Robson, 1993). Yin’s (1994) book
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on case studies suggests that they are the most relevant form of research 
strategy when the investigator has little control over events, when the focus 
is on a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context and when the 
research is exploratory in nature. Also, unlike other methodological 
strategies, case studies embrace methodological integration and do not limit 
the researcher to specific methodological tools.
Validity, reliability
The multi-method approach used in this research is also known as 
triangulation. Limitations of one method can be compensated for by the 
strengths of a complementary one (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). Yin notes 
that the unique strength of case studies is their ability to deal with a full 
variety of evidence — documents, interviews, questionnaires and 
observations, both qualitative and quantitative. The information gathered 
was cross-checked to provide a triangulation of methods and to strengthen 
the validity and reliability of the data collected.
An illustration of this method is the way that the total number of fishers in 
Arraial do Cabo was calulated. As no single source of reliable data existed, 
multiple sources were gathered and compared. These sources included 
documents from the fishing guild, membership cards from other fisher’s 
organizations, census data as well as information available from the Port 
Authority and IBAMA.
Tool selection
An important element of the research was the need to understand the 
historical and current processes lying at the root of the dynamic socio­
economic context that surrounds the reserve today. Initially, a review of
reserve documents and informal interviews with reserve management were
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used to identify the goals of the reserve, project objectives and major local 
and outside threats to these objectives. These interviews, along with 
continuous participant observation contributed to an initial rudimentary 
identification of stakeholder groups within the community and elsewhere. 
It is through this process that the sample group was identified.
Sample group selection
Stakeholders are those individuals/groups who have an interest in reserve 
activities/projects and programmes. Primary stakeholders are those directly 
affected, either positively or negatively by these activities. The process used 
to identify the sample group is called a purposive sampling process. This is 
a process often used in case studies where the researcher uses their 
judgement as to typicality or interest (Robson, 1993). The sample was 
selected in terms of the groups' degree of impact on and interest in project 
goals, with those groups/individuals with the highest impact and interest 
being at the core of the sample group along with those with high interest 
and little influence. Those groups with low interest and low impact being 
less and relevant to the research.
An example of an indicator for a group falling in the high interest-low 
impact category might be a group or individual with a high degree of 
dependence on natural resources for livelihood development but little 
influence or power over decisions which influence their access. It was 
through this process that the canoe fishers or beach seiners were selected as 
the sample group for this research. Their importance as stakeholders and 
the removed position they held in the past in terms of decision-making 
made their relevance as the sample group immediately apparent. They 
were also presented as the core target group by the manager of the A.C. 
Extractive Reserve (RESEX) and referred to in this respect by the project 
document (IBAMA, 1998).
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Once the sample group was selected, a more in-depth approach was taken. 
This involved the collection of data through sem i-structured interviews, a 
survey questionnaire of approximately 30 percent of the estim ated sample 
group, focus groups with fishers, and participant observation of fisher 
interactions. This enabled the researcher to begin mapping out the 
interests, incentives, and political and socio-economic geography of this 
group. Document collection and review and interviews with relevant 
secondary and tertiary stakeholders were on-going processes.
The following section describes how each tool was used along with the 
opportunities and constraints provided by each of the strategies. Although 
the fieldwork process can be divided into three main phases (See Table 5.1) 
many of the tools selected for data collection were used throughout. 
Moreover, each of the data collection strategies, both quantitative and 
qualitative was ultimately inter-linked. Document collection led to the 
identification of key informants (and more documents), observations 
contributed to appropriate interview and questionnaire design, participation 
increased access for the interviews as well as the questionnaire, interviews 
led to more documents, etc. Characteristics of the three phases are 
disagregated below. Figure 5.2 illustrates how the use of multiple tools 
increases reliability and validity.
Table 5.1 Phases of Research
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
• Informal interviews • Semi structured • Apply questionnaire
begin interview • Continue
• Observations begin implementation interviews
• Stakeholder • Questionnaire • Continue document
analysis design collection
• Design semi­ • Continued • Continue
structured observations observation
interview • Continue informal
• Document collection interviews
• Document collection
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Figure 5.2 Multi-method research process
Increased
reliability
Survey
Source- Author 
Docum ent Review
Throughout the fieldwork a wide range of documents was collected, 
summarised and subsequently analysed. These included project-related 
documents such as the original project proposal, m inutes from meetings, 
and membership cards. Also included were newspaper/magazine articles 
covering different aspects of the reserve, historical documents, local 
government documents including catch statistics and reports, and academic 
papers w ritten about the site concerned. Visits to regional university 
libraries and research institutes provided im portant texts w ritten by 
Brazilian authors on themes relating to the current situation of artisanal or 
caicara fishing communities throughout Brazil. These texts provided 
im portant background information about Brazil's fishing communities and
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past policies related to them that would have been otherwise unavailable in 
the United Kingdom.
Although the research concentrates on present-day events, the long 
tradition of beach seining and its development required a review of 
historical documents from which comparisons could be made concerning the 
degree to which local institutions governing fishing resources have changed 
over time. Because of Arraial's rich history and because of the presence of a 
fishing community with such unique characteristics, the Cape has been a 
popular site for academic study since the 1960s. Recently published papers 
by anthropologists and other social scientists provided a strong foundation 
for this study (Prado, 2000; Britto, 1999).
Participant Observation
Participant observation was a fundamental part of this research. Exploring 
the fives of the beach seiners and other fishers could not have taken place 
without participating in the daily rituals around which their fives are 
structured. This participation played a crucial role in gaining access to the 
fishers as well as in building a reputation in the area and building trust 
between the researcher and different fisher groups and local institutions. 
This participation not only contributed to the formation of important 
contacts and sources but also made the researcher available to those 
interested in discussing related matters. In this way, as much as the 
researcher selected key informants, she too was selected by fishers who 
learned of her presence and wanted to exchange ideas or share an 
experience or perspective.
Participant observation took place in a number of physical locations and
settings. Meetings at the RESEX headquarters were attended, along with
day to day activities at the reserve headquarters located on Praia Grande.
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Other meetings among fishers outside of the reserve were also attended, 
some of which were informal, held in local bars or near the beaches where 
seining takes place. Observations of fishing activities and interactions 
occurred on all beaches as well as in the huts where beach seiners wait for a 
sign from the lookout. Because some beaches where these activities take 
place are located at some distance from the mainland, it was often necessary 
to accompany crews for the full day, beginning at 4 am and only returning 
to the mainland at sunset.
Because of the size of the large net used by the canoe fishers, the assistance 
of non-fishers is needed in order to efficiently pull in the weight. Although it 
is mainly men who help with the nets, it is not uncommon to see women and 
children involved as well. It was extremely advantageous to me that the 
canoe fisher activities actually required the participation of non-fishers 
thereby providing the researcher with an open invitation for continuous 
contact with the sample group. As a result, the researcher not only gathered 
information but also actively contributed to the daily rituals that constitute 
an important part of the beach seiners’ livelihoods. This also meant that the 
canoe fishers were accustomed to having contact with non-fishers and used 
to explaining their activities and organisation to laymen. While fishers are 
often characterised as a particularly timid group, for the most part these 
fishers were very accessible and willing to share their experiences.
This process of daily participation in fishing activities also provided a less
formal initial contact with the beach seiners as well as contact with other
relevant members of the community. Elderly beach seiners often
participate in pulling in the nets or stand in groups nearby observing the
activities and commenting on them. These informal group meetings created
excellent opportunities to explore the intergenerational differences between
the fishers and how the informal institutions that govern them have
changed over time. By definition, traditional populations give their culture
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continuity orally, through their repertoire of stories and experiences. 
Contact with elder fishers was invaluable to the research.
Besides providing a wealth of pertinent information in its own right, this 
process of participation also established the building blocks upon which 
later stages of the research were based. For example, these processes 
proved valuable when realising the interview portion as well as the 
questionnaire. Not only did the researcher know the majority of the fishers 
by the time she undertook this part of the research but previous months of 
experience with them helped immensely in designing appropriate interview 
questions and the questionnaire. This continued interaction projected a 
level of commitment and interest that was crucial in gaining the trust and 
subsequently the access to the more personal attitudes and experiences of 
these fishers.
Where possible, notes of these observations were taken on site and then 
elaborated upon at home. At other times, this was impractical due to the 
physical activity involved or because of the apprehension a notebook would 
have caused on site. In either case, observations were compiled into an on 
going field diary and later analysed for content.
Interviews
Approximately twenty semi-structured interviews were carried out during 
the course of the fieldwork. Apart from these, numerous informal 
interviews were also realised. The semi-structured interview^were 
conducted with leaders of local fishing organisations, government agencies 
and other relevant organisations along with canoe fishers and 
representatives from other fishing modalities (See Annex II). Where 
possible, the interviews were taped and later transcribed. For the most part, 
interviews with fishers were only taped after a number of informal
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interviews had taken place. This allowed the fisher to feel informed about 
the type of questions that would be asked and how they would be presented.
An initial round of informational interviews was carried out with 
representatives of local fishing organisations. These had the dual purpose 
of introducing the researcher at the field site to local leaders as well as 
gathering information to assist in the design of the semi-structured 
interviews that followed.
All second round interviews were taped and transcribed either by the 
researcher or by an assistant.21 I was fortunate that my assistant was 
interested in the project itself and this reflected in his enthusiasm and 
precision in carrying out the transcription. Nevertheless, all transcriptions 
were then double-checked for errors. The tapes were then loaded on to the 
Atlas qualitative data analysis programme which allowed the content to be 
coded and analysed.
No respondents showed any concern over the presence of the tape recorder. 
Because Portuguese is a second language to me, I often explained that the 
use of the tape recorder was helpful because it allowed me to focus more on 
the content of the conversation instead of having to take copious amounts of 
notes. On one occasion, as a result of technical problems with the recording 
machinery, an interviewee was kind enough to do the entire interview twice.
Survey/Questionnaire
A questionnaire was applied during the later stages of the research in order 
to gather quantitative data related to the participation in and attitudes of 
fishers towards the newly established reserve. The timing was chosen in
21 My assistant was Flavio Costa, a resident of a nearby town with a degree in marine 
biology and experience with working with fishers in the region.
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order to capitalise on previous data gathered as well as to create an 
appropriate and well worded questionnaire. There was some concern as to 
how fishers would react to such a regimented research approach but a pilot 
questionnaire revealed a non-threatened response (Bulmer and Warwick, 
1993). In fact, as the following section on focus groups shows, the 
questionnaire was so well received that its implementation often evolved 
into focus groups with the questionnaire serving as a guide for debate and 
discussion.
Each canoe participating in beach seining is manned by a crew of nine to 
twelve men. Twelve are used when the canoes are required to travel longer 
distances and need to bring food for the day and a cook along. Canoes using 
a smaller work team or companha are usually those who fish on beaches 
nearer to the town centre where they can go home for lunch. Three 
companhas were chosen from Praia Grande, two from Praia dos Anjos and 
one from Prainha and Pontal respectively to participate in the survey. In 
almost every case, the entire companha was included in the hope that later 
they could be compared to each other. The approach to sampling is often 
called purposeful sampling (Gilbert, 2001). Depending on the approximate 
number of canoe fishers on each beach a related number of companhas were 
selected for interviews. An attempt was made to include a mixture of 
different companha groups, not only from the different beaches but also in 
terms of age of members and type of ownership arrangements (multiple or 
single).
Partly because of the distances involved, at least one full day (and usually 
many more) was spent with each group of fishers in and around their huts 
in order to complete one set of surveys. All surveys were applied by the 
researcher one*on-one with each fisher. During the pilot test, it was clear 
that this was the only way to keep responses unaffected by the comments of
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fisher peers as well as allowing the fisher to feel at ease in portraying his 
own views of the questions.
Although the questionnaire was relatively short (approximately 10 minutes 
long), sessions with fishers tended to take much longer than this as fishers 
were reluctant to provide purely quantitative responses. Instead, they 
would frequently offer an explanation to their perspective or even an 
anecdote illustrating their views. Notes of these conversations were taken 
on the back of each questionnaire and then written up at the end of each 
workday, they were later analysed along with other field notes and 
qualitative data.
Another advantage of spending the full day with each group was its relation 
to the quality of the questionnaires. Extra time meant time to check each 
questionnaire on site and refer back to fishers if information was missing or 
unclear. As a result, no data was lost due to missing information.
Out of the entire sample questioned, there were two fishers from Praia dos 
Anjos who refused to participate. It was never clear why they made this 
decision but it was nevertheless duly respected.
Outings with fishers were constantly affected by weather conditions and 
were often repeatedly postponed. Because this type of fishing is so 
dependent on a range of climatic circumstances, it is not uncommon for 
canoes not to 'go out' because of 'bad weather' or improper mungoes22. This 
often caused delays in observations and in implementing the questionnaires 
but created other opportunities for document collection and other non­
weather contingent research tools.
22 A word endemic to the Cape which signifies the combination of climatic and 
oceanographic conditions which present favourable or unfavourable conditions for beach 
seining.
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The survey was coded before implementation. These codes along with the 
data collected was then transferred to SPSS quantitative data analysis 
software and subsequently analysed. Although the sample selected 
attempted to be as representative as possible, it was not a probability 
sample from which precise inferences could be made about the 
characteristics of the population from which it was drawn (Gilbert, 2001). 
For this reason, non-parametric tests which do not make assumptions about 
the shape of a population were used. SPSS offered the use of mainly 
descriptive statistics and Chi-square tests.
Focus Groups
Focus groups complemented the questionnaires by bringing the topics 
covered into a group setting and creating a flexible and open forum in which 
these areas of interest could be developed further as a group. This was 
extremely helpful when trying to understand why certain actors felt the way 
they did; things that independently the questionnaire or other one on one 
methods would not have revealed.
Focus groups were always informal and at times even spontaneous. They 
took place in three specific settings: with fishers after the questionnaire had 
been implemented, with fishers and representatives of the reserve at 
reserve headquarters, with elderly fishers at strategic locations where they 
often congregate to watch the beach seining. Focus groups were successful 
because the issues that were covered were of high interest to those involved. 
Questions revolved around group organisation, group history, and 
participation in fishing organisations including the newly created reserve. 
An example of one of these focus groups follows.
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After the survey was implemented with everyone on the companha selected, 
members often gathered around to discuss issues covered. Because there 
were often hours of waiting without pulling in the net, these discussions had 
time to develop and proved useful in providing the thoughts and arguments 
behind some of the questions presented. Because the huts where fishers 
wait are located at a distance from other activities, they created excellent 
environments, free from distractions, for these sorts of discussions to take 
place. They were often frank and open and extremely relevant to the on­
going research because the questionnaire was used as a guide for their 
discussions.
5.4 Opportunities and constraints
Apart from the above-described methodological tools, other factors relating 
to the fieldwork created both obstacles to and opportunities for the success 
of the research. These include circumstantial factors in terms of the social 
atmosphere in which the research took place such as learning the local 
'dialect', living arrangements and the overall climate of conflict between 
fishers and organisations in Arraial.
Lansruaere
Upon arrival, I rented a room in the home of a retired fisher couple on Praia 
dos Anjos. After my first attempt to explain my purpose for being there, the 
couples’ daughter said, ‘You're going to have to learn how the canoe fishers 
speak before they will speak with you.’ It became immediately clear what 
she was referring to. Although I arrived as a fluent Portuguese speaker, 
there was a wealth of local terminology that I was not familiar with. This 
was especially relevant in the vocabulary used by canoe fishers who 
represent the most traditional group in the community and much of these
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local terms are related to their fishing activities. Reinaldo Fialho, a local 
historian, has compiled a dictionary of over 300 words which are 'endemic' 
to the Cape. Unfortunately, I only discovered this dictionary towards the 
end of the research and long hours were spent learning the many local 
terms used amongst these fishers. These terms are used and defined 
throughout the text and are deeply related to the relationship between the 
canoe fishers and their natural environment. They are also a reflection of 
the historical development of the Cape as well its insular experience.
Li vine? Arrangements
Because of the large numbers of tourists who visit Arraial during the 
holidays, there exists a variety of temporary housing options. After careful 
consideration, though, it was decided that living in the home of fishers 
would provide a depth of contact and experience otherwise unattainable. 
Therefore, during the research period, I rented a room in the home of a 
retired fisher couple, 'Seu' Binho and 'Dona' Estella.
Apart from Seu Binho and Dona Estella being Cabista or native to the Cape 
and eager to share their lifetime of experience and stories related to fishing 
and the community in Arraial, their children and grandchildren with whom 
I also became close, provided important insight into the generation 
differences and change which has occurred in the municipality. I 
accompanied them to social functions such as weddings, funerals, local 
festivals and the like. Seu Binho introduced me to some of the local fishing 
leaders and of course his friends and relatives who were also fishers. We 
frequently went line fishing and observed canoe fishing activities together 
and by the end, I felt very much a part of their family.
This relationship also provided me with a degree of respectability and
position within the community that I would not have had otherwise had I
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chosen to seek accommodation outside the family sphere. My residence at 
Seu Binho and Dona Estellas house provided a much-needed point of 
reference for others trying to understand who I was and why I was there. It 
was thought that if Seu Binho and Dona Estella trusted me - then so should 
others. I also benefited from the 'grapevine' system (or clog radio as they 
called it) of communication in place in A.C. Luckily, not only did my hosts 
like me but they told absolutely everyone they knew about me, thereby 
increasing my 'respectability'.
Access can be described not only as physical but also as social. Physical 
access, as described earlier in the methodology, was gained through initial 
meetings with reserve representatives as well as through participation in 
fishing activities throughout the cape. Social access, on the other hand, took 
longer and was gained through the processes of building respectability, 
reputation and trust amongst my sample group and wider community. They 
are closely linked and the ease of social access was to a large degree a result 
of on-going physical access.
Research Environment
Although much of the approach to the daily aspects of the research had been
predetermined, there were some aspects that could not have been foreseen.
Specifically, the level of inter-neighbourhood and inter-modality tension
(caused in part by the creation of the extractive reserve) provided a
somewhat 'touchy' environment in which to work. Canoe fishers are not just
canoe fishers; they are Praia Grande canoe fishers or Praia dos Anjos canoe
fishers. The self-categorisation of fishers as Praia Grande fishers or Praia
dos Anjos fishers became immediately clear along with conflict between
owners, middlemen and fishers. As a result, it became apparent that I
should avoid being seen frequently with any one group or even any one
person. Associating myself with certain groups, individuals or even the
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reserve itself would increase my access to some and decrease it to others. 
Perceived neutrality was essential.
In this respect, it was sheer luck that placed me in a somewhat neutral 
location in terms of my living arrangements. Although I lived in the Praia 
dos Anjos neighbourhood and therefore could have become associated soley 
with the fishers from this location, it turned out that although Seu Binho 
had been a fisher all his life, he was one of the very few who had done so 
mainly on larger trawlers based in Rio de Janeiro or other surrounding 
ports. Because of this, he managed to stay out, to some degree, of the 
neighbourhood feuding and was associated more with the fact that he fished 
outside of A.C. as opposed to his residence in Praia dos Anjos23. To what 
degree this affected my relationship with other fishers I cannot be sure but I 
constantly felt that this was a positive product of my living arrangements.
Female Researcher
Being a foreign female researcher in a 'mens' world also had certain 
implications. As a female, I believe fishers were less threatened by my 
presence. In terms of language, I was told that fishers in general were timid 
to speak because of the different vocabulary and accent they had. 
Fortunately, I too had an awkward vocabulary and accent and at times was 
shy to speak. In this respect, we worked together. I learned their words 
and they spoke slowly and often repeated things for my benefit.
5.5 Conclusion
This study focuses on the actions and perceptions of local resources users. 
Among resource users, beach seiners were selected as the specific focus of
23 In fact, his nick name is 'Cabo Frio' after a nearby town where the ship on which he 
worked for most of his life was docked.
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the study. Given the importance of this group to the success of the 
extractive reserve as well as their manageable size for such a study, this 
choice was considered both relevant and appropriate. Although other 
groups in the community were contemplated, they were not included as 
vigorously as the primary sample group. Also, given time and scope 
limitations, this study concentrated on the community level and less on the 
government institutions that support extractive reserves.
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Chapter 6 Gear Groups, Organisations and 
Institutions and the Creation and 
Development of the RESEX A.C.
This chapter will build on the background given on the social and 
environmental context of Arraial do Cabo, RJ, presented at the beginning of 
this thesis and provide a more specific breakdown of the characteristics of 
the fishing community itself. This will be done initially by describing the 
different gear type groupings that exist among the fishers in the 
municipality. It will then describe the organisations which have 
represented fishers over the years, first in a Colonia (fishermen's guild) and 
then with the onset of democracy and the opportunity for greater individual 
and collective expression into a number of 'free' associations. It will also 
describe some of the informal institutions which govern the beach seiners in 
Arraial do Cabo. The last section of this chapter will describe the process 
that led up to the establishment of Brazil’s first open water Extractive 
Reserve established in the locale as well as the Utilisation Plan that 
governs it.
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6.1 Stratification and Productive Technology
There are five main types of fishing or extractive practices in Arraial. 
Because the Cape extends so far into the ocean and because the area is so 
rich in marine life, there is no need to travel far to fish and almost all 
fishers stay around the Cape and around nearby islands.24 The first, and 
most important type of fishing practised in terms of the number of people 
involved is hook and line fishing from open-mouthed motorised boats and 
from rocks around the area. A second type of fishing strategy, involving 
approximately 100 members of the fishing community utilises the largest 
boats in the municipality (trawlers) along with a purse seine. The third 
type, professional sub-aquatic fishing or SCUBA fishing, has developed over 
recent years and its use of modern technologies has made it the most 
controversial fishing activity in the municipality. The fourth type is not so 
much a fishing modality but an extractive practice. Mollusc gathering has a 
long tradition in Arraial but only in the last thirty years has it become a 
commercial activity. These categories are explained in detail below.
The fifth type, beach seining25 is the focus of this thesis. Beach seiners are 
not the most numerous, nor necessarily the most vulnerable. But because of 
their cultural and traditional significance, their practices have attracted the 
attention of the Brazilian Government and it is their presence, the presence 
of a 'traditional' community that warranted the creation of Brazil’s first 
maritime extractive reserve. Apart from these, and within each of these 
categories, variations of these strategies and other forms of semi- 
subsistence fishing are usually practised in the shallow waters off the beach.
24 The Southeast of Brazil differs greatly from the Northeast in this respect. In the 
Northeast, the continental shelf extends far out to sea, requiring fishers to travel great 
distances to reach fishing spots.
25 Type of large pocket seine (approximately 600 metres long) used very close to sandy 
shores and manoeuvred by boat or canoe and subsequently pulled onto shore. For the 
purposes of this thesis, fishers who participate in this activity are referred to as beach 
seiners or canoe fishers.
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One of the most remarkable types encountered takes place with a north­
easterly wind and involves attaching a line with multiple hooks onto a 
plastic handmade kite. The kite, along with the line, is then carried out to 
sea by the wind.
A description of the five primary fishing types is included in the following 
section in order for the reader to become familiar with some of the dynamics 
of the fishing community in the Municipality of Arraial do Cabo. Specific 
attention will be paid to the beach seiners.
Boat and Hook and Line Fishers
Boat and line fishers are often grouped together in the same category in 
fishing discussions on the Cape. This happens for a number of reasons. 
First, boat fishers or fishers that hunt the coastal areas of the Cape by 
motorised boat are often the same fishers that hike the hills surrounding 
Arraial searching for fishing points from which to cast their fines. Second, 
both types of fishers are really fine fishers in the sense that they are often 
after the same species and use the same techniques to lure them.
Discussions with local fishers reveal that it is these modalities that are 
preferred by the caringos or recent immigrants to the cape. Often, these 
groups have come from other fishing villages in the region, bringing along 
with them their own techniques. Land fine fishing is also considered a type 
of fishing available to everyone. As opposed to beach seining26 or ocean 
seining where one would need to join a companha (work team) in order to 
participate, the low cost of the technology used (nylon fine and hook) as well 
as its ability to be performed outside of a group makes land fine fishing one
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of the most widely available types of fishing practised on the Cape. It is also 
a much more individualistic type of fishing and some fishers prefer it 
because of this characteristic. It is a type of fishing that can be done with 
the minimum of participation in the politics and discussions that surrounds 
the beaches and the local marina.
Both fine and boat fishing have experienced significant changes over recent 
years largely due to the abundance of squid in the area as well as the 
introduction of new fishing technologies with which to catch them. 
Specifically, it was the introduction of the squid jig  by a Japanese visitor 
that transformed how and when squid is fished along with who has access to 
these resources. Previously, it was thought that squid could only be caught 
during the summer months in the icy waters off Praia Grande using a beach 
seine. With the introduction of the squid jig, access to this resource became 
available to everyone. With a simple, inexpensive, multi-pronged hook and 
a nylon line, thousands of kilos of squid have been caught each year since 
the introduction of this new technology. Since beach seining is a somewhat 
closed profession, this has allowed for wider access to this valuable resource. 
Access to squid in Arraial is often said to ‘pay the rent’ of the fishers. This 
expression refers to the fact that while other species have become scarce, 
this new activity has become a safety net.
Purse Seiners (Treineiras)
Seiners represent the fishing modality capable of netting the largest
quantity of fish in one cast. They utilise the highest technological
investment of any type due to size of the craft, the use of motors to reel in
the net and the sheer size of the net itself. In some ways, they are similar to
the beach seiners in their use of a huge net and the fact that they also
require a spotter in order to visually locate shoals of fish. Apart from those
elements though, there is little in common between the two modalities.
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There are approximately ten seiners in Arraial with a maximum length of 
eight metres.27 They use a crew of ten men each including a skipper, spotter, 
a man to run the motor and a number of deck hands. They fish in two shifts, 
one during the day, the other at night. Night fishing takes place only when 
the moon is not full as the spotter depends on the darkness to observe the 
luminescent features of passing shoals.
After shoals are spotted, a large net is released and forms a semi-circle in 
the water. This creates a curtain in the water, suspended by the cork-line 
and weighted down by the lead-line. When the shoal enters the semi-circle, 
the running line is pulled tight to close the circle. The purse-line, which 
closes off the bottom of the net and preventing the fish from falling through 
it, is then shut. Afterwards, using winches, the net is then brought on 
board and the fish sorted and stored below deck.
SCUBA fishing (Mersrulho Professional)
Sub-aquatic fishing or SCUBA fishing utilises a relatively new type of 
technology and is not seen as a 'traditional' type of fishing by the local 
community. In fact, there are numerous problems related to the admittance 
of these fishers into the newly established extractive reserve. Many 
consider this type of fishing as predatory in nature as the fish, octopuses, 
and crustaceans they hunt have little chance of escape. There are 
approximately twelve boats which engage in this type of fishing with a 
number of them coming in from neighbouring towns (another factor which 
discourages local support for this gear group).
In principal, SCUBA fishing takes place on the deep-water rocky faces 
outside of the Boqueirao on the north-eastern sides of both the Ilha de Cabo
27 This size limit for seiners was created through the management plan of the RESEX.
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Frio and the Pontal de Atalaia (see Map C). Divers go out in boats with 
crews of only two per boat. One being the diver and the other controlling 
the air compressor and hose which provides air to the submerged diver. 
There must be a high level of trust between the diver and his partner. At 
depths of over fifty metres in freezing cold waters (approximately ten 
degrees centigrade), the fisher that stays on board provides the life line to 
his underwater counterpart. Also, because the boat must stay close to the 
diver and because the best possibilities for catch he adjacent to the cliff face, 
it requires great skill in open water to maintain a safe distance from the 
coast while simultaneously keeping an eye on the diver. The mariner is also 
responsible for the maintenance of the motor, the boat and the diving 
equipment. For these reasons, this is not the type of fishing where either 
party is easily replaceable. The skills and trust needed require a long term 
commitment and partnership between the two.
The caga submarina or underwater hunt is usually for octopus, lobster (this 
is illegal but often practised) and large fish which can be speared. The diver 
therefore dives with his scuba suit, gloves, a bag, spear gun and a hooked 
iron. He hooks the octopi with the iron and places them in the bag until the 
end of his dive (usually lasting about a half hour) and then brings them up 
where his partner kills them and prepares them for the middleman who will 
be waiting for them at the marina. Octopus per kilo is one of the most 
valuable species available and divers can make good money. On a decent 
day, divers catch fifty kilos of octopus that they sell for approximately five 
reais a kilo, totalling 250 reais (£80). It is not a type of fishing that can be 
carried out day after day due to the dangers associated with it. 
Nevertheless, divers often engage in multiple deep-water dives a day and 
many depend on injections to counteract the negative effects to their 
systems.
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Just as for other gear groups, success is dependent on a number of climatic 
factors. Specifically, water clarity is essential for the diver to be able to 
identify and capture his catch. Also, the north easterly winds create major 
difficulties for any fisher leaving the Baia dos Anjos (Angel Bay) through 
the Boqueirao. These winds make large waves that meet with the currents 
pushing the water out of the bay through the Boqueirao, creating dangerous 
currents and huge waves making it impossible to leave the bay. A cabega de 
agua do leste or waters brought by the eastern winds are bad news for all 
fishers dependent on fishing grounds outside the bay. But interestingly, it 
is not enough for a sub-aquatic diver to hear in the marina that there are 
eastern waters; each must go to the Boqueirao itself to see for himself.
Mollusc Gatherers (Coletores deMarisco)
Although often not considered fishers, mollusc gatherers are extractivists 
and do participate in the Extractive Reserve. They differ significantly from 
other fishing modalities in terms of their representation and work group 
organisation. One of the most significant differences is that the mollusc 
gatherers of Arraial work as a family unit. In contrast with other fishing 
groups, these gatherers utilise the efforts of both women and children 
directly in their gathering and processing activities. Their days start early 
as they have to walk for hours at times to sites where the molluscs are 
mature enough for gathering. They often spend entire days at a selected 
site, harvesting, cleaning, cooking and packing the molluscs. Wood and 
other materials must be brought for these purposes as in most places it is 
unavailable on site.
Generally, it is the male head of the family who is responsible for removing
the molluscs from the submerged rocks. Once removed, they are then cooked
over an open fire, opened and the mollusc removed from the shell and stored
in bags. Women are responsible for the cooking and the children for shell
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opening and mollusc removal. Processing takes place on site because of the 
weight that bringing back the shells would entail. For example, twenty-five 
kilos of muscles with the shell is only equal to five kilos without.
As a group they have been organised through the Association for Shellfish 
Collectors of Arraial do Cabo (ACRIMAC) since 1997. More than half of all 
shell collectors are paying and participating members of the Association. 
Unlike many of the other traditional fishing organisations, ACRIMAC is led 
by a former shell collector and someone who understands the livelihoods of 
the people he represents well. It is also the only fishers organisation 
encountered during the research that was directly attempting to address 
social issues within its community such as access to education and the 
eventual elimination of child labour from this precarious line of work.
Beach Seining/Canoe Fishing ( P e s c a  d e  C a n o a )
The fifth type of fishing gear group is the beach seining community, the 
focus of this study. Throughout the text, fishers participating in this 
activity will be referred to as either beach seiners or canoe fishers 
(Pescadores de canoa,). Seining refers to the large nets employed in this 
practice and the canoe fishing title comes from the dug out canoes required 
(both for practical purposes28 and by customary law) for carrying out the 
activity. This gear type, while not the oldest (mollusc gatherers have 
inhabited the coastline for thousands of years), has developed an 
organisational structure to which any fisher wishing to engage in this 
modality has to adhere. Customary laws deciding who can fish, when they
28 Beach seining occurs in other areas on the Brazilian coastline and around the world. 
Although canoes are used in Arraial, beach seiners in other areas utilise other crafts such 
as row boats and in some cases they involve motorised crafts. In Arraial, this process, by 
customary law, requires the use of large dugout canoes. Practically speaking, their length 
enables both the crew and the large net to fit in the craft. The relative scarcity of trees 
large enough to make these canoes out of, along with the associated costs make access to 
these resources difficult thereby limiting the possibilities for the entrance of more canoes 
into the system.
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can fish and exactly how they can fish have developed over time and still 
apply to this practice on the Cape today.
Beach seining, using the traditional methods employed in Arraial do Cabo, 
can only be practised where the Cape's transparent waters meet sandy 
coves with hills nearby. There are only a handful of sites on the Cape that 
fit these requirements. Each cove can sustain a maximum of two 
companhas or work teams at a time, thereby limiting the number of fishers 
who can engage in this practice. This space limitation most likely 
influenced the creation of collective arrangements for managing these 
fishing grounds.
This traditional fishing type has shaped the identity of the Cape's residents. 
To be considered Cabista, many would argue that one would have to come 
from a family that engaged or engages in this type of fishing practice. 
Canoe fishing has a long history on the Cape. It is the main point of 
reference for many of its residents and has influenced their identity and 
social structure. The following section will describe some of the formal 
institutions that have governed this activity for over a century. The 
intricate set of traditional institutions that govern these fishers will be the 
focus of Chapter 7.
6.2 The Colonia Z-22 de Nossa Senhora dos Remedios
Colonia Z-22, Arraial's local chapter, as it functions today, is testimony to 
the continued failure of these organisations to meet their stated objectives29. 
Although it prides itself on the fact that it has 900 fishers on its 
membership roster, only a tiny fraction of these actually participates in any
29 As stated earlier stated, the objectives were of ‘uniting fishers through fraternal 
solidarity promoting instruction, mutual aid and the prosperity of their associates and their 
families’ (Menezes, nd).
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form in the organisation. When they do, this participation usually takes the 
passive form of paying monthly dues and the three percent charge on gross 
catch that the Colonia is entitled to charge its members. The Colonia does 
not hold open meetings nor does it offer services such as access to lines of 
credit or medical care to its members. Opportunities for loans or other 
credit schemes through the Colony are non-existent. In fact, over the last 
fourteen years no credit of any kind has been offered to member fishers 
through the Colony.
The effectiveness and legitimacy of the Colonia is to a large degree 
dependent on who is president of the organisation. Speaking with local 
fishers, it was difficult to talk about the Colonia as a fishers’ organisation 
without personalising it to this level. In the past, the Colonia has gone 
through periods of widespread support. During these 'golden' periods the 
Colonia erratically offered access to a dentist for it members and their 
families. It was also through the local Colonia that fishers could track their 
working years and apply for social security later in life (although very few 
took advantage of this opportunity).
In the ‘good ole days’ the Colonia also facilitated fishers’ access to the 
documentation needed by the Capitania dos Portos or Port Authority. As a 
result, many of the older members are registered as professional fishers 
without ever having taken the required courses or exams. One of the 
reasons for paying dues at the Colony that I frequently heard is that it is 
known to have the fairest scale in town. ‘Middlemen have two sets of scales, 
one for buying and one for selling, they never lose’, I was often told. These 
sorts of handouts and favours mirror the ' assistentialismo' or patron-client 
approach which is a general feature of Brazilian society and is often adopted 
by the Brazilian Government, especially at the local level.
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The Colonia Z-22 de Nossa Senhora dos Remedios in Arraial was one of the 
earliest chapters established in the country with its code of conduct dating 
back to 1921. Initially, beach seining was the main fishing strategy and the 
only one which involved the co-ordination and co-operation of participants. 
As the income being generated by this modality far outweighed that coming 
from the other fishing strategies practised, protecting this modality became 
the primary objective of this newly established organisation. The following 
quote from the first printed code of conduct handbook illustrates this 
objective^
'As it is the beach seines that most contribute to the fishing 
industry [in Arraial], not only for the betterment of this Colony but 
also for the wider community, promoting in this way support for all 
fishers, let it be expressly prohibited, when any shoal of fish comes 
near that could be captured by the beach seiners, that [other fishers] 
keep a sufficient distance so as not to disrupt the biggest source of 
riches in this community which is the canoes and their seines’ 
(Teixeira de Mello, 1921 authors translation).
This quote reaffirms the roots of the initial structure of the Colonia and 
reinforces the degree to which canoe fishing was valued in the past. It also 
illustrates the centrality and interrelationship between canoe fishing and 
other fishing activities. This excerpt also helps us understand why this 
activity is still ingrained in local culture today.
As an organisation, the Colonia was often criticised for being out of touch
with fishers’ needs. One reason for this commonly cited is because, for the
most part, its representatives were not fishers themselves. It is not
uncommon for them to be politicians or other members of the local elite. Its
current board of directors includes middlemen and boat owners, not fishers
themselves. In Arraial, for example, this was one of the most common
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criticisms heard, 'How can someone who has never depended on fishing for 
his livelihood preside over the Colonia?’30 The profile of the current 
president of this organisation illustrates the web of corruption that has left 
the organisation with little to offer local fishers.
'Seu' Manuel has been in office for over fourteen years. Despite the fact that 
elections are meant to be held periodically, he has held on to control of this 
organisation. Although the salary he receives from the guild is not 
substantial, he benefits financially from his affiliation in numerous other 
ways. The organisation itself is located on the ground floor of his home. In 
return for using this space, he receives rental payments from the state level 
or though monthly contributions from fishers. His secretary, who also 
receives a salary, is his wife and his assistant is his daughter.
Unfortunately, hopes that independent fisher organisations would fill the 
gap left by the ineffectual colony were unfounded. Although many have 
emerged over the last twenty years, none has managed to garner any 
significant amount of support and they have generally been unsustainable. 
The following section describes the Cape's experiences in developing these 
organisations.
6.3 Free Association
With the introduction of the new Brazilian constitution in 1988 and the end 
of dictatorial rule, a political and ideological context was created in which 
citizens had much greater freedom of expression. Local fisher’s associations 
without formal affiliations to the government began to emerge with differing
30 This is actually a bone of contention that fishers have about fishing organisations in 
general. They resent the fact that so many different people from different organisations 
and institutions try to regulate their activity when the vast majority of them have never 
fished professionally.
177
degrees of success in terms of their ability to mobilise fisher support. 
Problems in most of them were related to the legacy left behind by the 
Colonias which continued to exist, although they lost much of their power 
during this period. People did not expect much from their new 
organisations and often control over these fell into the hands of the same 
local bigwigs which had formerly manipulated the Colonias for their own 
benefit.
For the most part, until the recent establishment of the Extractive Reserve 
(RESEX), no fisher’s organisation had managed to mobilise wide spread 
support among the fishers in Arraial do Cabo. Generally speaking these 
'free' associations were limited to representing fishers from specific areas 
and modalities, particularly beach seiners from Praia Grande. Other than 
ACRIMAC, the Association for Mollusc Collectors, the only free association 
still active on the Cape is APAC, the Fishers Association of Arraial do Cabo 
and then only marginally so. The following section reviews the evolution of 
formal local organisations in the municipality.
ALP AC
The Associagao Livre dos Pescadores de Arraial do Cabo (ALPAC) was the 
first 'free association' for fishers of the municipality. Established in 1985, 
its founders, mainly young idealist seiners, jumped at the opportunity to 
create a fishers' organisation run by the fishers themselves. While legally 
they had been given this opportunity, locally the association ran into many 
of the same problems that corrupted the Colonia. After the first election, 
larger canoe owners and middlemen managed to gain power and votes and 
the organisation soon fell into the hands of the local elite. This was one of 
the negative impacts of the consolidation of power over the means of 
production (canoes and nets) and access to this production through the 
informal direito do dia or user access system.
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Like the Colony, membership of ALPAC required a three percent payment 
to the association. Because the leaders of the association were the owners of 
the canoes themselves, they would take three percent of the entire catch, 
from each canoe and then redistribute it to themselves in the form of salary 
payments. Needless to say, fishers soon questioned the organisation's 
legitimacy and it inevitably lost local support.
APAC
The Associagao dos Pescadores or Fishers Association (APAC) was 
established soon after the ALPAC was taken over by local 'bigwigs'. 
Although there are over a thousand fishers, divided into at least five 
different modalities, it is around the Praia Grande canoe fishers that most 
of these formal organisations have evolved. Starting with the Colonia, then 
the ALPAC and continuing on to APAC, canoe fishers provided the basis or 
foundation of all these organisations. (In fact, the RESEX, although its 
headquarters are physically located on Praia Grande just above this beaches 
seining grounds, has proved to be one of the first organisations which tries, 
with varying success, to bring together fishers from different modalities).
APAC as an organisation never really got off the ground. Its purpose (as
described by its current president) was to ‘provide legal support to fishers
and to deal with issues related to depleting fish stocks in the area/ It was
always dependent on the support of fishers from Praia Grande where the
vast majority of its membership base is/was. The one achievement that is
attributed to this organisation is the resolution of the ‘surf wars’ between
canoe fishers and surfers on this beach. It is widely recognised among canoe
fishers that surfers 'startle' the schools of fish before they arrive in the
corner where the fishermen can fence them in with their nets. There is a
huge area that needs to be obstacle-free, according to canoe fishers, in order
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for their seining to be successful. After many years of arguments, threats, 
broken boards, etc. the two groups finally came to an agreement- when a red 
flag is up, it means that fishing is being conducted and no surfing is allowed, 
when a green flag is up, surfers can surf as they please. This agreement 
was registered with the local government and is still in use. Today, APAC 
is all but defunct, with only a handful of members still contributing. Its 
headquarters are located on Praia Grande and has since been donated by 
APAC to the new RESEX to provide space for their operations.
At one point, there was an attempt by a couple from the United States to set 
up a co-operative in the municipality. It was never fully operative and 
within a year the Americans were gone and the co-operative closed. People 
mention it from time to time as a good idea that was never realised.
6.4 Reserva Extrativista Maritima, Arraial do Cabo
On January 3, 1997 a fishing 'belt' was created around the municipality of 
Arraial do Cabo, Rio de Janeiro stretching three nautical miles from shore. 
The objective of this reserve is to 'guarantee the sustainable use and 
conservation of the natural renewable resources traditionally used in 
artisanal fishing by the extractivist population of Arraial do Cabo' (IBAMA, 
1998- 3). This section will present a summary of the history of the reserve 
and describe its operating structure. This first half of this section will 
review the factors that enabled the creation of the reserve (such as 
community support and the availability of local leadership). The second 
half will describe the different dimensions of the reserve. These include the 
reserve’s structure, decision-making and conflict resolution mechanisms, 
monitoring and enforcement arrangements among others.
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Enabling Factors
A range of factors contributed to the creation of Brazil's first Maritime 
Extractive Reserve. First, at the policy level, the existence of the Extractive 
Reserve conservation category codified in federal decree 98.897/90 after a 
lengthy and arduous struggle by extractive communities in Amazonia, 
described in the previous chapter, provided the legal framework for the 
creation of the reserve. Apart from this, there were other essential factors in 
Arraial do Cabo that facilitated its creation. Among these was the presence 
of a marine environment of biological significance (due to the upwelling 
phenomenon) as well as the presence of a 'traditional population' (the canoe 
fishers and other artisanal fishers previously described) with a strong 
connection to the resource base that included a system of local governance 
over these resources. Although these were cited in the Project Document as 
well as by the Regional Representative of CNPT as fundamental 
prerequisites for the creation of the Arraial do Cabo RESEX, there were 
other factors that played a significant role in the process.
At the local level, several important features were present which facilitated 
the creation of the RESEX A.C. The recognition of depleting fish stocks and 
the momentum created by the perceived success against industrial fishers 
were important unifying and empowering factors for the traditional fishing 
population. Also important at the local level was the presence of strong 
local leadership which provided needs articulation. Timely support for the 
creation of the reserve by both the mayor of the municipality and head of 
the Z-22 fishing Colony were also important. Each of these will be described 
in more detail in the following paragraphs.
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Table 6.1 Events leading up to the creation of the RESEX A.C.
Date Action
1993 FIPAC/IBAMA and fishers fight together against invading 
industrial fishers
1994-1995 Discussions begin between IBAMA/CNPT and local 
government about the possibilities of creating the RESEX.
1996 IBAMA/CNPT meet with local fishers to discuss the 
possibility of creating the RESEX.
1996 Project document sent to Brasilia for approval.
Jan  1997 RESEX A.C. created by presidential decree.
Early 1998 Implementation plan developed and approved
1999-2000 Period of fieldwork
Local factors
Depleting fish stocks ■ At the local level, there was a clear perception tha t 
fish stocks were being depleted and tha t this was primarily the result of 
unsustainable fishing practices employed by industrial fishers. This 
awareness was an important unifying factor supporting reserve creation. 
Another unifying factor was the success of struggles against these forces by 
the local government, IBAMA and local fishers. As reviewed in the 
introduction to this thesis, there are many th reats to small-scale fishing 
activities in Arraial do Cabo. The source of these th reats can be divided into 
two groupings- external and internal. While the in ternal threats are many 
(tourism expansion, marginal local government support for fishing activities, 
conflict between resource users, etc.), it was the external th reats from 
industrial fishers tha t united fishers around the idea of creation a RESEX. 
Struggles against predatory fishing were a much needed unifying factor for 
the socially fragmented fishing community in Arraial do Cabo.
Industrial fishing fleets, mainly from southern states such as Sao Paulo, 
Santa C atarina and Parana, attracted by the fish stocks resulting from the
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up-welling phenomenon, particularly drag net shrimp trawlers and gill nets, 
were and continue to be spotted in the waters surrounding the Cape. These 
large boats rarely respect the legal limits.31 Illegal activities often take 
place during the night to avoid being spotted, though it is not uncommon to 
see drag nets in operation from shore even during the day. Given that the 
only representative of IBAMA on site was a biologist and not a legal monitor 
with the power to sanction intruders, the battle against these predatory 
activities was a losing one.
In the years leading up to the establishment of the reserve, some local 
fishers, in conjunction with the local IBAMA representative as well as 
representatives of the local governments fishing support office, the 
Foundation Institute for Fishing in Arraial do Cabo (FIPAC), worked 
together to try to halt some of these degrading processes which compromise 
the livelihoods of local fishers and their families. On a number of occasions, 
these individuals and representatives confiscated gill nets placed illegally in 
coastal waters and either apprehended or destroyed them. From 1993 to 
1996, sixteen dragnet trawlers were seized within the two nautical mile 
limit. Approximately R$25,000 (£8,000) worth of fines (IBAMA estimate) 
were given and twenty tons of fish confiscated. Also during this period, 
seventeen gill nets were apprehended and destroyed (Boletim Informativo, 
1996).
Data from FIPAC show a total yearly catch for 1995 as 3,171,306 kilos. This 
figure represents an increase of 70 percent over the 1994 figures and an 
increase of 146 percent over 1993 statistics (IBAMA, 1998). Although this 
increase could be attributed to a number of factors (as stocks increased
31 Portaria Normativa No 43, 1993 started in Arraial and was later applied to the whole 
coast of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Specifically it states that • Drag net fishing and crafts 
over ten tons are prohibited in coastal areas of the state of Rio de Janeiro less than two 
miles from shore (Boletim Informativo, 1996).
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regionally during this period), locally, this increase was perceived as being 
directly linked to the action taken against invading industrial fishers as 
well as to the success of the directive (Portaria Normativa No. 43) which 
made trawling within two nautical miles from shore illegal. These events 
played an important role in building a sense of collective efficacy among 
fishers and, to some degree, among the organisations that participated as 
well. In this way, these developments created an appropriate foundation 
upon which later developments were built.
Local Leadership ■ The local IBAMA representative, a progressive biologist, 
member of the workers party (PT) and resident of the municipality for over 
twenty years, was pivotal in identifying the need for the reserve as well as 
for garnering support for its creation. He is also credited with bringing the 
idea of implementing extractive reserves in an open-water marine 
environment. Although not a fisher himself, Fabio Fabiano was often 
referred to as the ’Chico Mendes' of the RESEX A.C. Through his work with 
IBAMA as well as because of his own personal/political interests, he was 
aware of the terrestrial examples of extractive reserves and felt strongly 
about the need for and viability of applying this concept to Arraial do Cabo. 
Not only was his role critical in terms of articulating the needs and concerns 
of local fishers at the federal level, but Fabio Fabiano was also well placed to 
explain the process and procedures and answer questions the fishers had 
about extractive reserves. He is now the manager of the RESEX A.C. as well 
as the regional representative for CNPT. He has since become a very 
controversial character in Arraial with fishers having a love/hate 
relationship with him. His position as a local leader is complicated by his 
employment with IBAMA ■ an organisation viewed with much scepticism, 
particularly by resource users. Locally, fishers commonly perceive IBAMA 
as a corrupt organization and feel that this organization was created to 
restrict rather than support their activities.
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Political will - Support from local leaders such as the mayor and president of 
the fishing colony were also important in legitimising the proposal to 
IBAMA/CNPT for the creation of the RESEX. The then mayor David Dutra 
de Oliveira, was considered one of Arraial's more progressive leaders and 
supported the creation of the RESEX A.C. along with other initiatives which 
encouraged local fishing activities. It was under his leadership that local 
planning laws (Plano Diretor) were passed which included measures for the 
protection of fishing activities (Titulo III, Capitulo I Dos Recursos do Mar e 
da Pesca). Also achieved under his leadership was the establishment of 
FIPAC, the municipal fisheries department.
These achievements were an aberration in Arraial's political environment 
and garnering support for such an activity during the leadership of other 
mayors would have been difficult. Most see fishing activities as part of the 
municipality's past and not its future. In fact, succeeding mayors have not 
shared their support for the RESEX and see it as more of a threat to their 
power rather than an opportunity for local sustainable development. 
During the period of fieldwork, the vice mayor clearly expressed his disdain 
about the establishment of the RESEX A.C. He owns of one of the two 
icehouses in the municipality as well as many motorised boats. He is not 
only one of the biggest middlemen but also the largest supplier of ice and 
other essentials to industrial boats which unload in the city's docks. 
Needless to say, he has a huge stake in the success of industrial fishing 
activities in the area.
Colonia approval ■ The project document submitted to IBAMA/CNPT would
not have been complete without the signature of the president of the local
fishing colony (Z-22). As the head of by far the largest fishers' organisation,
it was essential that he support the proposal. Although he was not sure
what the creation of the reserve would mean for local fishers, during an
interview with him he declared that he did not want to stand in the way of
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something that could potentially benefit them and therefore signed the 
project document, showing his support. This support was quickly retracted 
and, since the creation of the reserve, the Colony has refused to participate 
in any of the activities of the RE SEX.
6.5 Other factors
Co-operation of Academic Institutions - Prior experience in the field and 
proximity of the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) in facilitating the 
process was also important. With a long history of sociological and 
anthropological research carried out in fishing communities in the state, the 
head of the Anthropology Department (Dr. Roberto Kant de Lima) along 
with his postgraduate students32 provided technical support and guidance 
for the development of the RESEX Project document which was 
subsequently sent to Brasilia for approval.
Timing and chance• Lastly, timing and chance were important elements. 
The success of the on-going struggle against industrial fishers coupled with 
a natural increase in catch size (catch of main species more than doubled 
from 1993 - 1995) created an environment in which, if only for a short period, 
fishers were drawn together in support of a common goal, protecting their 
fish stocks and their livelihoods. All of the factors mentioned above were 
important in building the foundation for successful proposal for the reserve.
With support from the Municipal government and the anthropology 
department of the nearby federal university (UFF) a proposal to the federal 
government was researched, developed and submitted. The Project 
Document was approved by CNPT/IBAMA and the Arraial do Cabo RESEX
32 This department has since housed a number of post graduate students studying different 
aspects of the A.C. reserve along with other proposed marine extractive reserves on the 
Fluminense coastline (ie. Itaipu, Gargau).
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was finally established on January 3, 1997 by Presidential decree, marking 
the successful completion of phase one of the extractive reserve creation and 
development as outlined in the previous chapter.
Over the following year, the Utilisation Plan (piano de utilizagao) was 
developed and finally approved by IBAMA/CNPT on Feb 18, 1999 - Portaria 
no. 17. This marked the termination of phase two of the creation and 
development of the reserve. The following section will briefly describe this 
phase including organisational and operational aspects of the RESEX A.C.
6.6 RESEX A.C. Organisational Structure and Operations 
AREMAC
As in all collaborative management regimes, responsibility over the 
management of resources is shared between government and resource users. 
In the case of the RESEX A.C. administration and operations of the reserve 
are shared by IBAMA (representing the federal government) and AREMAC, 
representing the fishers.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, according to the regulations 
stipulated by the federal government for the creation of Extractive Reserves, 
a local institution must exist which acts as an intermediary between the 
local population and the federal government. It is through this association 
that the use rights to resource users are distributed (Titulos de Autorizagao) 
and through which decisions will be made regarding what those rights 
entail. In principal, this organisation is one in which anyone can participate 
and is not a class-based group or syndicate which responds solely to the 
users themselves. This association can take many forms. In some reserves 
it is called the Residents Association (Associagao de Moradores) encouraging 
all members of the community to participate.
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In the case of Arraial do Cabo, it was felt that a new organisation needed to 
be created to serve this purpose. Existing fisher organisations were 
considered either too restricted in their membership or questionable in 
terms of their ability to adapt to a more open and participatory 
management style. The mission statements of these organisations were also 
inappropriate as they did not include certain elements such as, the ability to 
receive donations of apprehended fish and to be able to auction this fish and 
keep the proceeds.
The two other fishing organisations in existence at the time of the creation 
of the RESEX were APAC and the fishing colony. Neither of these was 
deemed suitable to fulfill this role. APAC's limited membership and relative 
inactivity rendered it undesirable for this purpose. Fishers along with 
Fabio Fabiano and others were sceptical about empowering the local Colony 
with the administration of the reserve. This concern was due largely to its 
undemocratic history and lack of experience with fisher participation in 
management as well as the fact that public support for this organisation 
was dwindling.
The organisation created to represent fishers in the reserve is the 
generically named Associagao da Reserva Extrativista Marinha do Arraial 
do Cabo (AREMAC). AREMAC is run by a board of directors with a 
president, vice president, treasurer, first and second secretaries. The first 
board was appointed as a temporary measure to be replaced later by 
individuals elected at the general assembly. Efforts were made to put one 
representative of every modality (besides shell collecting) on the board in 
order to present a unified management approach as well as to encourage 
fishers from all backgrounds to participate. It was agreed that no board 
member can be on the board of any other fishing organisation and that 
every board member must be a fisher himself.
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These rules were enacted in order to prevent non-fishers from hijacking the 
reserve power structure as well as to mitigate against the possibilities of the 
concentration of power over local organisations. As was previously 
mentioned, past leaders of fishing organisations have been (and continue to 
be) non-fishers. Also this measure was taken to prevent secondary 
stakeholders such as middlemen, ice house owners etc. from controlling the 
process.
At the time fieldwork was carried out (99/00), there were approximately 120 
voting members of AREMAC and this number has grown since the 
development of the Utilisation Plan. All aspects of this plan were voted on 
in general assemblies and any changes to them in the future must also be 
voted on through this process. In principal, it is the voting members of this 
organisation that have management decision-making power in the reserve. 
In order for fishers to be able to vote, their monthly dues must be paid in 
full by the day of the general assembly. They must also be registered with 
the Port Authority as well as with IBAMA.
IBAMA -  IBAMA, Brazil’s federal environmental control agency, is
responsible for the overall administration of the RESEX A.C. IBAMA also
has primary responsibility for monitoring the activities within the RESEX.
It is also responsible for supporting the development and implementation of
the Utilisation Plan. In this respect, IBAMA has a supervisory and
mediating role in the process. IBAMA’s involvement in the RESEX is
intended to be front-loaded. During the initial phases (initial request,
reserve creation and the development and implementation of the utilisation
plan), IBAMA's role is meant to be greater than during later stages of
consolidation and development, when responsibility for many reserve
functions is to be handed over to AREMAC. There is no exact timing
stipulated for this hand-over, although the local representative of IBAMA
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said that, 'neither IBAMA nor AREMAC are ready for this yet. As the 
concept for extractive reserves is still a new one to both resource users as 
well as to IBAMA both sides need time to mature' (P5- 1177 ■ 1178).
IBAMA is also responsible for accessing technical information (such as 
biological studies) related to the reserve’s activities. This is done primarily 
through the Scientific and Technical Counsel of the RESEX that is called 
upon to discuss technical issues needing further research or information. As 
later sections will detail, IBAMA is also primarily responsible for 
monitoring activities within the reserve.
Utilisation Plan
The utilisation plan was developed through a series of meetings attended by 
fishers along with other interested members of the community. These 
meetings were facilitated by the local IBAMA representative and at times 
with the assistance of representatives from CNPT/IBAMA from Brasilia. 
Although meetings are open to everyone, it is only the fishers who have 
voting rights on the decisions made which affect the utilisation plan. 
Interested parties are free to present their arguments for or against 
different measures but do not have the right to vote. Changes to this plan 
are made using the same method. Proposed changes or additions to the 
utilisation plan are voted on in general assemblies. Results are 
subsequently sent to Brasilia for approval and published in the federal 
public registry.
Only fishers have the right to vote but not all fishers do. As the reserve was 
created to protect traditional populations, there was much debate about who 
would and would not be allowed to participate. As defined at the general 
assembly of July, 1997,
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'Traditional fishers are those citizens who live from artisanal fishing 
(be it fine fishing, beach seining, diving or trawling). There are two 
other stipulations that have to be met: s/he will have to live in the 
city (for over ten years) and vote in the city (for over five). Meeting 
these stipulations guarantees, according to the unanimous 
consensus of the fishers present, the right to use the Extractive 
Reserve as well as to vote and be voted for in its Assemblies' (Prado, 
2000:137 author’s translation).33
Monitoring
In theory, the monitoring responsibilities of the reserve involve a four­
pronged strategy. IBAMA, AREMAC and the individual fishers themselves 
as well as the fiscais colaboradores or voluntary monitors all play a role in 
this process.
As Article 5 of Federal Decree 98.897/90 states, monitoring is primarily the 
responsibility of IBAMA. 'It is the responsibility of IBAMA to supervise 
extractive areas and to accompany the fulfilment of the conditions 
stipulated in the [utilisation plan]' (Felippe (nd): 24 author’s translation).34 
Resource users share this responsibility in the sense that their actions 
should 'defend and preserve the environment' (ibid). Actions contrary to 
this objective, with the creation of the extractive reserve, become criminal 
offences, making it the responsibility of citizens living off these resources to 
protect and preserve them. Article 14 of the RESEX A.C. Utilisation Plan
33 ‘pescador tradicional de Arraial do Cabo e o cidadao que efetivamente vive da pesca 
artisanal (seja de linha, rede de lango, traineira ou mergulho). Ele ainda deve cumprir duas 
exigencias: morar na cidade (no minimo a 10 anos) e votar na cidade (no minimo a 5 anos). 
O cumprimento destas (exigencias) garante, segundo consenso unanime dos Pescadores 
presentes, o direito de fazer uso da Reserva Extrativista, de votar e ser votado em suas 
Assembleias.’
34 ‘Cabera ao IBAMA supervisionar as areas extrativas e acompanhar o cumprimento das 
condigoes estipuladas no contrato de que trata o artigo anterior.’
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states that 'each extrativist is a monitor of the reserve. Therefore, it is their 
responsibility to denounce irregularities to IBAMA or AREMAC' (IBAMA, 
1998: 2).
Taking advantage of paragraph 2 of Article 70 of the Environmental Crimes 
Law (Lei de Crimes Ambientais), Article 17 of the plan describes how some 
individuals are to be trained to become fiscais colaboradores. Article 70 
along with a Resolution of the National Council for the Environment 
(CONAMA No 003/88) provides the framework within which IBAMA can 
train civilian entities or individuals to be more effective monitors. So far, 
thirty-three of these monitors have been trained. While many of them are 
resource users themselves, the voluntary monitors can be members of the 
wider community not directly involved in the reserve.
Financial Resources
Possibilities for the RESEX A.C. to become financially self-sustaining seem 
to be much greater than for other extractive reserves created in more 
distant and isolated locations. To date, there has been no funding made 
available though the G-7 Pilot Project for maritime extractive reserves. In 
fact, funding from external agents has been extremely limited. There are no 
non governmental organisations involved in this reserve. The RESEX A.C., 
though, has other sources of income that can be drawn upon. Potential 
sources of income include charging an 'environmental tax' for tourists who 
use the aquatic space by motorised boat (this would include scuba divers as 
well as day-trippers). Other sources of income involve charging the 
industrial users of the reserve (such as the container ships which cater to 
the Alkalis plant, as well as for the oil drilling platforms which are serviced 
within the reserve boundaries). There has also been some discussion about 
whether the RESEX can receive cruise liners which would also provide 
substantial financial benefits for the reserve. All of these sources of finance 
are questionable in terms of their environmental (and social) impact.
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Furthermore, the local government might react unfavorably to the growing 
power that the RESEX A.C. acquires through these measures and it is 
clearly uncomfortable with the level of power the reserve currently has.
Currently, however, although many of these options are being explored by 
IBAMA and AREMAC they are still possibilities and immediate financial 
needs are not being met. One project supported by the state fisheries 
extension agency (FIPERJ) for the purposes of setting up a small 
aquaculture project was unsuccessful. Other than promises from Brasilia of 
much-needed funds, AREMAC is forced to rely on donations from local 
businesses (such as Alkalis) and membership dues to support its activities. 
The largest donation AREMAC has received was from an individual. A 
tourist from the region donated a small yacht to AREMAC which it uses for 
monitoring missions. Upkeep is expensive though, and the lack of funds for 
repairs means it is often grounded for long periods.
One of the more controversial elements related to the finances of the 
RESEX A.C. is the fact that the local government is paying a monthly salary 
(ranging from 200 - 600 Reais approximately £65 -195 to each member on 
the board of directors of AREMAC. Many feel that this payment 
compromises the legitimacy of the board and of the organisation as well as 
the organisation’s ability to act free of government influence and 
interference.
Conflict
In theory, marine reserves should be easier to establish since there is no 
need to buy out owners and resettle populations, which is often necessary in 
the establishment of their terrestrial counterparts. Unlike other protected 
areas, in the case of the RESEX A.C., there was no need to buy out owners 
to create the reserve. Even given this fact, however, the creation of the 
reserve did exclude other users and created much conflict as a result.
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Apart from the industrial fishers who were intentionally excluded from 
using the resources within the RESEX A.C., artisanal fishers from near by 
municipalities were excluded as well. After many meetings, it was finally 
agreed by the general assembly that a certain number of small-scale fishers 
from the neighbouring municipality could use the reserve if they paid yearly 
membership fees. Even with this measure taken, many small-scale fishers 
were still excluded. In response, there has been some effort by these 
communities to create their own Extractive Reserves.
According to Fabio Fabiano, the reason for defining the limits of the reserve 
at three nautical miles is twofold. On the one hand, the distance needed to 
be great enough to protect migratory stocks upon which fishers depend. On 
the other, a distance greater than three miles would have reached very deep 
waters (approximately 60 metres) which are home to the pink shrimp and 
fertile fishing grounds to Brazil's industrial fishing fleet. These measures 
were taken, therefore, to protect fishers as well as to minimise the conflict 
associated with the creation of the RESEX A.C.
6.7 Summary & Conclusion
The purpose of the first half of this chapter was to describe in detail the 
different dimensions of the fishing community in Arraial do Cabo, RJ 
focusing on the beach seiners and the informal and formal institutions that 
govern their activities. There are many different fishing gear groups 
working in and around the Cape. Each has its own perception of and 
strategy for using the resources around them. Beach seiners have by far the 
longest tradition of organised fishing efforts governed by rules that have 
gone relatively unchanged for many generations.
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The first half of this chapter also described the limited experience that the 
fishers on the cape have had in forming their own organisations 
independently of the State. Since the change to democratic rule in 1988, 
fishers have had greater opportunities to organise themselves. The fisher 
organisations in Arraial have not been successful in attracting membership 
and support and for the most part have catered to one or another gear group. 
The RESEX A.C. managed through AREMAC is the first organisation that 
attempts to create bridges between groups and consolidate efforts to 
manage fishers and the fishery in Arraial.
The second half of this chapter focused on the background and structure of 
the RESEX A.C. and reviewed the enabling factors for its creation. 
Although some of these are peculiar to this extractive reserve many are 
relevant to other fishing communities attempting to establish this type of 
regime in their municipality. The second half of the chapter also provided 
an overview of the different aspects of the reserve including the 
management plan, user rights and responsibilities along with the 
characteristics of the two groups responsible for shared management of the 
extractive reserve* IBAMA and AREMAC.
The reserve is now in phase three during which its long-term viability will 
be tied and tested. The following chapters will explore the nature of canoe 
fishing, the characteristics of canoe fishers as a ’community’ and the health 
of the institutions that have traditionally managed it. They will also look at 
how the reserve has impacted on this community, exploring the role of canoe 
fishers in the reserve as well as their attitudes towards and participation in 
the reserve. This will be done in order to understand the role of maritime 
extractive reserves in protecting and supporting traditional populations.
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Chapter 7 Beach Seiners and their 
M anagement System s
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the strength of the common 
property resource regime which has developed over generations to regulate 
beach seining on the Cape. The chapter will begin with the presentation of 
data concerning the physical attributes of the resources involved. It will 
then describe the decision-making and institutional arrangements that 
regulate access to and use of these resources. It will then describe some of 
the key characteristics of the beach-seining community which affect the 
potential for successful long-term collective action including the presence of 
deep divisions and conflict. Finally, this chapter will analyse the resilience 
of this regime using Ostrom’s (1990) design principals (presented in Chapter 
3) as a guide for evaluation.
The presentation of data is based on the framework used by Ostrom (1990), 
Oakerson (1992) and Berkes and Folke (1998) in their analysis of common
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property regimes. The framework is designed to help identify the 
characteristics of the ecosystem, people, technology, local knowledge, 
property rights and institutions that characterise the case study as a strong 
or weak CPR (Berkes and Folke, 1998*14).
7.1 Physical Attributes
Beach seiners depend primarily on the migratory fish that come from the 
south and stop in the municipality on their way north, providing the 
mainstay of the livelihood of this community (see Map C). These fish travel 
in schools, hugging the shore and making beach seining possible.
Stock
There is general agreement by modern scientists, seiners and other local 
resource users that the fishing grounds in Arraial are being depleted at a 
rapid rate. Catch statistics, interviews and informal discussions 
immediately revealed this. All of these sources cite predatory and 
unregulated fishing activities as the cause of resource depletion. Seiners 
often say, 'Canoe fishing is a dying tradition, things are so bad we can't 
survive from this anymore. We used to do more than survive, we used to 
five from seining' (PI 4:651).
Another fisher remembers the days when fish was abundant,
'In my time, we buried a lot of fish. One time we caught six tons of 
xerelete, big ones around a kilo each. We caught them over on Praia 
do Farol. We sold what we could to the fish salters, but the rest we 
buried, in the corner by the Marines, you know, the one we call 
Baleia (Whale). Back then, there was lots of fish but no way to take 
advantage of it all. Everything has changed now, before we had
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plenty of fish and no one to sell it to. Now it has more value but 
th a t won't help us when the stocks are gone' (P14: 330).
Flow
Seiners more than  any other gear group on the Cape are affected by 
predatory fishing and unregulated use. As previously mentioned, beach 
seiners, unlike other gear groups such as the trawlers or motorised boat 
fishers, do not pursue their catch. Instead, they wait in defined fishing areas 
for fish to come to them. It is part of deep rooted traditional ecological 
knowledge tha t migrating shoals keep a constant trajectory. Shoals 
approach the Cape from Massambaba in the South35 and work their way 
around the Cape passing Praia Grande first then through the Boqueirao 
past the Praia dos Anjos beaches then onto Prainha and finally passing 
Praia do Pontal (See Map C).
Figure 7.1 Resource Flow and Local Knowledge
'When fishers from M assambaba (in the South) see a good school go by, 
they give us a call to let us know. Depending on the tem perature of the 
water, we know what time the school will arrive at Praia Grande. For 
example, if a school of bluefish passes them  at 9am and the water is 
warm, it will arrive here around l ‘15pm. Now, if the w ater is cold, the 
school will arrive faster.’ (fisher from Praia Grande P I 1-202)
Beach seiners identified the unobstructed flow of migratory fish around the 
Cape as crucial to the success of their traditional activity. The sources of 
disturbances to this flow are both internal (caused by the seiners 
themselves) or external (caused by outside factors). Interruptions in the flow 
outside of the control of the canoe fishers have increased in recent years due
35 It is not uncommon for fishers from Monte Alto or Figueira to spot shoals passing their 
beaches and informing fishers from Praia Grande that a shoal of for example bluefish 
would be arriving at their beach soon.
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to the growing number of predatory and small-scale fishers who often 
invade their fishing grounds. Increasing numbers of surfers, motorised 
boats and divers have made matters even worse.
Although seiners have little control over the outside pressures on these 
ecological patterns, they nevertheless have an important role to play in 
protecting this flow by minimising internal disturbances. Traditional 
unwritten rules state that when beach seining is practised properly, the 
entire school of fish should be caught. This rule is rooted in the belief that 
when fractions of the whole are captured, the remaining fish become 
frightened and head out to sea taking other shoals along with them.36
The characteristics of the resource flow create a natural hierarchy between 
the beaches with Praia Grande being the beach with the first opportunity to 
capture passing shoals (See Map C). If seining is not being practised 
'correctly' according to local ecological knowledge and informal rules, this 
could frustrate the efforts of fishers from other beaches and create a 
subtractibility problem. One of the most contentious issues among beach 
seiners is related to this.
Seiners on Praia Grande have begun in recent years to leave their nets in 
place while they go home for lunch so that passing shoals will be captured 
and waiting for them when they return from their break. Seiners from 
other beaches (and even some from Praia Grande) state that it is only 
certain species that become trapped in the nets and that those that do not 
get caught become frightened and change their natural course and, like 
fragmented shoals, are likely to take other schools of fish along with them. 
In this way, neither fishers from Praia Grande nor those from other beaches 
will have the opportunity to capture these shoals. Fishers from the other
36 One of the characteristics that a lookout uses to describe the 'perfect' shoal is that it is 
'bem formada' meaning that the fish are tightly grouped together.
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beaches are furious that Praia Grande seiners are disrespecting traditional 
rules in this way.
A retired fisher from Praia Grande sympathises with seiners from the other 
beaches-
'On Praia Grande, they're not fishing right. A school of 1,000 fish 
comes around and they only catch 300. As a result, the others not 
only run away but they take other schools with them. And another 
thing, the fishers from Praia dos Anjos are right. That net that they 
[seiners from Praia Grande] leave up is ruining their pescaria 
(seining activities). That spot on Praia Grande is one of the spots 
where the schools pass, you know. When they leave that net just 
sitting there, how are the fish supposed to get past and go to Praia 
dos Anjos?' (P14: 390)
Another fisher comments on the same issue-
'The waiting net they use [on Praia Grande] is prohibited. They can 
only fish like that if there is a canoe in the water waiting to capture 
the fish once they get caught in the net. But they just leave the net 
and go off someplace. On Prainha they use the same net but it’s not 
as problematic as the one on Praia Grande. Because all the schools 
of fish [that come to the Cape] pass that beach, either by land or 
outside.37 You know, that’s what we call desmandar, when the fish 
come from the South to the North it’s usually to lay their eggs, so 
these fish normally arrive full of eggs. So anyway, they all pass 
through Praia Grande. Sometimes they come in large numbers and 
sometimes they don't. Two, three, four, six. They normally put up
37 By land or outside means that the fish either pass close to the coast or farther away. It is 
a term commonly used by 'cabistas'.
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the waiting net when the water is yellow38 because the lookout can't 
do his job when the water is like that. Fishers from the other 
beaches are always complaining about it, but nothing has changed'
(P9- 582).
As schools of fish often stay for a period on the Cape, their movements are 
monitored by the lookouts. Whereas in most fisheries it is difficult to 
pinpoint subtractibility (instances where one groups use subtracts from the 
use of others), in Arraial it is often very clear that if one group caught a 
shoal this means another group will not. This is the case both on the 
individual beaches and among the different beaches. For example, a shoal 
of bluefish caught on Praia Grande means one less that fishers from Praia 
dos Anjos will have the chance to catch. On the other hand, if the fishers 
from Praia Grande let one pass39, their chance is gone and the Anjos fishers 
get a try. Often fish (such as dogfish shark) stay on a beach for more than 
one day creating strife between companhas of the same beach. If a 
companha does not catch it on their day then the next day’s work teams get 
a chance to capture it.
In the past, when stocks were more abundant, there was plenty for everyone. 
Lookouts claim that they would pick and choose only the best shoals as 
opposed to now where entire days can pass without one shoal being spotted. 
Lookouts also stated that they do not reveal sightings of shoals that were 
not captured so as not to give other lookouts an advantage for capturing 
them the next day. This provides an illustration of how competition 
between and within beaches is exacerbated by depleting stocks.
38 Yellow water corresponds to murky water or low transparency.
39 Not every shoal that passes is captured. Lookouts may not see them or shoals may pass 
in areas that make them inaccessible to seiners.
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Boundaries
Successful beach seining requires a huge area of undisturbed waters. 
Fishers often identify disturbances tens of kilometres away as the source of 
problems. As in any fishery, the physical area where fishing activities are 
carried out does not represent the full area that requires co-ordination for 
the activity to be successful. The rules which govern beach seining are 
specifically related to the traditional fishing spots on each beach and not the 
entire trajectory needed to be protected for this activity to be successful. 
This is most likely due to the fact that when these institutions were created 
there was no need to regulate the larger area as external disturbances were 
rare.
Changes in technology and number of resource users have increasingly 
undermined beach seining activities. That is, the boundaries regulated in 
the regime are not 'congruent with the underlying boundary conditions 
determined by the physical nature of the resource (Oakerson, 1992:48).' 
Therefore, no matter how efficiently seiners adhere to the rigid system in 
place which determines entry and access rules for seining spots, this system 
cannot single-handedly protect the flow of migratory fish upon which this 
group depends. This indicates an exclusion problem whereby access to the 
resource cannot be effectively restricted. This has important implications for 
the long-term sustainability of this activity. The following section will 
provide an overview of the institutional arrangements that have 
traditionally governed this activity.
7.2 Institutional Arrangements
Insitutional arrangements are defined by Ostrom (1990: 51) as, ‘the sets of 
working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions 
in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation
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rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information 
must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to 
individuals dependent on their actions’.
Operational Rules
Operational rules are those institutions that regulate use of the commons. 
They include limitations on the type of technology used, the duration of time 
that each user or group of users can access the common resource. These 
rules also include the mechanisms with which these rules will be enforced 
and monitored. This section will describe the various facets of the common 
property resource regime which governs the activities of the beach seiners of 
Arraial do Cabo.
Historically, beach seining has been governed by a set of institutions created 
in order to regulate access and use of common fishing grounds. These 
complex norms continue to be unique to the beach seining community. In 
the absence of government support and regulation described in previous 
chapters, over time these fishers developed an informal system of local 
management over their common property resources. Other gear groups have 
not developed their own in the same way nor do they participate in those of 
the canoe fishers.
Not all of these institutions have survived over the years while others have 
continued and in some cases become formalized. The seiners’ management 
system has been partially formalised at different periods over the last 
century. Earliest documents date back to 1921. The rules defining this 
activity were codified in the Colonias handbook published at this time. 
Later, elements of this regime were documented with the local government 
as well as with the Port Authority. Apart from the Utilisation Plan for the 
Extractive Reserve (published in 1998) the last formally documented aspect 
of the beach seiners’ common property regime occurred in 1983 and was
203
signed by the owners from Praia Grande. This document addressed a 
num ber of different aspects of the management regime but focused on 
lim iting access to the Praia Grande seining grounds.
The following sections detail the operational rules associated with the beach 
seining tradition. These rules are associated with access, decision-making, 
monitoring and enforcement and benefit distribution of the resources in 
question.
Work U nit - Companha
Figure 7.2 Photo of elderly work team
The companha is the work unit or team associated with each canoe. A full 
companha consists of a minimum nine camaradas40, each with their own 
specific role in the beach seining process. Seven of these fishers stay on the 
boat itself with the other two on land. From the front of the boat to the back 
the companha consists of the following positions:
• Remadores’ The four rowers, as one might imagine, propel the canoe 
using two wooden paddles each. They are directed by the mestre or 
skipper.
40 Camaradas literally means comrades. Canoe fishers commonly refer to their fellow 
beach seiners using this term.
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• Corticeiro' The corticeiro or cork-line man along with the chumbeiro or 
lead-line man are responsible for casting the large net into the water. 
One side of the net is lined with cork to keep it afloat and the other with 
lead, sinking the net and creating a curtain or suspended wall that traps 
the fish. While the corticeiro throws in the cork line, the chumbeiro foes 
the same with the lead fine.
• Mestre' The mestre or skipper, stands at the bow of the canoe facing the 
rowers. He conducts the manoeuvres of the canoe by interpreting 
signals from the vigia or lookout and translating them into different 
commands for the net throwers and rowers.
Two following camaradas stay on land throughout the process with very 
different responsibilities:
• Cabeiro' The cabeiro or lineman stays on the beach and is responsible 
for initiating the closure of the net by pulling in a fine which is attached 
to one side of the net. He will later be helped by the crew themselves 
after the entire net is placed in the water.
• Vigia- The vigia or lookout is the key player in this process. Standing at 
specific points on the mountainside near the shallow sand bottom coves 
utilised for beach seining, he is responsible for visually locating 
incoming shoals and schools of fish and for signalling with hand 
movements and a bright cloth to those on the canoe, the direction, 
placement and speed which needs to take place in order for the capture 
to occur (See Figure 7.4). For the most part, the 'sign language' used by 
the lookout does not change according to the person's personal style. 
This is important so that if fishers move from canoe to canoe, they will 
be able to understand the signals. Also, if a lookout falls ill, his 
replacement will be aware of the proper signal and will be able to 
communicate effectively with the companha. Currently, there are only 
six individuals with this capability in Arraial do Cabo.
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Figure 7.3 Lookout spotting incoming schools of fish
In the past, each camarada held a specific position on the boat throughout 
his career. For example, he would be a rower, line m an or corkm an. 
Positions such as m estre  were earned over time. Vigias in the past and 
even today are often nurtured from a young age to fill this position. Often, 
today's vigias are the sons of former lookouts. This is the only position tha t 
is still distinguished and separate from the rest. It would be quite rare to 
have a fisher who is a rower one day be a lookout the next. This would only 
occur if a lookout seeks more fishing days and can only find space on canoes 
tha t already have a lookout, forcing him to hold a different position.
For the most part, seiners spend their day waiting in the shade or in small 
huts close to their fishing grounds for a signal from the vigia. It is only 
when the vigia identifies incoming shoals and signals to the fishers waiting 
below, th a t the rowers, cork-line man, lead-line man, and skipper take to 
the canoe to position it according to the vigias instructions. Once the net is 
cast, both ends of it are brought to the beach where the process of pulling it 
in begins.
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The net itself is too heavy to be recoiled by the companha alone. Also, in 
order to keep the shoals from escaping, the canoe often stays in the water 
during this process with members of the crew smacking the waters surface 
with their oars in order to scare (espantar) the fish back into the net. As a 
result, the companha depends on the assistance of people on the beach to 
pull in their catch. Depending on what the catch is thought to be, and the 
time of year (tourists often participate during the high seasons) the number 
of assistants can range from a handful to over a hundred.41
Well co-ordinated, the entire cerco or ‘fencing in’ process takes place in 
silence. According to the canoe fishers, fish have differing sensitivity to 
noise above the surface of the water. One of the most traditionally valued 
fish of Arraial do Cabo, the Anchova or Bluefish (Pomatomus saltatrix), is 
known for its extreme sensitivity. In the past, children and animals were 
not even allowed to run on the beach so as to not scare these precious shoals 
away.
Canoes fishing on beaches that he at a distance from the mainland often 
require larger work teams. Canoes docked at Praia dos Anjos with fishing 
rights to the Maramuta, Praia da Ilha, and the Prainhas require the use of a 
motorized boat to tow the canoe and its companha to these fishing grounds. 
Historically, the work team would use man power and wind power in the 
form of a small cotton sail to get to these locations. Although many canoes 
are still equipped with these sails, with the availability of low cost transport, 
all canoes working these beaches have resorted to motorised assistance.
41 This high number occurs mainly during cagao or dogfish season where each fish can 
weigh up to 90 kilos. This type of fish comes to the waters edge and often stays for a 
number of days, giving fishers and the local population fair warning that they'll need to 
mobilise efforts to bring them in.
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Another factor which contributes to the need to use a larger work team is 
also related to the distance of the beaches. While many canoe fishing spots 
are located close to the urban centre and therefore close to fisher’s homes, 
those same work teams that require the assistance of a motorised boat must 
also bring a cook along with them to prepare the engrosso42 ov beans and 
rice dish commonly eaten on these fishing trips43. Increased fuel costs and 
the actual time taken out of the work day in order to go back and forth 
would be extremely inefficient. In the next section, the economic 
implications of these different needs will be described.
Income distribution ~ O Quinhao
Although the type of work and the level of responsibility vary significantly 
among the different positions, this is not reflected in the distribution of 
earnings within the group. Each camarada is entitled to a share of the catch, 
locally referred to as a quinhao.44 This share does not increase over time, 
meaning that a young fisher just learning the trade will earn as much as 
another with many years experience. Although there are slight variations 
between beaches and seasons where more or fewer fishers are utilised, for 
the most part, there are two main scenarios which illustrate the division of 
catch among the camaradas and owners of the canoes and nets. Literally, in 
Portuguese, a quinhao refers to one fifteenth. In practice, shares may vary 
from one fourteenth to up to one seventeenth but it is still referred to as a
42 Engrossar literally means thickening. Engrosso refers to the thick bean and rice paste 
commonly prepared by canoe fishers. In the past, the cook used one pan to make both the 
beans and the rice in the same pan, resulting in a thick paste. Food was prepared over a 
wood fire and joining the two saved on the amount of fuel used. Today, they bring small 
camping stoves with them and the food is cooked separately. Out of habit though, it is still 
referred to as the engrosso.
43 Any fish caught during the trip to these distant beaches using a hook and line, are also 
fried up and included in the meal.
44 Quinhao literally means portion or quota. The etymology of the term has roots in a 
distribution done in fifteenths and in Arraial the word is used in this way. I.e.- a quinhao is 
equal to approximately one-fifteenth of the total catch.
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quinhao or share. In either scenario, it is the boat and net owners who earn 
the lion's share of the catch.
The most common distribution is illustrated in by situation A (see Figure 
7.4). In this situation there are nine camaradas45 working with the use of 
one canoe and one beach seine. The shares of catch in situation A are 
divided into fourteen parts. In this case, the owner(s) of the canoe is 
entitled to one share, the owner(s) of the net is entitled to four and the 
rem aining nine parts are districuted amongst the nine camaradas.
Figure 7.4 Income distribution for a nine member work team
Situation A
Basic Model
Companha
9/14
Canoe
1/14
Situation B represents another breakdown of shares common to those 
canoes th a t require the assistance of motorised boats to tug them to d istant 
beaches. As stated earlier, it is these canoes th a t also require a cook to 
prepare food for the camaradas. In situation B, the catch is broken down 
into seventeen parts (see Figure 7.5). In this case, there are ten camaradas/
Net
4/14
45 Comrades is the word used to describe the individual members of the team
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the nine crew members and the cook. The cook receives as much as the 
other participants in return  for his labour. Apart from the crew and cook, 
two shares are distributed to the owner of the  tug boat bringing the total to 
twelve. As in Situation A, the remaining five shares go to the owner of the 
canoe (l share) and the owner of the net (4 shares)46.
Figure 7.5 Income distribution for a ten person work team using 
a tow-boat
Situation B
10 p erson  companha+tow-boat 
Canoe
1/17
Net
4/17
Companha
10/17
Boat
2/17
7.3 User Access Rights - Direito do Dia
When, where and how beach seining takes place and who is involved is 
determined by a set of rules called the D ireito do Dia or Right of the Day.
46There are situations that may alter this breakdown, for instance, in the absence of one 
fisher. When a long term fisher from a companha falls ill, this can lead to an increase in 
the number of shares to be distributed. Whether as a result of an accident, a temporary 
illness or if a fisher becomes unfit to fish (due to age or illness) they may receive a quinhao 
or half a quinhao until they are ready to come back or indefinitely if the fisher is elderly. 
Widows of canoe fishers can also be eligible for this type of payment. It is not uncommon 
for a canoe to have one or two extra quinhoes included in its distribution.
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Each beach has its own corrida or use sequence which defines who has the 
right of access for each day, but all beaches generally follow the same rules 
set out in the Direito do Dia system. Rules can be changed by agreements 
made by the owners of the canoes of tha t beach.
According to this system, under no circumstances are canoes from one beach 
to be used on another. They cannot be transferred from one beach to another, 
either for temporary purposes (ie. to fish for the day) or for the long-term (ie. 
to replace a damaged canoe). ‘Canoes from Praia Grande should never enter 
the bay through the Boqueirao and canoes from the other beaches should 
never leave the bay through the same passage’ (Elder fisher).
Table 7.1 Fishing days per beach
Praia Grande 21 Days 42 canoes
Praia dos Anjos 12 Days 12 canoes
Prainha 7 Days 7 canoes
Praia do Pontal 4 Days 4 canoes
There are a certain number of ’days' associated with each of the four 
beaches (Praia Grande, Praia dos Anjos, Prainha, Praia do Pontal) that 
determine when each canoe has the right of the day (see Table 7.1). So not 
only are canoes restricted to specific beaches but they m ust also wait their 
tu rn  to fish, as defined by the system. By customary law, each day must 
have a corresponding canoe and full gear kit (net, paddles, rope and, of 
course, companha). For example, Praia dos Anjos with twelve 'days' 
should47 have twelve individual canoes and gear sets in working order, one 
for each 'day'. This does not mean tha t there are twelve different
47 For all beaches except for Praia Grande, these rules are still adhered to. On Praia 
Grande, as many canoes have fallen in disrepair and most are owned by one individual, 
canoes and nets are frequently re-used in the sequence.
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companhas (ie. 120 fishers) on this beach as seiners are allowed to fish on 
multiple days. In fact, the tendency over the years has been that fewer 
companhas are fishing on an increasing number of days.
Each day has a name (and corresponding canoe) associated with it which is 
registered at the local fishing colony. As a result, should an old canoe be 
replaced, it will always be given the same name which is linked to that 
canoe's fishing day. There are canoes that have been replaced many times, 
always though, retaining the original name. As the canoes are dug out from 
huge trunks and repainted every six months (another customary rule), they 
can last for generations. Bacurau, one of the Praia Grande canoes, is said to 
be over one hundred years old and many others are over fifty or sixty years 
old.
On some beaches, more than one canoe fishes on a given day. This is either 
because there are a number of fishing sites associated with the beach or 
that two canoes fish the same site. Where canoes work in pairs, locally 
called 'canoas casadas' or married canoes, each canoe takes turns casting 
their net. As the process of recoiling the net is time consuming, the 
presence of a second canoe avoids the possibility of shoals passing without 
being caught during this process. On Praia Grande, 'the fishing day should 
never occur with more or fewer than two canoes' (Britto, 1999-259). A 
breakdown of the canoe partnerships from Praia Grande are listed in Table 
7.2.
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Table 7.2 Right of Day system on Praia Grande -  Day division 
partnerships
Day Canoe Day Canoe Day Canoe
Day 1 1 - 2 Day 8 15 - 16 Day 15 2 9 -3 0
Day 2 3 -4 Day 9 17- 18 Day 16 31 -3 2
Day 3 5*6 Day 10 19-20 Day 17 33-34
Day 4 7 -8 Day 11 21-22 Day 18 35- 36
Day 5 9- 10 Day 12 23-24 Day 19 37-38
Day 6 11 - 12 Day 13 25-26 Day 20 39- 40
Day 7 13-14 Day 14 27-28 Day 21 4 1 -4 2
After day 21 the user access system starts again from day 1 
On other beaches, such as Praia dos Anjos, there are two fishing spots but 
only one canoe per spot so tha t two canoes48 go out each day. For example, 
the first in line goes to 'the island' and the second goes to a fishing spot 
called 'M aramuta'. The following day, the second in line would go to 'the 
island' and the third would go to 'M aramuta' and so on. When each corrida
or sequence is completed, it starts over with the first canoe in the run. 
Figure 7.6 Picture of Canoe on Praia Grande
48 During mullet season in the winter months, there are three fishing spots associated with 
this beach.
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7.4 Monitoring & Enforcement
Ostrom’s design principals refer to monitoring and enforcing common 
property management regimes. For these measures to be effective,
'monitors should be accountable to the appropriators or are the
appropriators’ (Ostrom, 1990* 98). This principal could have held true in
Arraial do Cabo in the past but, since then, many changes such as the
concentration of ownership have significantly altered the reliability of the 
monitoring system of this regime.
Actions are held in check by a variety of monitoring mechanisms. Some of 
these are no longer practiced at all while others are still used on some 
beaches and not on others. Traditionally, each companha was required to 
have a monitor among the crew who was responsible for observing the 
activities, and reporting irregularities and infractions to the Colonia 
(Teixeira de Mello, 1921). This meant that the Colony itself was involved in 
sanctioning canoes or owners who did not comply (in a way that it is no 
longer involved). Sanctions were gradual, but severe, and initial infractions 
were fined with subsequent ones leading to the exclusion of that canoe from 
the sequence. Fines were then (supposed to be) invested in education and 
medical services in support of fishers and their families.
The most effective tool for monitoring access is still in use by all beaches 
and is inherent in the sequence itself. Because each companha has an 
interest in and incentive to protect its 'day' and right to fish, the group will 
naturally be making sure that other canoes are complying with the system. 
For example, if a companha arrives on the beach on their fishing day and 
there is a canoe out of sequence already there, the companha which has the 
customary right to fish will fight to protect and maintain it.
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It is not just the sequence, though, that provides these sorts of incentives. 
For the most part, unlike other fishing types, seining takes place in very 
accessible and public spaces. Because it is such a participatory type of 
fishing as well as because it is such an intrinsic part of the local culture 
generally, it is not just the fishers who know the rules. Canoe fishing is a 
spectacle that locals like to watch and participate in. These observers 
consist of fishers and non-fishers alike and they too play a role in supporting 
the system. It has been that system that has supported the community for 
so many years and therefore, these informal monitors (through the 'clog 
radio') create an awareness of who is and who is not upholding the rules.
Nevertheless, there are a number of major infractions occurring, 
particularly on Praia Grande, that are not being addressed. Powerful 
individuals with vested interest in the regime have pursued a policy of 
selective rule enforcement which protects their control over the system and 
minimises their investment. For example, there are significantly fewer gear 
sets than there are days (i.e., there are approximately fifteen canoes/nets 
when there should be forty-two). In the past, this would not have been 
possible as each day was owned by a different set of individuals. Owners 
without fishing gear would not be able to participate. Because today, one or 
two individuals own most of the canoes and access days, they have the 
power to decide that they will not invest in multiple gear sets in order to 
take advantage of their days. Instead, they own a couple of canoes/nets but 
fish on multiple days with each set.
Another significant infraction occurring on Praia Grande and impacting all
the seining beaches is the practice of leaving the seine in the water
unattended. This net disrupts the flow of fish upon which all beaches
depend. This was described in more detail above. Finally, it has not been at
all uncommon for canoes to be brought from Praia Grande to fish on the
other beaches. In fact, the 'big sharks', as these powerful owners are locally
215
referred to, not only control access to the Praia Grande seining area but 
they also have a growing presence on the other beaches. This will be 
examined in the following section.
7.5 Decision-making Arrangements
Ostrom (1990) defines collective choice arrangements as those where most 
individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying them. 
In the past, when most fishers were also owners of at least part of either the 
canoe or net, they had the right to participate in decisions affecting the 
management of their common resources. Each gear set had many owners 
associated with it, the net being the most valuable item with the most 
corresponding owners. Today, concentration of ownership of the means of 
production along with the marketing of catch has created a situation in 
which most fishers are 'employees' of the gear owners. These fishers have 
little say in how decisions are made and in deciding which rules are 
enforced.
Decisions about the rules are traditionally made by the owners of the nets 
and canoes of each beach. Generally speaking, the rules of the beaches are 
almost the same, with slight variations reflecting the different social and 
environmental setting of each beach. As previously illustrated, seining on 
Praia Grande must take place with two canoes working in partnership. On 
Prainha, canoes can be invited to help should there be a large shoal that one 
canoe alone could not bring in, but otherwise canoes fish independently of 
eachother. This relative independence allows for beaches to take care of 
their minor issues such as, for example, how the rest houses should be 
managed. The camaradas or the fishers themselves are rarely involved in 
this decision-making process. This makes the owners of these resources
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that more powerful and the concentration of this ownership, that much 
more significant.
One of the strongest powers of the owners of these resources is deciding who, 
if anyone will be allowed into the sequence. Traditionally, anyone who had 
the standard materials49 (large dug out canoe and net approximately 270 
metres long and 16 metres wide), would be eligible. In 1983, the owners 
from Praia Grande passed a ruling (registered at the local colony), that no 
new canoes would be allowed entrance to the sequence on 'their1 beach. The 
only way new owners are permitted is if they purchase existing materials 
and the days linked to them. Although this ruling only applied directly to 
Praia Grande, the fact that the same owners have veto power on the other 
beaches sent a clear message! no new canoes.
As previously mentioned, although it was not uncommon in the past for 
fishers to be part owners, today it is only a small minority of seiners who are 
owners. Of those who are owners, ownership has been acquired in the past 
and not recently gained. Small owners are slowly becoming the exception to 
the rule. There are approximately three owners (who are all part of the 
same family ■ father son and cousin) who make decisions which affect the 
livelihoods of all canoe fishers. These same individuals are also owners of 
many of the motorised boats operating on the Cape along with one of the 
few icehouses and fishmongers. These owners are revered, feared and hated 
by canoe fishers. Because of their influence, they have veto power on 
decisions made on all of the beaches. Fishers and non-fishers alike refer to 
the current seining management system as a 'Mafia', in which the 
canoes/nets, refrigeration, and marketing systems are controlled by a tightly 
knit group. The following section looks more closely at these imbalances.
49 Only materials meeting these standards would be considered acceptable.
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Ownership patterns - Os Proprietarios
Ironically, the horizontal structure of the companha is not reflected in the 
ownership patterns of the days, nets, canoes and other means of production. 
In the past, because of the expense of the materials used in this type of 
activity, principally the net and canoe, groups of individuals would 
collectively own these items. Fifty years ago it would have been very 
common for a canoe to have three or four owners. As the nets are 
significantly more expensive than the canoes, they often had even more 
owners. These owners were most often fishers working on the canoe itself. 
Also, owners of canoes from each beach were typically residents of that 
beach. Praia Grande canoes were owned by people from Praia Grande, 
Praia dos Anjos canoes were owned by people from the Praia dos Anjos 
neighbourhood and so on.
Local statistics show that only 12 percent50 of fishers in Arraial are owners 
or part owners of the boats they use to fish. Within canoe fishers this 
statistic is even lower and, in comparison to other modalities, concentration 
of ownership is even more marked. In recent years, a few individuals have 
come to own the vast majority of the canoes and nets, thereby controlling 
the associated 'days' and access to the fishing grounds.51 The vast majority 
of fishers are not owners and many owners (particularly those that own 
multiple canoes) are not fishers themselves. The breakdown of ownership 
on Praia dos Anjos is a good illustration of these trends. It also shows
50 This can be compared with statistics from three other towns in Rio de Janeiro which have 
been examined for eligibility for Extractive Reserve creation
Itaipu/Itacoatiara/Piratininga). In these locations, over 56% of fishers have their own 
boats/canoes.
51 Ironically, the individual who owns the most canoes, nets managed to buy them with a 
subsidised loan from the government. In one go, he bought 10 sets of gear and the 
associated days.
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another interesting trend, that owners from Praia Grande are increasingly 
buying out owners from the other beaches.52 A (non-owner) seiner explains^
'I could never have the means of getting my own canoe on Praia 
Grande, even if they would let me. They used to be much cheaper. 
Now, in order to get a canoe on that beach it's going to cost a fortune 
and for what? In order to fish once every 21 days? You'll never get 
your money back, you'll need at least 4 or 5 days to do that. If not, 
months could go by without you earning anything on your 
investment (bad weather etc....)' (P10- 245).
Praia dos Anios
Ten individuals own parts of the twelve canoes on Praia dos Anjos along 
with access to these fishing grounds. Of these, five are residents of Praia 
dos Anjos and the other five are residents of Praia Grande. The five owners 
from Praia dos Anjos own 37.5 percent (4 1/2 canoes) of the means of 
production (and, therefore the access to that production) on this beach while 
owners from Praia Grande own the lion's share at 62.5 percent (7 1/2 
Canoes). A single family (father and son) from Praia Grande owns 50 
percent of total access to the Praia dos Anjos fishing grounds. Of the 37.5 
percent owned by people from Praia dos Anjos, 16.6 percent of them are 
owned by widows53 who inherited them from their husbands.
52 Conveniently, each owner paints their canoe (s) a certain colour so a quick glance at the 
canoes lined up on the beach make it easy to distinguish the distribution of ownership on 
that beach.
53 When a canoe is not being looked after properly, needs painting or has fallen in disrepair, 
it is common to hear people calling them canoa de viuva or widow’s canoe.
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Table 7.3 Breakdown of gear/access ownership on Praia dos
Anjos
Total # of owners on P. dos Anjos 10
# of owners who are P. dos Anjos residents 5
# of owners who are P. Grande residents 5
Percentage of total owned by P. dos Anjos residents 37.5
Percentage of total owned by P. Grande residents 62.5
Percentage of total owned by one family (from P. Grande) 50
Percentage of total owned by women (widows) 16.6
Fishers from other beaches commonly expressed tha t they felt th a t their 
seining activities were being overrun by these powerful owners. Not only 
are access days on all beaches owned and controlled by these individuals but, 
generally, these owners choose crews from their own beaches to work on 
their canoes, thereby limiting the access of residents to seining 
opportunities on their own beaches. This trend has increased the tension 
between beaches.
'Since [Praia Grande seiners] started fishing on our beach they built 
a little hut for themselves to use. On this beach there are two! one 
for seiners from Praia Grande and the others for Seiners from Praia 
dos Anjos. They built it because they are full of themselves. They 
don't want to share anything with anybody. Its because of attitudes 
like tha t th a t [canoe fishers] can't improve our lot together. No one 
wants to help but everyone wants to benefit (P I5:281).'
Another im portant change tha t has taken place in recent years is how the 
catch from this modality is processed and marketed. In the past, the day's 
catch was publicly auctioned on the beach where multiple buyers would
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present their bids. This guaranteed a fair price for owners and fishers alike. 
This practice no longer exists and now fish is sold to a handful of buyers 
who own the peixarias or fishmongers along with either of the two icehouses 
on the Cape. Increasingly, those individuals that own the greatest share of 
access to the fishing grounds have become the owners of these processing 
and marketing centres. This example further illustrates the increasingly 
centralised nature of this common property regime.
The following is a quote from a young seiner who fishes on Edilea, a Praia 
dos Anjos canoe whose owner has only one canoe*
'Everyone wants to fish on Edilea, because it’s the only canoe that 
sells its catch to the highest bidder. That makes it the best. It sells 
its catch for a better price than the others because the owners of the 
others are also the middlemen. I used to work for them. I had to 
leave because I didn't want to sell my share for such a low price. 
Because the owner was the buyer, he thought he could pay whatever 
he wanted and I would take it. But I didn't. I took my fish and sold 
it to another buyer. Most people are afraid of them. Most of the 
people that work on those canoes are elderly. So they can't run that 
sort of risk. And since those owners own almost everything, they 
would have no place to go. I took my fish and left the canoe. I had 
to leave (P15* 534).'
There is a significant gap in the beach seiners CPR between the rules of the
game and the actual behaviour of the resource users. Social transformation
within this group has contributed to this situation. Over the last fifty years,
most seiners have become the employees of a handful of powerful owners.
These owners now determine how seining is practised on the Cape. Other
characteristics of this 'community' such as the pre-existing conflict and
divisions between beaches have eroded reciprocity and contributed to
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mutually subtractive use of common resources. These divisions will be 
explored in the following section.
7.6 Patterns of interaction 
Divisions and Conflict
Size is often cited as a factor which determines the success of communities 
in organising themselves for collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Bromely and 
Cernea, 1989; Baland and Plateau, 1996). It is commonly thought that the 
smaller the group, the easier it is to 'motivate individuals to work towards a 
common goal. Yet, Baland and Plateau (1996) aptly point out that it is often 
among these small communities that rivalries and internal strife are 
pervasive. This view is extremely relevant to this particular case study 
where although the group is small54 there are deep divides that constrain 
collective efforts.
As described in earlier chapters, divisions among the residents of Arraial do 
Cabo run deep. They are as much the result of the historical and colonial 
development of the Cape as they are of the effects of modernisation and 
social change which has occurred during the last fifty years. The process of 
colonisation on the Cape lasted from approximately 1503 when Amerigo 
Vespucci arrived in the Baia dos Anjos until Brazilian independence in 1822. 
During this period, Portuguese settlers, French pirates and other northern 
Europeans along with African slaves made, willingly and unwillingly, the 
Cape their home. Although they adopted the skills and techniques used by 
the Sambaquis Indians before them, these traditions are all that is left of 
these indigenous communities.
54 Size is determined not only by number of people but in terms of their visibility to each 
other (Ostrom, 1990).
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Today, the distinctions between the remaining groups are still clear and the 
separations still relevant. The miscegenation Brazil is so famous for did not 
occur in any significant form on the Cape. This has left the community 
scarred and less able to act collectively in response to problems which affect 
them as a community. Neighbourhoods are divided among these lines. 
Relationships are dictated by these divisions. Although significant changes 
have taken place, seiners more than any other group in Arraial have held on 
to these separations. Throughout this chapter there have been references to 
growing inequalities and hierarchies along with increased competition and 
subtractive behaviour between seining beaches. This section will explore 
the roots and current manifestations of these processes.
The presentation of findings related to social interactions among beach 
seiners on the Cape must include a description of the divisions and conflict 
which exist within this group. Seiners from Arraial cannot be characterised 
as an 'organic whole' as seen from the outside, nor do seiners characterise 
themselves in this way. Any attempt to approach this group as a cohesive 
community would be misguided. The divisions are not new and as 
mentioned earlier are rooted in the post-colonial history of the Cape. 
Although non-fishing residents feel that these divisions have become less 
pronounced in recent years, the relations between beach seiners as the most 
traditional group are a tribute to the Capes' divided past. A seiner from 
Praia Grande explains*
"Before55, here in Arraial it was three tribes, Praia Grande, Prainha 
and Praia dos Anjos. Who was from Praia dos Anjos did not come to 
Praia Grande. They just didn't come. It was like Iraq and Iran. 
There was a fisher from Praia dos Anjos ....that said, 'They say the 
world turns, if it turns and brings me to Praia Grande, then I'll go,
55 Cabistas often use 'before' to refer to the time before the arrival of the CNA - Alkalis. 
Likewise, after commonly refers to the years following the establishment of this company.
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but if it doesn't I wont go, ever!' This lasted many decades, many 
decades, it is an important part of our history as well as our present 
(P14: 390)."
Although the physical separation no longer exists as the city has grown and 
the boundaries of these neighbourhoods are not longer as distinct, they still 
exist for local people. This is especially true for canoe fishers who represent 
the most traditional and conservative group in the municipality. Conflict 
between members of the different beaches is immediately apparent. 
Residents, especially canoe fishers, do not just five on one beach or another, 
they are from a certain beach. The following quotes illustrate the 
contemporary relevance of these divisions-
Resident from Praia Grande:
‘In truth, there were three hamlets, not one. It wasn't one people. 
Each group stayed in their corner. Prainha, that’s where the blacks 
stayed. Anjos, belonged to the fair people with blue eyes, and they 
were rude, less civilised, ignorant, really ignorant, so much so that 
you can see today that the youths from Praia Grande are more 
expressive, more cultured and developed, more educated...’ (P14: 
400).
Resident from Praia dos Anjos-
"The [residents of Praia Grande] are just different from us, you 
know, a different race, a different breed. They're ignorant and rude.
I almost never go there. I only go when my daughter comes to visit, 
she drags me there and I always get snide comments like, 'What are 
you doing here, this isn't your neighbourhood!' (P18-2491).
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Reinaldo Fialho, a local historian, notes that although the two groups lived 
only a small distance away from each other people from the different 
neighbourhoods developed very different identities. 'Those from Praia 
Grande are known to be more sociable, those from Anjos more closed and 
serious and those from Prianha, black' (P18-2149).56
Although they share the same rules, seiners from each beach act 
autonomously when responding to threats to their activities. This may be in 
part because the sources of these threats are different. On Praia Grande for 
example, one of the issues of concern is the number of surfers that obstruct 
the flow of fish schools. On the Anjos Beaches (Maramuta, Praia do Farol, 
Prainhas) it is the Marines57 who complicate seining by requiring tourists to 
submit their passes58 right through the middle of their seining spot, not only 
disrupting activities but startling fish as well. On Prainha, the source of 
problems is the number of tourists that crowd the beaches during the 
summer months59 leaving seiners with little space to recoil their large nets. 
And finally, the fishers from Praia do Pontal complain about the pollution 
coming from the nearby Alkalis plant.
There has been no case where seiners from multiple beaches have united to 
address a common problem. And, apart from the Praia Grande seiners who 
have after years of negotiation signed a contract with the Surfers 
Association regulating their activities, none of the beaches have 
independently addressed their problems. This indicates that conflict and 
division is not only an aspect of the relationships between the seiners (and
56 It may be worthwhile noting that he is from Praia Grande.
57 When the Marines initially came, during the 1980's they tried to prohibit beach seining 
on the island all together. The canoe fishers (from Praia dos Anjos) continued to fish. Now 
it seems they do everything possible to disrupt this activity in the hopes that fishers will 
eventually leave.
58 The island is protected by UNESCO and access is controlled by the Marines.
59 These represent the most important months for beach seining.
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wider community to a lesser degree) of different beaches but also among the 
seiners of each beach.
Although the beaches are all within a ten minute walk of each other (with 
the exception of Praia do Pontal which is a five minute drive ■ 20 min walk) 
there are few fishers who fish on more than one beach. Of those that do, 
most are from Praia Grande. There was only one instance where a fisher 
from either Praia dos Anjos or Prainha fished on Praia Grande, and this 
individual was a lookout. An elderly canoe fisher from Praia dos Anjos 
notes that this measure was acceptable to the fishers form Praia Grande for 
two reasons. One because the lookout remains physically separated from 
the rest of the companha and two because good lookouts are a scare resource 
(P18- 2485). Observations and informal interviews revealed that fishers 
and owners from Praia Grande have an increasing presence on beaches 
outside of their neighbourhood. Nevertheless, fishers from other beaches 
are not welcome to fish on Praia Grande.
Conflict and disunity are also reflected in the interactions between fishers of 
the same beach. One might think that seiners working for years on the 
same canoe would develop a certain sense of loyalty to their work-team. 
Seiners though, describe relations within the companha differently.
'If a seiner works on one canoe for a day, he'll work with the crew 
and hope that that day they will catch some fish. If the next day 
that same seiner works with a different crew, he'll hope that the 
crew from the day before doesn't catch anything at all. It’s like 
we’re loyal to each other just for the day but there's no long-term 
commitment to the companha' (Pll* 493).
Problems with sharing the same space on beaches often result in sub-
optimal outcomes for companhas. An example from Praia dos Anjos
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illustrates this. On Praia dos Anjos, each canoe must bring a portable gas 
cooker, water, pots pans and other staples to the hut where they work each 
day. They first must carry these goods from their homes to the beach. Then 
transport them by canoe to the fishing spot, unload them and carry them to 
their hut and of course, repeat this whole process at the end of the day. 
When asked why they do not leave these resources on the beach one fisher 
explained,
'We can't leave anything in the hut. Not even in a locked box. We've 
tried it and it just doesn't work. We come back a couple days later 
and everything is gone or broken. You'd think there was some way 
to avoid carrying all this weight over here everyday but there isn't. 
There's just no respect between companhas' (P12: 318).
Another seiner offers an example,
'That rich guy on the hill60, he built us a nice hut down by his house 
to replace the old one. It had electricity and a toilet and everything.
In no time it was ruined. Seiners took everything home with them, 
even the fight bulbs. Now we don't even need to lock the door when 
we leave because there's nothing left. It could have been really 
useful to have those things. Us canoe fishers are really divided. We 
can't do anything together' (Pll- 320).
A fisher from Praia dos Anjos describes the interactions between fishers on 
his beach;
60 This wealthy individual has been elected prefect of the municipality since this fieldwork 
was completed. The construction of this hut was very likely used to influence votes during 
election time
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"So they think like this; 'I don't like that guy and so I don't want to 
do anything that helps him, even if it’s going to help me too.' In 
order to make the hut on Maramuta we could only get six of the 
twelve [Praia dos Anjos] canoes to help. Can you believe it, there 
are twelve canoes that would benefit and six wouldn't help make it, 
they just didn't want to work together. And those that didn't help 
are benefiting from it just the same.”(P15‘274)
Seiners do not characterise themselves as a unified group. They are the 
first to reveal the long-standing divisions which exist among and within the 
beaches. They are also very quick to describe how these divisions 
complicate collective action. This lack of 'social capital' exists not only 
between the different beaches which have suffered from an historical legacy 
of mistrust but also within the beaches themselves, even among members of 
the companha. Although the size of the beach seining 'community' is 
relatively small there are deep divisions which separate seiners at all levels.
Dependence on Resource
Baland and Plateau (1996*297) argue that collective action is more likely to 
result when the common resource is recognised as scarce and is critical to 
local incomes. The recognition by beach seiners that the stocks and flows of 
migratory fish upon which their activities depend are becoming increasingly 
scarce was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The relative 
dependence of this community on their seining activities is particularly 
relevant though and will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
Significantly, both quantitative and qualitative data collected indicate that 
there are few fishers who depend on seining as their sole source of income 
over the long-term. Ninety-two percent of fishers have been employed for 
extended periods with something other than beach seining. Of these, 44
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percent were employed with Alkalis and 22 percent with the municipal 
government. Other sources of employment include other types of fishing 
activities and work with local commerce. Duration of employment outside of 
their traditional beach seining activities varied although over 50 percent of 
seiners held jobs for over ten years with 14 percent of all seiners having 
worked over twenty-five years in another profession.
It is hard to say precisely what percentage of total income seining provides 
for these individuals. This is because of the uncertainty involved in seining. 
For example, it is not unheard of for months to pass without a significant 
catch being pulled in. Fishers may come home with enough fish to put on 
their dinner tables but not enough (or the right quality) to sell. Therefore, 
even during hard times, seining provides small benefits. The percentage of 
income derived from seining is also heavily dependent on where and how 
often each individual seines. What is clear, though, is that fishers do not 
live from seining alone and that other economic activities and sources of 
income are essential to their livelihoods. Although it has been common to 
engage in economic activities other than beach seining for extended periods, 
research revealed that these individuals often continued to seine during 
their period of employment. In fact, the survey showed that 50 percent of 
seiners continued to beach seine during these periods.
An elder fisher explains:
'When Alkalis came to the Cape in '45 it hired a lot of Cabistas. So a 
lot of seiners went to work. Just because they took these jobs 
though doesn't mean they stopped being fishers. They never stopped 
being fishers. They fished on their days off and whenever they could' 
(P14* 674).
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The statistics which represent the number of fishers who currently depend 
on outside employment are similar to those of the past. The survey revealed 
tha t 80 percent of beach seiners have other sources of income apart from 
their seining activities. During interviews many stated th a t they would 
engage in other activities when they became available but would always 
come back to seining.
Table 7.4 Days per week that 
canoe fishers fish
Whereas in the past 44 percent of canoe 
fishers were employed by Alkalis, only four 
percent could say so today due to cutbacks 
and down-sizing as well as increased 
mechanisation of this industry. Alkalis, 
though, still plays a very im portant role in 
the lives of canoe fishers. Although only 
four percent actually work there, many 
still receive a pension from the Company. 
Currently, 48 percent of beach seiners 
receive a pension of some sort with the vast majority earning this income 
from their past employment with Alkalis. The value of these pensions 
usually varies between 50 and 100 £ per month. And although this may not 
seem like much, this income places them in the 50th percentile of the income 
distribution in the municipality (IBGE, 1996). The pensions they receive 
provide them with something tha t fishers earning shares infrequently have; 
income stability.
# of Days Percent
1.00 16.0
2.00 4.0
3.00 34.0
4.00 18.0
5.00 14.0
6.00 10.0
7.00 4.0
Total 100.0
When asked if it was possible to live from canoe fishing alone, a fisher from 
Praia dos Anjos replied, 'No, it’s not possible. No way. It just isn't enough,
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even fishing seven days a week. Because if you catch some fish today, you 
may not catch anything for the next one or two months. You can’t  stay that 
long without earning anything1 (P15: 341).
Fifty-four percent of canoe fishers interviewed fish three or fewer days per 
week. Seventy-two percent seine four or fewer days per week. That is, more 
than half fish up to three days per week. Given the uncertain income 
associated with this (and most) types of fishing, it is easy to see why fishers 
must engage in other economic activities.
Table 7.5 Does the canoe fisher 
currently live from fishing alone?
Those th a t do not have other sources of 
income often seine six or seven days per 
week, also a factor th a t could affect their 
ability to engage in collective activities.
Eight percent are still in secondary 
school and live with their parents. Only six percent engage in other types of 
fishing activities (professionally).61 The breakdown of the source of outside 
earnings is related to the age distribution of the beach seining community.
Response Percent
yes 20.0
no 80.0
Total 100.0
Age distribution
As indicated by the findings presented in the previous section, fisher 
dependence on beach seining in Arraial is deeply intertw ined w ith the age of 
fishers, many of whom complement their fishing earnings with pensions. 
The elderly represent a significant portion of active beach seiners. Forty-two 
percent of seiners are over 49 years of age and, very significantly, 32 percent
61 It is not uncom m on to see fishers line fish ing for a fish to take home but not for 
commercial sale.
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are over sixty. It was not uncommon to see fishers in their eighties pulling 
in nets.
A respondent from Praia dos Anjos describes this phenomenon,
'The majority [of canoe fishers] are retired, elderly people. On our 
canoe there are a number of youths but tha t is rare, most of the 
others are old men. The other canoes usually have two younger 
people and eight older ones. They seine just to complement their 
salary. If they don't catch anything they still have a guaranteed 
amount at the end of the month. So they can leave the beach and go 
home, lie down and have a rest while we have to go to our other 
jobs.'
Table 7.6 Age Distribution of active Beach Seiners
Age Percent
16 to 26 16.0
27 to 37 22.0
38 to 48 20.0
49 to 59 10.0
60 or older 32.0
Total 100.0
Most of these fishers receive pension payments from Alkalis. Even though 
they would be eligible to receive pension payments from the government for 
their years as fishers, most do not as they have not been registered as 
professional fishers during their active years and therefore lose access to 
this resource. In fact, of all fishers who participated in the interviews, only a 
fraction receives pension payments from the government for their fishing 
years.
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At the other end of the spectrum, there are also a significant number of 
youths who participate in this activity. Those interviewed were still in 
secondary school and live at home with their families. These individuals 
fish in order to earn spending money or help out at home. Unlike the 
elderly who claim to be fishers even when they are not fishing, this group do 
not define themselves as fishers even though they are fishing. To them, 
seining is just a job and not part of their identity. Although seining is 
respected as an important part of the history and traditions of the Cape, it 
is also seen as uncertain, low-paying manual labour and a future which 
most youths on the Cape would like to escape. An indication of this is the 
fact that young fishers do not like to be seen in the streets carrying fish.
Participation in fishing associations
Regardless of their age, canoe fishers, possibly more than any other fishers 
on the Cape, live on the periphery of formal organisational life. There is 
marginal adherence to the laws that regulate fishing activities requiring 
fishers to be registered with both the Port Authority62 and IBAMA63. 
Participation in local associations is equally scant not only in terms of 
membership but also in terms of the depths and dimensions of the little 
participation that does take place. Even given the fact that membership of 
the local fishermen's guild is no longer mandatory, only a small fraction 
remain members and fewer still contribute monthly dues. A higher 
percentage is members of APAC, the local fishers association, but as this 
organisation is all but defunct, active participation in this entity is limited.
62 The government entity which provides training for fishers seeking a professional license 
along with the registration of their crafts.
63 IBAMA is the Federal Environmental Agency responsible for providing licenses to fishers 
who have successfully completed their course with the Port Authority. This agency is also 
responsible for ensuring that fishing activities are carried out in accordance with 
environmental legislation.
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This situation can be described as one in which participation has been 
limited to consulation at best. Without decision-making power or an ability 
to influence the direction of the organization, fishers have yet to be 
empowered by local organizations.
As discussed earlier, the current structure of the traditional management 
regime that governs seining activities no longer provides the space for active 
fisher participation. Although fishers participate in other ways, such as 
upholding the rules and gaining access and other benefits by its existence, it 
is only owners of the gear and access days who are included in decision­
making. And even within this group of owners, small owners have a 
negligible impact on decision-making because of the power held by a few. 
To all intents and purposes, seiners have become employees of these 
individuals.
According to the survey, 95 percent of canoe fishers are not registered with 
the Port Authority. This situation has important consequences. 
Unregistered fishers are not treated as professional fishers (no matter how 
long they have been fishing) and their fishing activities are considered 
illegal. This also has important implications in terms of fishers’ 
relationship with these authorities to the extent that they fear sanctions 
and do not feel that they can seek out these entities with their own concerns. 
Focus groups revealed that fishers feel that these organisations work 
against them and do not support them.
Also according to the survey, 82 percent of seiners are not registered with
IBAMA which is another requirement for a professional fisher to legally fish
in Brazil. Only four percent of canoe fishers are members of the local
fishing colony and 12 percent are members of the (now defunct) fishing
association (APAC). This lack of participation affects the ability of fishers to
have organisations that represent them. It also means that fishers over the
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years will have no way of proving that they were fishers their whole lives 
and will not be able to claim social security (INSS) benefits. These figures 
illustrate the peripheral position that seiners have vis a vis the authorities 
that regulate fishing activities along with the local institutions created to 
represent fishers.
When asked why they were members of the different associations, 
respondents focused on issues of representation and access to medical 
services which in the past were provided by the colony. The majority who 
were not members of any local organisations cited the lack of benefits of 
membership as the primary reason for opting out. In fact, they cited the 
lack of representative leadership and incentives, such as access to medical 
care, as reasons for not participating. Responses also indicated a general 
apathy towards collective efforts. Seiners felt that many institutions have 
come and gone without providing any benefits. They often cited the 
leadership of the local Colony as a current example of this. Qualitative data 
clearly revealed a mistrust of local leadership and general apathy towards 
membership.
'The groups around here, they don’t represent the fishers and they 
haven't managed to show fishers any real progress, they haven't 
done anything. The leaders of those organisations are just out for 
themselves. Behind all the mission statements, behind all the 
boards of directors there are parallel interests at play that have 
nothing to do with what's good for us' (P10: 422).
Research into the finances of ALPAC, the first free association, corroborates 
these concerns. Membership required the contribution of three percent of 
gross earnings of canoe fishers to be paid in monthly. Records show that the 
majority of these funds were used for the purchase of building materials but
no one could identify what was actually constructed with these funds.
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Fifteen percent of the total contributions would go to the director of the 
organisation and another 15 percent to the president. The longest running 
board of this organisation included two sons of the biggest canoe owner in 
Arraial. In other words, the organisation served as another way for a few 
individuals to gain a larger share of the potential earnings from canoe 
fishing.
For the most part, participation in fishing organisations has been limited to 
paying dues. Few local organizations have held meetings open to its 
members and even fewer have allowed fishers to participate directly in 
decision-making in the organisation such as, for example, where funds will 
be allocated. Most fishers are not members and as they have little to offer 
to attract (and keep) a strong membership base.
A quote from a representative of the state-level fishing institute (FIPERJ) 
illustrates why fishers are reluctant to participate in the Colonia and other 
associations,
'It’s a question of economics. The fishers stopped paying the colonies 
and now the colonies have no money. This is the case throughout 
the entire state [of Rio de Janeiro]. So, the colony was left with no 
money to pay for a dentist or doctor. Why doesn't the fisher pay his 
dues? Because he doesn't have a place to unload his fish, he lives 
under the thumb of the middlemen and therefore has no money to 
pay' (P3-346).
In conversations with fishers, it is also apparent that their relationship with
their associations has been based on weak ties. Their level of participation
in these organisations has been low, and usually based solely on their
monthly payments of a few reis. Formal meetings are rare, none provide
any space for fishers to participate in decision-making within the
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organisations, budgets are kept a secret and most fishers if not all, regard 
these organisations with distrust. Their leaders are known for taking 
advantage of their positions through nepotism and corruption.
7.7 Outcomes and Consequences
Although many other factors were explored throughout the period of 
fieldwork, the analysis above restricts itself to characteristics of the canoe 
fishers’ CPR that were particularly relevant in determining the strengths 
and weaknesses of this regime. Clearly, the beach seiners have over time 
developed an intricate set of institutions which govern their activities. The 
fact that these institutions are still in place and on all beaches where beach 
seining has traditionally been practised in an indication of their resilience 
in the face of ecological and social change. Qualitative and quantitative data, 
though, indicate that these institutions have become increasingly fragile.
If judged by the design principals identified by Ostrom (1990) the CPR 
developed by the beach seiners would be categorised as weak or not robust. 
In fact, the beach seiners’ common property resource regime meets few if 
any of Ostrom's conditions (See Table 7.7). Although operational rules 
define and limit the number of users and frequency of use within the seining 
community, the characteristics of the resource in question (migratory fish) 
complicate the ability of commoners to exclude other resource users.
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Table 7.7 Ostrom's Principles as applied to the Seiners CPR, past 
and present
Design Principle Past Current Strength of Canoe Fisher Resource
Regime
1. Clearly
defined
Boundaries
YES NO. Although boundaries are clear and seiners 
understand the flow of the resources upon which 
they depend. In the past there was no need to 
close the area to outsiders as there were very few 
users. Now, this flow is often appropriated or 
disrupted by other users creating an excludability 
problem.
2. Congruence 
between 
appropriation 
and provision 
rules and local 
conditions
YES NO. There are a number of indicators tha t these 
rules and conditions are incongruent. Fishers do 
not feel tha t they earn enough to live on. Owners 
have sold their shares as too many days were 
added on some beaches leading to rent 
dissipation.
3. Collective * 
choice
arrangem ents
YES NO. Extremely few owners make decisions for 
everyone. Fishers have little say in changes to or 
the m anagement of the regime.
4. Monitoring
YES YES. Day to day monitoring still takes place but 
rules are enforced selectively and continuous rule- 
breaking by big owners is not uncommon.
5. Graduated 
Sanctions
YES NO. Although rules do include the use of 
graduated sanctions, these are not longer used.
6. Conflict- 
re solution 
mechanisms
YES NO. In the past, the Colony and the owners of 
canoes/nets would play an im portant role in this. 
Now it seems it is up to the big owners to resolve 
(or not) discrepancies between rules and 
behaviour.
7. Minimal 
recognition of 
rights to organise
YES YES. Local government, Port Authority and other 
fisheries officials including the head of the colony 
recognise the legitimacy of the canoe fishers CPR. 
They may in fact perpetuate some of the 
inequalities inherent in the system as it is not 
uncommon for local politicians to have family ties 
with the big owners.
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This fragility has multiple roots interacting at many levels. Oakerson (1992) 
refers to the technology used and the nature of the resource itself as the 
'hard constraints'. In the case of the seiners’ CPR, the nature of the 
resource coupled with the traditional fishing methods employed create as 
situation whereby (as in most fisheries) monitoring and excluding others is 
particularly difficult. Because this type of seining depends on the 
unobstructed flow of migratory fish, vast undisturbed areas are needed to 
provide ideal conditions.
Socio-economic change over the last fifty years has created many obstacles 
for successful seining as well as many challenges for the institutions in 
place to overcome. Population growth locally and regionally has put more 
pressure on resources. New fishing technologies have been introduced 
which conflict with the ecological patterns upon which seining depends. 
This has presented difficulties for monitoring external threats to the 
resource regime.
The arrival of the Alkalis plant along with other aspects of modernisation 
created possibilities for wealth accumulation and introduced hierarchical 
structures into the community which previously were less acute. These 
processes also changed the way the community interpreted the beach 
seining activity,* from tradition and social identity to a 'backward' activity 
representative of the past, not the future. Historical documents and oral 
testimonies suggest that in the past the situation was very different. This 
changed because too many people were let into the access sequence, 
producing a problem of rent dissipation whereby investment in the gear etc., 
was no longer worth the benefits. This situation was exacerbated by falling 
fish stocks.
These social changes have had important implications for the sustainability
of the resource regime. Many if not most fishers at the time found wage
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labour opportunities with the Company (Alkalis). These opportunities led to 
the accumulation of wealth amongst those employees who made it to the 
higher ranks within Alkalis. This process introduced a hierarchy in the 
community based on positions within the company as opposed to the concept 
of respect based on traditional knowledge whereby fishers with knowledge 
and experience were the most respected. It also facilitated the emergence of 
concentrated ownership of the nets and canoes which has led to subtractive 
behaviour and selective rule enforcement. These internal threats have been 
monitored but rules have not been enforced.
The inability of canoe fishers to overcome the historical legacy of deep 
divisions between beaches has inhibited their ability to articulate 
themselves politically in order to overcome common problems. The 
concentrated ownership of canoes and nets coupled with control over market 
access by the same individuals are problems that all canoe fishers face. 
This situation has been exacerbated by the lack of representative leadership 
among this group. The combination of a fragmented community with little 
faith in local leaders has created an environment ripe for the proliferation of 
negative social capital whereby local institutions are being harnessed by a 
few individuals for their own benefit.
Seiners, especially non*owners, play a very passive role in decisions that 
affect their livelihoods. Even those who are owners and therefore entitled to 
a say in the management of the system no longer have much power. Seiners 
participate passively in the management regime and their participation in 
other associations and entities is extremely limited both in quality and 
quantity.
Although most fishers have other sources of income, the majority earn a
very small pension and still depend on seining for a living. This should
make the group more willing to fight for their concerns and needs. But as
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many seiners are elderly, they are less able to find employment elsewhere 
and may for other reasons, which will be explored in the next chapter, be 
less likely to articulate themselves politically.
Ironically, while Alkalis is symbolic of the processes of modernisation that 
have challenged the resilience of this regime, the Company still plays an 
important role in beach seining. The pensions paid to over 40 percent of 
fishers in a sense subsidise and support this activity. Although fishers feel 
that there are fewer fish today, many continue to seine because they have 
these pensions to fall back on. Although in the past, regulating the canoe 
fishers’ resource management regime was enough to protect their 
livelihoods, changes over the last 50 years (technology, population growth) 
have meant that the scale of regulation has had to be increased in order to 
protect the commons. During this period, both internal and external threats 
have increased.
Even if the beach seiners’ management institutions were robust, they would 
not be able to significantly effect the health of the ecosystem on which they 
depend. With the introduction of the Extractive Reserve, the health of the 
ecosystem and the future of the traditional activities which rely on it is now 
dependent the ability of trawler fishers, boat fishers and SCUBA fishers to 
be integrated into a larger CPR. It is also essential that the reserve 
mitigate against external threats from industrial fishing which present a 
constant threat to the ecosystem and all who fish in this area.
7.8 Summary & Conclusion
This chapter presented research findings related to the quality of resource 
governing institutions among the beach seining community in Arraial do 
Cabo. These included a description of the characteristics of the resource 
itself. It also included a description of the work teams or companhas that
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participate in this activity along with the Right of Day system which 
regulates access to the physical areas where beach seining takes place. It 
went on to describe how the gains from this activity are distributed, 
including a description of the ownership patterns on some of the different 
beaches.
The chapter also presented data relating to some of the characteristics of 
the beach seining community. These factors include the degree of 
dependence on this activity, threats to seining activities, the level of 
participation in local fishing institutions and fishers’ attitudes towards 
these institutions. It also presented qualitative and quantitative data 
relating to the historical divisions which persist among the beaches.
The last section took the findings presented above and, using some of the 
design principals for long standing CPR's identified by Ostrom (1990, 1992), 
attempted to gauge the strength of the management system employed by 
canoe fishers to manage their activities. It found that, although the seiner 
CPR has been in place for generations, there are many reasons for believing 
that it has become increasingly fragile. Indicators of this fragility include 
selective rule enforcement, subtractive behaviour and low levels of 
participation in decision-making along with increased threats to the 
boundaries of the CPR and the natural resource itself.
In 1997, Brazil's first Maritime Extractive Reserve was established to 
protect the activities and resources of this traditional fishing community. 
The following chapter will present and analyse data detailing the 
relationship between the canoe fishers and the newly created conservation 
and development initiative. It will look at what role seiners had in the 
creation of the reserve and their involvement in its current management. It 
will also analyse seiners’ attitudes towards and participation in the reserve.
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Finally it will summarise the impact the creation of the reserve has had on 
the long-term sustainability of the canoe fishers’ CPR.
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Chapter 8 Social Change and the RESEX  
A.C.
One of the primary goals of Brazil's first Maritime Extractive Reserve is to 
protect the beach seining community. The traditional fishing practices 
employed by this group along with the informal institutions that support its 
activities were identified and subsequently targeted with this innovative 
conservation and development regime in order to protect this cultural 
diversity. The creation of the Extractive Reserve was also seen as a vehicle 
for the long-term protection of the natural resource base, nurtured by the 
up-welling phenomenon and intrinsically linked to these traditional 
activities. In part, protection of these aspects of the community is seen as 
important because local fishing activities are based to a large degree on 
sustainable principles and local knowledge.
Because the RE SEX A.C. is the first of its kind, there is little prior 
experience of how traditional maritime fishing populations and their 
management systems interact with these initiatives and what role they play 
in them. The aim of this chapter is to present data on the relationship
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between canoe fishers, their management systems and the newly- 
established Extractive Reserve. This chapter will analyse the way that the 
canoe fishers' institutions described in previous chapters were contemplated 
in the Utilisation Plan and will look at the articles in that plan that directly 
impact on their activities and their management arrangements. It will also 
present data related to the type and intensity of participation of this group 
in the reserve with a particular focus on their ability to influence 
management decisions. This chapter will also analyse how the different 
dimensions of the reserve (management, monitoring, etc.) are perceived by 
fishers. The chapter will then conclude with a discussion about the impacts 
of the reserve on the sustainability of the canoe fisher CPR and to what 
extent the social objectives of the RESEX A.C. have been achieved.
8.1 Creation of the Utilisation Plan
The legal establishment of the Extractive Reserve in Arraial do Cabo 
represented the first step in creating a common property resource regime 
collaboratively managed by fishers and government. The intentions and 
purpose of this CPR are similar to those of the regime that governs the 
canoe fishers; to manage access to resources in a sustainable and equitable 
way for a limited number of resource users. Although their intentions are 
similar, however, other characteristics of these two regimes differ 
significantly. The RESEX A.C. absorbed the existing canoe fishers’ CPR and 
created a larger system which included all fishers in the municipality as 
opposed to just one gear group. Other differences in the structure of these 
systems, apart from federal government support and involvement, are 
related to the way decisions are made and by whom.
The Utilisation Plan was developed to define the rules that govern the 
Extractive Reserve. This plan represents the social contract among fishers
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as well as between fishers and government. It also regulates other activities 
such as SCUBA diving that take place within the reserve boundaries. The 
Utilisation Plan took approximately one year to develop and was finally 
published by the federal public registry in February 1999. All fishers, local 
NGOs, and secondary stakeholders were invited to participate in a series of 
meetings in which the rules were discussed and voted upon. For the most 
part, this process was facilitated by the local representative of IBAMA with 
support from representatives of the Brasilia-based National Centre for 
Traditional Populations (CNPT).
The creation of the Utilisation Plan was the first step visible to the fishers 
themselves that the RESEX A.C. was a reality and did not exist just on 
paper. With the creation of the plan, fishers along with other stakeholders 
had the opportunity to see how the concept that they had generally agreed 
upon in theory would be operationalized. This was the first time that 
fishers from different modalities were brought together to try to resolve 
their problems. In order to develop the plan, there was a need to find 
common ground upon which to build. Furtado describes this process’
'Besides the outside threats to the fishing grounds, the creation of 
the RESEX revealed the absence of a common identity [among local 
fishers]....Because of the proliferation of different identities which 
resulted from the social change which had taken place in the area 
[namely as a result of the establishment of the Alkalis plant], no one 
knew anymore how best to define who really was a traditional fisher 
of the Cape. The principal internal problem for these fishers was to 
distinguish, in this enormous sea of immigrants, who could be 
considered Cabista and therefore gain access to the reserve' (Prado, 
2000• 132 author's translation)
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The initial idea of creating an Extractive Reserve in A.C. was well received 
by local government, leaders of fishing organisations and traditional leaders. 
The unity behind the creation of the reserve came from the widespread 
agreement that predatory fishing pressures from around the region were 
compromising local fishing efforts. This common outside threat provided an 
important unifying factor for these groups. This collective support dwindled 
quickly, though, when some groups began to perceive the newly created 
reserve as a potential threat to their own power base.
Power Struggles
With the creation of the Utilisation Plan it immediately became clear that 
the traditional authorities which governed fishing activities in the area such 
as boat owners, local government and the Colonia, would be challenged by 
the new powers of IBAMA and AREMAC. This realisation developed into 
conflict between these organisations and an overall loss of support for the 
RESEX.
The development of the Utilisation Plan went far beyond excluding 
predatory activities and fishers from outside the Cape. It focused on issues 
internal to the fishing community on the Cape such as the conflicts between 
user groups and use of space, issues that were much more divisive than 
joining forces against a common enemy. Also, the Colony and other local 
institutions and traditional leaders thought that they would be playing a 
much greater role in the management of the reserve. When AREMAC was 
created, and none of these groups were represented, many withdrew support. 
Examples of this situtation are presented in the following paragraphs.
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The Colonia
As the largest local fishing organisation, support from the Colonia was 
pivotal for the creation of the RESEX. Initially, the Colonia supported the 
setting up of the reserve by signing the petition included in the original 
proposal sent to the federal government. The president of the Colonia 
believed that his organisation would be strengthened by the creation of the 
reserve and that he would be involved in its management*
'The reserve was created by using a petition that was not signed by 
a single person in our municipality. When the decree was published 
[formally creating the reserve] it stated that the reserve could form 
a partnership with any association or co-operative in the 
municipality. But, for some reason, the Colonia was not included in 
this process, and I'm not sure why. What I am sure of, though, is 
that when they needed my signature in order to create the reserve 
they told me all kinds of things to make sure I signed it.
When the time came to create an association to manage the reserve, 
they forgot about the Colonia and chose a little group of their friends 
to head it. I was with the Mayor at the time and we contested the 
choice, we took it all the way to Brasilia...the Reserve is a farce. If 
they [AREMAC/IBAMA] take the port away from us64 what will I 
do? I'll tell you, I'll defend the Colonia with tooth and nail' (P7* 
0192).
Since the creation of the reserve, the Colonia has refused to participate in 
any of the activities associated with the RESEX A.C.
64 Before the creation of the Reserve, the port was administered by the Colony.
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Owners
Decisions about the rights and responsibilities of members of the RESEX 
were made through public voting which provided fishers and other 
community members (to a limited degree) with the opportunity to influence 
this process. The process of voting on user regulations deviated enormously 
from traditional decision-making arrangements. As presented in earlier 
chapters, the power to regulate fishing activities has generally been 
monopolised by a few individuals. This is true for canoe fishing as well as 
the other gear groups present in A.C. In this new forum, non-owners, it was 
assumed, would have the same influence over the process as would owners.
The establishment of the reserve bypassed the legitimacy of the canoe 
owners as the final decision-makers in the canoe fishers’ CPR. From then, 
all decisions would have to be voted on in the general assembly. In practice 
though, it did not work this way and the voice of the owners was still 
considered important. Some, such as the fisher that provided the following 
quote, would even argue that their word continues to rule the conduct of 
canoe fishers (and other fishers) and affects their participation in the 
reserve:
'I think Fabio Fabiano [of IBAMA] is afraid of the owners from Praia 
Grande. I'm sure he is because they are disrespecting IBAMA, a 
federal agency, right in front of his face. That alone shows how 
powerful they are. They are not following the rules set out in the 
Utilisation Plan. Today, the word of the owners of Praia Grande is 
more important than those of IBAMA and the Assembly. They are 
very powerful. We've had voluntary monitors quit because they 
were being threatened by the owners' (P9: 625).
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In the beginning the owners/middlemen were involved and enthusiastic 
about the creation of the reserve, but now they refuse to come to the 
meetings and discourage people who work for them from going. The owners 
from Praia Grande also continue to defy the articles that specifically 
address the 'waiting net' problem on this beach.
'In the beginning they were much more involved, mainly so they 
could make rules that would suit them. When we [members of 
AREMAC] voted in a new canoe to their sequence, they wouldn't let 
it enter. One side says you can, the other says you can't.' (P9- 582)
'The owners of the canoes are also the middlemen who control the 
marketing of their catch. So, they think they can do whatever they 
want. When you go to Praia Grande to talk about something they 
say, "What do you know about fishing? Are you 'cabista'? What are 
your roots? I've heard there are people in that Reserve talking 
about fishing that don't know anything about fishing!" These owners 
have a lot of power over the canoe fishers and they don't want 
anything to do with the reserve.' (P9: 675)
The owner of the greatest number of canoes commented on the reserve-
'The idea of the reserve was mine. I'd been talking about it for ages 
but they've made a mess out of it and now I don't want anything to 
do with it. There's some group running the place that dosen't know 
the first thing about fishing. I don't even want to get near the front 
door of that place because I don't have the least respect for those 
people or their ideas.' (P18: 1622)
The fact is that the owners/middlemen involved in seining activities have
largely rejected the authority of AREMAC and IBAMA, and this has
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important implications for current levels of participation in reserve 
activities.
Local Government
Although the reserve was created with full support from the Mayor, 
successors felt threatened by the implications that the reserve would have 
on their power and control over the resources in the municipality. The 
economic life of the Municipality of Arraial do Cabo is almost entirely 
dependent on the water resources that surround the Cape.
Since the creation of the RESEX A.C. control over the local port has been 
transferred from the federal government to the municipal government. 
Built in order to service the National Alkalis Company, the port has since 
been under-utilised. With the municipalisation of the port, local 
government is now entertaining bids from private companies. Among these 
Honda, Petrobras, Shell and Odebrecht have demonstrated interest (Jornal 
do Sabado, 1998). Local government plans for the port include building an 
offshore terminal to service oil platforms from the nearby Campos Basin. 
The government would also like to encourage cruise liners to stop on the 
Cape on their way to Rio de Janeiro.
With the creation of the Extractive Reserve, these opportunities would have 
to be supported by IBAMA and voted on in general assemblies. So far, 
IBAMA and AREMAC have been sceptical about the appropriateness of 
servicing oil rigs inside the reserve and have become a potentially enormous 
obstacle for local economic development as envisaged by the current 
government.
Since the reserve was created, it has become increasingly clear that fishers,
through AREMAC, could have powers in the community never before
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imagined. Apart from those mentioned above, other groups, such as the 
Tourism Association and fishing groups from other municipalities also felt 
threatened by the creation of the Utilisation Plan. The next section will 
focus the relationship between the beach seiners themselves and the 
utilisation plan.
8.2 Beach Seiners and the Utilisation Plan
Although the beach seiners occupy a central place in the origins of the 
RESEX A.C., only four articles (of approximately 75 in total) in the 
Utilisation Plan apply directly to beach seining. Of these articles, none 
addresses the weaknesses in the traditional management systems used by 
canoe fishers presented in Chapter 6. The management regime used by this 
group is included on a general level but specific rules have not been 
explicitly (re)defined and consolidated into this plan. As a result, the 
utilisation plan does not provide a clear and solid foundation upon which to 
rebuild these traditional management systems. The relevant articles are 
described below.
The first article in the Utilisation Plan that relates directly to the activities 
of the seiners (Article 5.1) vaguely defines the relationship between their 
'traditional' management regime and the Extractive Reserve. Specifically, 
Article 5.1 of the plan states that, 'Canoe fishing is permitted according to 
the norms of the 'right of way' system that regulates the canoe sequence 
{corrida)...as well as any agreements between companhas duly registered 
with AREMAC' (IBAMA, 1999- 2). In essence, Article 5.1 incorporates the 
written and unwritten rules discussed in Chapter 6 without stating exactly 
what these rules are. It is as though an assumption has been made that 
those rules that have traditionally governed this gear group are intact, up- 
to-date and effective. It does state however that any changes to these rules
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in the future would have to be formally registered with AREMAC, the 
association of the Extractive Reserve created to represent the local fishing 
community.
Articles 5.2 and 5.3 address the relationship between canoe fishing and 
other gear groups. The former regulates the use of throw nets within 500 
metres of canoe fishing activities and the latter restricts the use of lanterns 
during night canoe fishing which takes place on Prainha so as not to disturb 
the trawlers that fish nearby who need total darkness. Article 5.4 stipulates 
the exact dimensions that each seine should have.
Article 5.5 is the only one in the Utilisation Plan that directly addresses one 
of the main points of contention among canoe fishers presented in detail in 
the previous chapter. Namely, this problem centres around the use of a 
waiting net by fishers on Praia Grande that disturbs the resource flow to 
other seining beaches. Specifically, Article 5.5 states that on Praia Grande, 
seining can only be practised 'while there is a canoe present and in the 
water alongside the net' characterising the activity as artisanal and 
harmonious with the 'right of way' system' (IBAMA, 1998-2). In fact, what 
is meant by this is that a canoe and companha have to be present in the 
water.
Impact on the Seiner CPR
Little change is required of canoe fishers in terms of the technology they use, 
the timing of this use and place for use as a result of the establishment of 
the reserve and the creation of the Utilisation Plan. For the most part, 
change in these factors is required much more by the other modalities than 
by the canoe fishers.
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In essence, the reserve has had little impact on the way canoe fishing is 
practised, either in terms of monitoring adherence to rules or in terms of 
dealing with ownership patterns or other weaknesses in the seiner CPR. 
The Utilisation Plan does attempt to address the problem of the 'waiting 
net' on Praia Grande. This problem is of particular significance because it is 
by far the most important recognised internal threat to successful seining. 
The 'waiting net' problem is symbolic of the disunion between the different 
seining beaches. It is also symbolic of the power that canoe owners have in 
changing the rules unilaterally. For these reasons, it is essential for the 
reserve to clearly define and monitor rules to mitigate against this practice. 
But without the support and participation from the owners and without 
redefining the rules which govern this activity the short-term impact is 
minimal. The plan has in fact complicated the management of the seining 
activities as it has become less clear who in fact has the authority to alter 
and enforce them.
For example, the practice of using the 'waiting net' continued after the 
creation of the Utilisation Plan, even though the plan directly addressed 
this issue. Over a year after the plan was made, the owners from Praia 
Grande were invited in writing to the RESEX headquarters to discuss this 
practice. Neither of the powerful owners attended the meeting and both sent 
their invitation back to the headquarters unopened. Although they now 
leave a canoe in the water with the waiting net (as stipulated by the 
Management Plan), the canoe companha does not stay. So these owners 
have taken a literal interpretation of these rules which has left seiners from 
other beaches along with the AREMAC and IBAMA representatives 
increasingly frustrated.
The Utilisation Plan could have played an important role in redefining the
rules of engagement among canoe fishers (as well as redefining the
relationship between canoe fishers and other modalities) but it did not
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succeed in doing this. The plan assumed that the traditional management 
system was effective and that it could simply be absorbed by the larger 
regime. As a result, the plan sends out a contradictory message. On the one 
hand, it codifies the authority of canoe owners to continue with the status 
quo of selective rule enforcement. On the other, it gives canoe fishers (as 
well as other fishers) a right to vote, offering a new more democratic forum 
in which individual canoe fishers have greater influence over decisions 
made regarding their fishing practice. This situation in turn has negative 
consequences for participation because people are afraid to expose 
themselves by going against the owners.
As a result, the management plan does not provide a solid base for 
managing beach seining activities. It does not compensate for the 
weaknesses in the existing CPR which would be necessary in order to clarify 
both the 'rules of the game' and the power structures which govern them.
8.3 Beach Seiner Participation in the Extractive Reserve
The ability of the RESEX A.C. to meet the needs of the seining community 
is largely dependent on the ability of this group to articulate their needs 
through greater participation in decision-making as well as in other aspects 
of the reserve management and implementation. The following paragraphs 
review the legal provisions for participation in the RESEX. They will also 
look at the incentives that exist to encourage participation by this group. 
This section will also explore the current membership of this group and 
other groups in the reserve.
Legal provisions for participation
Chapter 5 reviewed some of the preconditions for inclusion in the RESEX
A.C. To be considered a 'traditional fisher' as defined in a General Assembly,
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a fisher must have been resident in the municipality for ten years and 
voting in it for five years. Meeting these conditions, however, does not 
immediately guarantee membership or the associated voting rights. 
Whether or not a fisher is a member, s/he is responsible for adhering to the 
rules defined by the Utilisation Plan. In future, all fishers utilising the 
space of the reserve must become members.
Apart from meeting the conditions for being a 'traditional fisher', in order to 
gain membership to the reserve, fishers must be registered with IBAMA 
and the Port Authority. Whereas registration with IBAMA is fairly simple, 
the Port Authority requires that every professional fisher complete a 
competency course and exam in order to get their fishing license. In order 
to sign up for the course, the fisher must produce a number of documents 
including proof of registration with IBAMA.
The following is a list of the documentation necessary in order to take the 
professional fisherman's course (POP) given by the Port Authority’
1) Identity Card
2) Proof of Residence
3) CPF (equivalent to a social security number)
4) Army Reserve Certificate
5) Proof of good health
6) Two photos
7) IBAMA registration
8) Statement of intended activity (in this case, professional fishing).
The local Port Authority is located an hour away from Arraial do Cabo by
bus and has restrictive hours. Efforts have been made by the local
government fishing organisation (FIPAC) to try and improve access by
providing opportunities for fishers to sign up for courses within the
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municipality. Fishers complain that their experiences with the Port 
Authority have not been good. They feel that this administrative body 
exists in order to police them as opposed to supporting their activities. 
Many are illiterate and afraid that they will not be able to pass the test that 
is required at the end of the course.65 Fishers also complain that the 
courses are offered infrequently and often fill up quickly.
A canoe fisher from Praia dos Anjos explains why he has not yet joined:
Tve been to AREMAC headquarters to sign up but I have to get my 
fishing license first so that I can register with IBAMA. Most fishers 
don't have a fishing license. It's difficult to get a place in the classes 
in order to take the exam. The course itself isn't hard, but whenever 
we go to sign up, the class is full of engineers and rich tourists. 
There are people that don't even fish but they take the course just to 
have the license....Arraial has more than 1,500 fishers and 90 
percent of them don't have their license' (PI5: 234).
Many fishers complain that they do not have the time to take the course. It 
lasts approximately five days and, although it is free, the associated costs 
such as lunch away from home and transport are not insignificant barriers. 
Because fishers depend so much on the changing weather conditions and 
the flow of resources, many stated that taking a week off work could result 
either in no loss of income or it could be the week that they earn their 
months wages.
'Weeks can pass without us catching anything but then, all of a 
sudden, we catch a lot in one day. Taking a week off work could 
mean losing a month's salary' (P15: 278).
65 These tests are made in such a way that they do not disadvantage individuals without 
reading or writing skills.
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As a result, less than half of all canoe fishers are registered with the Port 
Authority. This is a significantly greater percentage that other fishing 
groups, probably due to the number of elderly fishers who were 
automatically registered with the PA during a period when the Colonia 
provided this service for fishers. Confirmation of this lies in the fact that 
less than 20 percent of canoe fishers are registered with IBAMA. Once a 
fisher has the appropriate documentation, they can then bring this to the 
RESEX headquarters to register for membership with the reserve.
Incentives to participate
'Even assuming that [resource users] are aware of the on-going 
processes for resource depletion and of the extent of damage done, 
rural dwellers are likely to be reluctant to participate in local 
conservation efforts if they do not receive eternal assistance to tide 
them over the critical period during which they must build up their 
resource to the steady-state level where it can be optimally 
maintained' (Baland and Platteau 1996* 295).
The president of the reserve, a canoe fisher with a long history of 
involvement in fishers’ rights offers his explanation for why incentives are 
essential in this process:
'Fishers need to see results. Fishers have always paid. They paid 
their three percent to the Colony their whole life, understand? They 
have never gotten anything in return. The day we have to go to the 
Colony to get a tooth pulled, we have to pay extra, it’s not included
in our three percent or our monthly payment Fishers today are
always told what they can and can't do but what about some return 
for them? What about meeting some of their needs?' (P10: 659).
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In the short-term, fishers are not provided with direct economic incentives 
to encourage their participation in the reserve. Unlike many such types of 
conservation and development initiatives where alternative income 
generating activities are introduced or increased access to health care or 
education are provided, the RESEX A.C. does not have any of these 
incentives built into the plan. In general, very little funding has been made 
available for operationalizing the reserve. Financial incentives could play 
an important role in the future when AREMAC begins to earn money from 
local tourism and possibly through Petrobras and other companies that 
want to use the Reserves water space. For now though, financial incentives 
have not been cited as a reason for participating in the reserve.
Although no economic incentives have been offered, the creation of the 
RESEX A.C. along with the implementation of the Utilisation Plan has not 
put canoe fishers in a situation where they must forgo short-term benefits 
for long term gains - a factor which would heighten the need for financial 
incentives for participation. The Utilisation Plan has not restricted their 
activity at all. They are free to fish almost precisely as they did before the 
reserve was created. Other gear groups though, have been faced with 
restrictions on their activities through the creation of ’no go' areas within 
the reserve as well as not being as free to invade the areas traditionally 
fished by beach seiners. But even these constraints are limited as they only 
cover a small total area within the reserve and many fishers are aware of 
the need to rest these areas (See Figure 8.1).
Almost all gear groups operating within the reserve were automatically
classified as artisanal and therefore environmentally sustainable. This
meant that their methods of fishing were not affected by the creation of the
reserve. As a result, local fishers did not suffer from a decrease in income
after the reserve was created. On the contrary, by combating predatory
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fishing, these groups have much to gain (through increases in catch rates) 
from the creation of the reserve. The fact tha t threats to the resource base 
stemmed from the predatory fishers invading the area from the outside is a 
boon to the process because it means tha t local fishing practices can for the 
most part go on as usual.
Figure 8.1 ’No go' areas- Bank of Brazil
Canoe fishers feel th a t significant 
benefits for them could result from 
excluding predatory fishers and from 
organising themselves internally. 
The exclusion of predatory fishers 
would very likely lead to increases in 
catch. Through more representative 
organisations, they would have a 
greater chance of challenging the stranglehold the owners currently have on 
them. Canoe fishers have perhaps more to gain from these arrangem ents 
than any other gear group because their activities are so vulnerable to the 
actions of others. Other incentives exist such as the opportunity to gain a 
voice in the decisions tha t affect their activities, greater possibility of 
challenging the hierarchical nature of the existing system and ultimately 
getting better prices for their fish.
This may mean tha t economic incentives may not be as necessary in this
case as in others where there is an immediate opportunity cost absorbed by
resource users in order for conservation goals to be achieved. Although there
are certainly social barriers to participation, financially fishers are better off
with the reserve in place. As described in Chapter 6, increased catches
have been an important incentive for local support for the reserve. Only
minor changes have been made which have direct negative economic
impacts on fishers. This may very well be positive given the questionable
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'We are no longer allowed to fish 
a t the Ilha dos Franceses. You 
know what we call tha t island, the 
Bank of Brazil because it used to 
be guaranteed th a t each time we 
would go we would come back 
with a lot of fish. It was like a 
bank. It’s not like tha t anymore, 
th a t’s for sure' (P18- 224).
long-term sustainability of financial incentives for participation in 
conservation initiatives.
Membership
A breakdown of AREMAC membership is a crude but useful indicator of 
levels of participation within the RESEX A.C. (See Table 8.1). AREMAC 
records indicate tha t there is a total of 209 members in this association. 
This total includes both voting and non-voting members. Non-voting 
members include fishers from other districts th a t legally fish within the 
reserve and supporters of the reserve th a t contribute monthly dues and 
often attend meetings. Individuals related to the tourism industry, 
particularly those involved with SCUBA diving activities, make up more 
than half of the non-voting members of AREMAC.
Table 8.1 Breakdown of AREMAC membership
Canoe fishers by beach Total # of fishers
Total # of 
members of 
AREMAC
Praia dos Anjos 40 8
Praia Grande 70 23
Prainha 40 13
Pontal (cocktail beach) n/a n/a
Sub-Total 150 44
Other voting members
Boat/Line fishers 1,000 57
Trawlers 80 19
Shell collectors 90 26
SCUBA fishers 20 20
Sub Total 1,190 122
Total # of voting members 1,340 166
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Canoe fishers by beach Total # of fishers
T o ta l# of 
members of 
AREMAC
Non Voting members
Divers & Trawlers from 10 10Cabo Frio
Collaborators r
(pay but do not vote) O
Tourism (recreational 
divers, fishers and boats 23
involved in tourism)
Sub total 38
Other 5
Grand Total AREMAC 2gg
membership
The gear group with the largest number of members is the boat/line fishers. 
As presented in earlier chapters (l & 5), this group is characterised by their 
use of motor boats and the fact tha t they mainly line fish (as opposed to 
using seine nets like the trawlers and canoe fishers do). They are also, for 
the most part, not 'cabista' but immigrants from the Northeast of the 
country and the north of the state of Rio de Janeiro and are discriminated 
against by the 'cabistas'. With one thousand individuals engaging in this 
activity, this gear group is far larger than any of the others.
Currently, only six percent of boat/line fishers are members. This group, 
therefore, has enormous potential to increase their level of participation in 
AREMAC. Over time, this will certainly occur as all fishers will have to 
become members. The fact tha t every member of the AREMAC directory has 
been 'cabista' could be a factor explaining why this gear group is not better 
represented. This gear group has the potential to harness up to 74 percent 
of the total possible votes in the assembly. If they do begin to join AREMAC 
and participate in greater numbers, they will be able to dominate the 
management decisions made by AREMAC.
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Forty-four canoe fishers are members of AREMAC. This rate is 
significantly higher than the other groups and even given their small 
numbers (approximately 150 total) canoe fishers still make up the second 
largest gear group represented in the association. There are 23 members 
from Praia Grande, making it the beach with the highest membership of the 
four beaches. This high number is in part due to the fact that the RESEX 
headquarters are located on this beach, making it much easier for this 
group to join. Also, members of APAC, who were predominately canoe 
fishers from Praia Grande, were automatically given membership of 
AREMAC.
Eight beach seiners from Praia dos Anjos are AREMAC members and 
thirteen from Prainha. Most members from Prainha joined in order to 
increase their chances of gaining access to the user sequence on that beach. 
This process is explained below.
Joining the user sequence
One of the factors that has contributed to increasing AREMAC membership
among canoe fishers is related to their newly enhanced ability to join the
user sequence on the different beaches. The creation of the reserve has
allowed fishers to join the 'Right of Day' system. If an individual meeting
the criteria expresses interest, their request will be voted on in the general
assembly. In 1983, canoe owners from Praia Grande had signed a 'social
accord' which stated that no new days could be added to the use sequence.
New owners could only enter if they were to buy an existing day. Although
other beaches did not have a written agreement on this issue, owners from
Prainha, Praia dos Anjos and Praia do Pontal were/are just as reluctant
about letting new owners join. Thus, the RESEX has created new
opportunities for those individuals who have a gear set (canoe and net) and
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meet the other conditions for membership in the reserve (residency, etc.) 
and want an opportunity to seine.
As stated above, owners on all beaches have discouraged the entry of new 
canoes on their beaches. 'Seu' Manuel, a fisher and resident of Prainha is 
an illustration of this attitude. A resident of Prainha for over fifty years 
and a fisher (and owner of the required gear) for over twenty years, Manuel 
has only in the last year managed to get a 'day' of access to the beach 
seining sites on Prainha. In order to be able to use the voting process of the 
reserve to get his canoe onto the user sequence, he had to become a member 
of AREMAC. He also had to persuade other fishers to support him and to 
vote for him in the general assembly. An important source of fisher support 
came from the nine men that work on his canoe and make up its companha. 
Manuel encouraged them to become members as they had a lot to gain by 
being able to fish in the sequence as well.
At the general assembly called to discuss this issue, apart from the four 
members of the AREMAC board, only 14 individuals with voting rights 
attended. Of this group, nine were crew members of 'Seu' Manuel's canoe, 
Blue Thunder. Apart from voting members, others present included two 
representatives from ACRIMAC, two Scuba dive shop representatives, one 
fisher from Cabo Frio, three marine biologists from the nearby 
oceanography institute (IEAPM) and six academics from the Department of 
Anthropology at the Federal Fluminense University (UFF).
Although the canoe owners and middlemen were against their entry, none
attended the meeting. There were significantly fewer fishers at this meeting
than at any other general assembly called during the 1999-2001 period of
fieldwork. All voting members present voted for the entry of the canoe. On
the day that 'Seu' Manuel's canoe entered the water, the local police,
IBAMA and members of AREMAC went along to ensure that no problems
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would arise. The process was trouble-free and Blue Thunder caught four 
tons of fish that day.
Although gaining access to the fishing grounds is a powerful incentive for 
individuals to join, it is questionable how active in the Association these 
members will be after they have achieved their goal. It is also questionable 
what will be the impact of letting more users into the system. Many have 
also raised concerns about the legitimacy of these decisions as they are often 
made by a small handful of individuals.
Participation in RESEX Meetings
Canoe fishers have played a marginal role in the process of creating and 
implementing the RESEX A.C. This is exemplified by their lack of 
attendance at meetings held at the RESEX headquarters and particularly 
by the fact that most have never voted on any decision made at these 
meetings. Many argue that they do not feel comfortable speaking in the 
meetings and it is highly probably that their participation is constrained by 
the opposition that the RESEX faces from the owners and middlemen that 
control their activities. As mentioned before, economic and time factors also 
play a role in whether these individuals become eligible for membership.
There are two types of meetings held at the RESEX that involve fishers. 
Some meetings include only a gear group or specific group of fishers and are 
called in order to discuss a problem of particular relevance to them. The 
other type of meeting is the General Assembly. All changes to the 
Utilisation Plan are made during these meetings and all fishers (and any 
other interested parties) have the right to attend. As explained earlier 
though, only those who are members of the RESEX and up-to-date with 
their payments are allowed to vote on amendments to the plan or any other 
decisions that are made by the General Assembly.
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Word of mouth was by far the most common way that fishers became aware 
of meetings held at RESEX headquarters. The other ways that fishers were 
informed of meetings were through direct contact with the AREMAC 
directorate or by hearing the announcement made by the sound car.66 
Announcements are often made one or two days before the meeting itself 
and people are generally not aware of the agenda beforehand. This agenda 
is set by IBAMA and AREMAC although members of the directorate argue 
that it is IBAMA that determines the issues to be discussed at meetings.
Forty-eight percent of canoe fishers stated that they have at some point 
participated in a meeting at the RESEX headquarters (on Praia Grande). Of 
the 48 percent of canoe fishers that had attended meetings, 80 percent felt 
that the issues discussed were important to their livelihood. Qualitative 
responses to this question expanded on this saying that although the topics 
were often important, the meetings were too long and disorganized.
Of those that did not attend, most were aware that the meetings were being 
held. Therefore, lack of knowledge of the meetings is not the reason for the 
low turnout of canoe fishers (and other fishers). Questionnaire responses 
indicate that there is a general awareness of the RESEX but that many 
fishers still opt not to participate. Those canoe fishers who had never 
attended a meeting at the reserve offered three principal reasons- l) they 
did not feel that their presence would make a difference, 2) they were 
working - either fishing or at another job, or 3) they were not aware that the 
meetings were taking place.
66 Sound cars are cars with large speakers attached to them that are commonly used in 
Brazil, especially in small towns, in order to make public announcements such as funerals 
and meetings.
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Figure 8.2 RESEX A.C general assembly
One of the independent owners from Praia dos Anjos who is also one of the 
more active seiners describes the reasons beach seiners do not attend 
meetings-
’Canoe fishers think the reserve is a great thing, but they don't go 
and join. When the time comes th a t something is happening tha t is 
of in terest to him, it's too late to join. There are a lot of fishers who 
go to the meetings without being a member. They can't vote on 
anything! Like that, how are we supposed to win? The others are 
the majority, the traw ler fishers. When Ze M aria67 was president, 
he called on all his friends to join up. The reserve will only be able 
to benefit the canoe fisher if he participates in the meetings and 
votes. If we [canoe fishers] don't get organised, the reserve will 
serve as an instrum ent for those th a t are members, like the trawler
67 Ze Maria owns and fishes on a trawler.
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fishers. And the people from the reserve are going to say, 'What do 
you want us to do? The canoe fishers couldn't be bothered, they 
don't show up, how are we supposed to fight for them' (P13* 2265)?
Significantly, only 34 percent of canoe fishers were aware that members of 
the reserve have the right to vote. Of those, only one fisher who 
participated in the survey voted in any meeting at the reserve headquarters. 
This figure is particularly alarming, as the entire Utilisation Plan has been 
defined specifically for the purposes of protecting this traditional population 
through the process of co-management.
One factor that seemed to hinder the ability of canoe fishers (and other 
fishers) to feel comfortable voting was the way that votes are made and 
recorded. Voting is made publicly and fishers must raise their hands to 
have their votes counted. Fishers must keep their hands up until their vote 
has been counted. This means that everyone in the room is aware of how 
fishers voted. Given the tensions between gear groups and between fishers 
and owners, this could be a significant deterrent for fishers to express their 
views and opinions through voting.
The non-secret ballot, although transparent, is not very reliable as hands go 
up and down and it is difficult to record votes. These problems could be 
resolved using a different form of voting, such as 'pocket chart voting' 
whereby fishers go behind a panel to vote and insert their vote in a secret 
envelope. Like this, votes would be recorded on paper and would be easier 
to count and fishers would be free to vote as they choose.
Another factor identified as an inhibitor of verbal contributions in meetings 
is the presence of biologists, sociologist and other professionals who often 
attend these meetings. Fishers feel timid and aware of the differences in
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class and experience between themselves and these groups. One fisher 
describes this issue-
'There is always tha t fear th a t we have in the meetings, when there 
are biologists, scientists, doctors, university students. Some of us 
are afraid to speak out. We feel ashamed and afraid tha t we are not 
going to speak correctly. Fishers have their own way of speaking 
tha t is different to theirs' (P10- 245).
The creation of a representative democracy, where smaller groups are 
represented by elected individuals, could help alleviate some of the 
problems caused by the lack of space and large numbers of fishers involved. 
Breaking down the larger group into smaller ones also might lessen the 
likelihood of 'participation fatigue' and be more efficient. A system like this 
could also help to aviod the possibility tha t one group could in the future 
dominate the whole process as decisions are made democratically.
Physical setting of m eetings
Figure 8.3- RESEX headquarters on Praia Grande
^ASSOCUCAO RES.EXTRATIVISTA MAR1NHA’ l^CABO-AREIIAC
ASS0C1ACA0 PESCADORES * ARRAIAL CABO- APAC
fUlADOS
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Assemblies are held at reserve headquarters comprising a small concrete 
storehouse donated to AREMAC by Alkalis (See Figure 8.3),. The building 
is located just above the beach seining grounds on Praia Grande. The 
structure consists of two main rooms approximately four square metres in 
size connected only by a small doorway. Attached is a small room that 
IBAMA uses as an office. Each of the larger rooms has a small window 
protected by iron bars. The entry way into the space consists of two large 
wooden doors. The space available for meetings is hot and cramped. The 
public phone outside is the only phone available and it is via this telephone 
(when it is working) that AREMAC and IBAMA conduct their business.
The room used for meetings is sparsely furnished. There are a few old chairs 
scattered around the room with one desk at the far end of the room. There is 
enough seating for approximately ten people, leaving others to stand 
throughout the assemblies. The room itself holds enough space for 
approximately twenty people uncomfortably, forcing other interested parties 
to stand outside the meeting proceedings and either listen through the 
doorway or find out what is taking place from others who leave the room 
from time to time. No fresh water is available and the toilet is rarely in 
working order. There are plans to modernise facilities with funds from 
Alkalis but negotiations are still underway.
Meetings take place during the day or early evening. They often do not 
start on time and usually last for many hours and sometimes all day. 
Voting often takes place at the end of these long meetings. It is not unusual 
for people to come and go throughout the meetings and by the time voting 
takes place, few of the total number of attendees are still present while 
some have only just arrived and have not been a part of the discussions 
leading up to the voting. This could be another factor explaining why, 
although many seiners have attended meetings, few have actually voted.
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The front of the building has a concrete bench used mainly by elderly fishers 
who congregate here in order to watch the seining activities on Praia 
Grande. Any seiner coming to or from the fishing grounds on Praia Grande 
must pass by this building. Given the historical divisions between seining 
beaches, the location alone is enough to deter some individuals and groups 
from attending meetings. This means that seiners from other beaches are 
much less likely to have more casual interactions with AREMAC and 
IBAMA that would result if they were just to stop by and see what was 
going on.
The agendas for the meetings are usually set in advance. The agenda is 
decided by representatives of AREMAC and IBAMA although the 
directorate often complains that the IBAMA representative makes many 
decisions unilaterally. Fishers complain that meetings tend to focus on 
issues that are not related to their interests.
8.4 Beach Seiner Perceptions of the RESEX
Understanding beach seiners’ perceptions of the RESEX is the key to 
understanding current levels of participation in this process as well as for 
determining the likelihood for long-term participation. The following 
sections will review different aspects of the seiners’ perceptions of the 
reserve including their overall awareness, their perceptions of its leadership, 
meetings and monitoring practices.
'The reserve has been a dream for the fishermen. It's given them 
everything they need; they just need to realise it. The problem is, 
they barely pay attention, they're so disinterested, complacent, you 
know what I mean? They are at the mercy of the canoe owners and
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middlemen. Canoe fishers have a lot of problems. We do a lot just 
to survive from fishing. Today there's squid, tomorrow there's 
bluefish but who knows how long tha t will last. The squid season is 
already ending. After tha t there's the mullet season and we can 
hardly get any of those because th a t’s when the sea starts to get real 
rough and the wind so strong we can't even leave the house.' (P10- 
222)
The vast majority of canoe fishers are aware th a t the RESEX A.C. exists. 
Although, 90 percent of canoe fishers interviewed said they were aware that 
the Extractive Reserve had been created, many were not sure why the 
reserve had been set up. Of those who knew of the reserve, 60 percent 
stated tha t it was created in order to provide support for the fishing 
community of Arraial do Cabo. Significantly, 34 percent of canoe fishers 
were not sure what its purpose was.
Perceptions of the reserve by the elderly
The previous chapter documented the importance of the elderly in the 
seining tradition. Not only are they the holders of much of the traditional 
knowledge upon which this activity rests, but they make up a large 
proportion of the active canoe fishers. It is not uncommon to see men in 
their eighties fishing four days a week.
Figure 8.4 Perceptions of the reserve by the elderly
• The directors of the reserve are the traw ler fishers tha t 
are scaring our fish away!
• They don't care about us old people and they don't listen 
to w hat we have to say!
• The directory of AREMAC is just doing things to benefit 
themselves and their friends.
• They (AREMAC) have forgotten about us. All they care 
about are the canoe fishers from Praia Grande.
• The reserve is just another coat hanger for government 
jobs!
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There are important implications stemming from this situation in terms of 
canoe fishers' participation in the RESEX. For example, the elderly may not 
have as much incentive to invest for the future ■ especially if they do not 
have family who work as canoe fishers (which many do not). Also, the 
elderly may be less apt to participate vocally in reserve meetings as they are 
often more soft spoken and the younger fishers usually dominate the space. 
Another important issue is the fact that many of the elderly work for the 
"big sharks" and their retirement payments are often only one minimum 
salary per month (approximately 50 £). This extra income is important to 
their livelihoods. Since there are few options for other employment they 
may be hesitant to ‘make waves’ and risk losing their already fragile 
positions as canoe fishers.
Perception of the AREMAC Leadership
The AREMAC board is made up of a president, vice president, first and 
second secretary and treasurer. It is this group of individuals that directly 
interface with government representatives in the collaborative management 
partnership. These individuals are by far the most active fishers in the 
reserve structure and are the core of fisher representation in the RESEX. 
The capacity and strength of this group to carry out their duties is essential 
to the success of the reserve. However, there are a number of indications 
that this group is weak.
Since the establishment of the reserve, the leadership has not changed and 
three out of the original six members of the directorate have resigned for 
different reasons. Although new elections were to take place, no individuals 
presented themselves as willing candidates to fill these positions so the 
three remaining individuals reluctantly continued to lead AREMAC.
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The first president of AREMAC recently resigned. He had held the post for 
over a year and cited problems with IBAMA as his reason for leaving. He 
was a trawler fishermen, a controversial character often blamed for 
summoning his 'friends' (trawler fishers) to join at the expense of the needs 
of other fishers. During his presidency, he was spotted fishing illegally in 
the area designated for the Prainha canoe fishers on a number of occasions 
and was eventually caught by IBAMA and fined. This was most likely one 
of the reasons that he resigned as he lost a lot of support from fishers. 
Understandably, canoe fishers repeatedly cited his behaviour as the reason 
that they did not feel that AREMAC represented their interests. This 
incident also compromised his ability to work side-byside with the IBAMA 
representative.
Canoe fishers and other fishers often complain about irregularities in the 
financial dealings of the reserve. They feel that it is unclear how funds are 
being spent. Because other fishing organisations, such as the Colonia, have 
been highly criticised for this, fishers are wary of supporting another 
organisation that will not account for its expenditures. There were frequent 
accusations that money earned by selling the catch of trawlers fishing 
illegally in the reserve ended up in personal bank accounts as opposed to in 
the hands of local charities.
Many fishers feel that AREMAC leadership is no different from the leaders 
of the other organisations. Canoe fishers and other fishers clearly resent the 
fact that board members are paid monthly salaries by the municipal 
government. Payments range from 300 reais to 600 reais (approximately 
100 to 200 £). These are significant payments not only in terms of the 
amounts but also in terms of their regularity. Whereas other fishers do not 
have the security of knowing what their month’s earnings will be, these
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individuals now have a guaranteed income. One fisher commented on this 
situation-
'They are all getting paid, all except the treasurer who is running for 
council member. The local government has them all in their back 
pocket. Why should we bust our butts monitoring the reserve when 
we could be fishing? What do they get paid for anyway?' (P18  ^ 116)
A former member of the directory of AREMAC states-
'If they were to call a meeting now, no one would show up. The 
fishers are angry, they weren't told about payments made to the 
board and now the Mayor has them in his back pocket just in time 
for the elections' (P18- 2383).
The directory felt justified in receiving these payments since they were 
putting in a lot of time and effort in the reserve and this meant that they 
spent less time fishing. The former president justifies these payments^
'Fabio Fabiano gets paid for the work that he does for IBAMA, why 
shouldn't we? Not only do we have to follow the rules and set an 
example for the other fishers but we also spend a lot of time working 
for AREMAC, monitoring and doing other things and that means we 
have less time to fish!' (P9- 577)
Fishers are jaded as a result of their negative experiences with local 
leadership. This history has left them with an apathetic attitude towards 
the reserve. The problem is exacerbated by their inability to unite to change 
the structures by which they are constrained. In interviews and focus 
groups it was clear that fishers are waiting for the reserve to do something 
for them. They do not recognise the central role that they should play. As a
result, there is little sense of ownership over the process. The idea of co­
management is a new one for them and one that they do not fully 
understand. Although beach seiners do have a history of informal/formal 
resource governing institutions, they have little else upon which to build 
this effort.
Monitoring
A crucial weakness of the RESEX A.C. rests in its ineffective monitoring 
system. The ability of AREMAC and IBAMA to monitor the entire reserve 
rests on:
1. Support from IBAMA
2. Availability of resources
3. Collaboration of fishers/ other community members
As stated previously, monitoring is primarily the responsibility of IBAMA. 
This activity is supposed to be carried out by monitors trained and 
empowered to levy fines and confiscate fishing material as well as carry out 
other types of monitoring on land and at sea. IBAMA is unable to carry out 
these tasks within the RESEX A.C. because it lacks both the manpower of 
trained monitors as well as the infrastructure and equipment necessary to 
monitor the marine area.
There is only one full-time IBAMA representative on site at the reserve, a 
biologist, and he was recently promoted to be the regional representative for 
CNPT so that he can facilitate the creation of more Maritime Extractive 
Reserves in the state of Rio de Janeiro. This has put extra constraints on 
his time. Also, because he does not have a monitoring license to police the 
reserve, there is very little he can do to defend the area from outside 
predatory fishers or even from internal threats. Not only is IBAMA
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understaffed but even if the staff could be mobilised, they do not have the 
infrastructure to monitor the reserve. Although they do have a car which 
increases their mobility on land, they do not even have a boat which would 
be a minimum requirement to begin policing the waters around the cape, to 
say the least.
Civilians (fishers and other community members) were initially 
incorporated into an overall monitoring plan through a programme of 
training voluntary monitors. In this vein, approximately 30 individuals 
were trained to be voluntary monitors and given permits by IBAMA to carry 
out related activities. Currently, only one or two of these individuals are 
still carrying out their monitoring duties. This decline in effort is due 
largely to the lack of response to the infractions that they record. Any 
infractions had to be addressed by official monitors who would be called in 
from time to time from IBAMA's state headquarters in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro. But again, these monitors cannot be effective without having 
access to a craft with which to police the waters.
A member of the AREMAC directory complained about the situation-
'Extractivism is a word which a lot of people are saying these days.
It’s just a word that people say, it doesn't mean anything. Just like 
the Extractive Reserve, it only exists in name. It may even exist on 
paper but nothing more. The commitment by the federal 
government doesn't exist, that’s for sure. IBAMA is supposed to 
monitor the area, that’s their job. Isn't marine life part of the 
environment? They just talk, that’s all. IBAMA doesn't even have a 
boat to do the work they're supposed to do. Its never going to work 
like that. The dragnets keep dragging, right near the beach. I see 
them.' (P14 : 706)
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Some voluntary monitors have ceased their efforts because of the 
controversy that now surrounds the reserve. Because the activities of the 
reserve have left many groups dissatisfied, some fear that association with 
the reserve could create problems with other groups. Some fear that their 
association with the reserve could lead to them losing their job with the 
local government or a relative being fired etc. This is a significant threat as 
most if not all individuals in Arraial do Cabo have one or more relatives who 
work for the local municipality. For voluntary monitors who are fishers, 
monitoring would often mean reporting infractions made by their own 
bosses and other fishers, clearly a disincentive for them. Monitors 
complained that they would submit their reports, jeopardise their 
relationships with other fishers, their employers etc. and no authority would 
follow up with these claims.
Ironically, although the federal environmental control agency (IBAMA) does 
not have a boat, the fishers’ organisation (AREMAC) does. A craft was 
donated to AREMAC by a wealthy individual from Sao Paulo. But even the 
day to-day up keep and fuel costs are difficult for AREMAC to sustain. 
Although they receive donations from time to time from the local 
government and Alkalis for petrol, any engine problems or other problems 
with the craft (which is quite old) inevitably means that the boat is out of 
service for long periods. It is not uncommon for the boat to stay out of the 
water due to the lack of funds to fix it. And since communication within the 
reserve is done by radio, this means that all fishing boats around, especially 
the larger ones that are more likely to have radios, are fully aware that 
there is no one to police the reserve and they can do whatever they want.
All these factors cripple the reserve's ability to monitor the area effectively.
IBAMA and AREMAC cannot effectively address infractions committed by
individuals from the municipality and are much less able to deal with
offenders coming from other regions. This makes fishers question the
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authority, purpose and seriousness of the reserve effort. It is also a factor 
which could discourage long-term participation in the reserve.
8.5 Outcomes & Consequences 
Ecological sustainability
By broadening the scope and scale of the management regimes in place, the 
RESEX A.C. has taken an important first step towards the sustainable use 
of the A.C. fishing grounds. The creation of a legal framework which 
supports restricted use of these fishing grounds has decreased the discount 
rate among fishers and created a forum for collective action to protect the 
resources upon which their livelihoods depend. By mitigating against the 
immediate threats to these resources (ie- industrial fishing), fishers can now 
take on a longer-term vision in their own use of these resources. This could 
lead to less subtractive behaviour between and among the different gear 
groups as well as greater protection from external threat. This is a 
particularly important first step for canoe fishers as their fishing practices 
are limited to small areas within the reserve and the success of their 
activities is dependent on the regulated use of much larger areas. It is these 
large areas that seiners have found difficult to monitor and control in the 
past.
Threats to the canoe fishers’ traditional activities stem not only from
external but also from internal sources. Internal threats include those from
within the canoe fishers themselves and between them and other gear
groups. The RESEX has not, so far, dealt with the weaknesses inherent in
the canoe fishers' management regime. Weakened management institutions
will have to be redeveloped, codified and enforced. With greater
opportunities for participation, these rules should be developed by a broader
base of canoe fishers as opposed to just owners, as in the past. Greater
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participation will encourage a more equitable system. Because of the size of 
the fishing community in A.C. it would be useful to divide it into gear 
groups in order to facilitate management and to encourage participation.
Achieving ecological sustainability within the reserve will require more 
than just creating the reserve and developing the Utilisation Plan. Results 
depend on an effective monitoring system supported both by IBAMA as well 
as by local fishers and their representative organisations. The conflicts 
which have emerged among the different community groups (local 
government, colonia, tourism association etc.) indicate that sustainability 
will also depend on the reserve's ability to plan a long-term strategy for the 
development of the area which takes into account the rest of the community, 
not just fishers.
Co-management
At different stages, the RESEX A.C. has exemplified characteristics of the 
entire spectrum of co-managment arrangements. At no stage, though, has 
the contribution of either group (fishers or state) been ideal. The federal 
environmental organisation, IBAMA, has not kept its part of the bargain. 
With only one representative on site and no monitors, this group is clearly 
not able to staff or fund its responsibilities. However, although fishers have 
participated to some degree, canoe fishers have not had a significant voice in 
this process. The RESEX A.C. may best be characterised as a form of co­
operative management where both sides lack the capacity (funds, training, 
experience) to support an efficient and effective system for collaborative 
resource governance. Greater fisher participation and more support from 
the federal government are necessary in order to achieve a more equitable 
and effective management system.
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With the creation of the reserve, canoe fishers have been given the 
opportunity to influence decisions made about their own activities as well as 
to contribute to decisions on the activities of the wider fishing community. 
Even so, few fishers have taken advantage of this opportunity. Reasons for 
this include the barriers to fishers obtaining the legal status to vote. But 
even with their documents in place, canoe fishers are clearly constrained by 
the power structures which have in recent years come to control their 
activities. Also, although canoe fishers do have experience in managing 
common property resources, in general, the organisations that have 
represented fishers in the past have not given fishers the opportunity to 
influence the process in the way that the RESEX proposes today. As a 
result, the fishing community may need some time to adapt to its new 
opportunities and new role in creating and sustaining a common property 
management regime in collaboration with the State. In the meantime, 
there is a feeling that fishers are waiting for IBAMA and AREMAC to do 
something for them and little indication of a general awareness of what role 
the fishers themselves can play in the process (monitoring, decision-making 
etc.).
Empowerment and Participation
There is enormous potential for community empowerment that has not yet 
been realised. It is taking time for fishers to perceive what kind of an 
instrument the reserve could be for reorganising and protecting their 
activities. New opportunities include creating alternatives to the current 
marketing structure whereby few owners have a stranglehold on fishers. 
Higher earnings, coupled with an improved catch and a strong voice in 
negotiating with the different modalities would not only strengthen the 
canoe fishers' management regime but also provide hope for the continuity 
of this sustainable practice.
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Canoe fisher participation is constrained on a number of levels. Historically, 
rifts between beaches still run deep, complicating the abihty of individuals 
from different beaches to come together to resolve common problems. Power 
structures within these groups (owners and middlemen) also act as a 
deterrent to participation. The creation of the reserve has led to conflict 
between fishing groups, IBAMA and the local government. These negative 
relationships also inhibit membership, monitoring and other forms of 
participation. Other factors such as the documentation needed to join the 
reserve constrain membership numbers.
Although the Utilisation Plan flirts with the existing imbalance of power 
within the canoe fisher community it has not yet managed to change it 
significantly. The process by which this change was made is questionable as 
canoe fishers did not play an active role in the process. An indication of this 
lies in the few articles in the Utilisation Plan which directly refer to canoe 
fishing. Because of the conflict which has emerged as a result of the 
creation of the reserve, it is possible that fishers are wary of the 
implications of participating.
If the process of reserve creation cannot bring about more equitable power 
sharing, reserve activities may very well serve to reinforce inequalities. In 
fact, it is not impossible for canoe owners (who are also middlemen and 
owners of many other boats used in the reserve) to hijack the process of the 
reserve given the fact that they are legally registered fishers (as opposed to 
many of the fishers themselves that fish without legal papers).
Clear procedures and rules
The institutions governing the canoe fishers have not been clarified or 
revitalised by the creation of the reserve. These institutions, weakened over 
the years, have not been strengthened in the short-term. The Utilisation
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Plan does not address these weaknesses and sends an ambiguous message 
regarding who now has the authority over the management of these 
activities. Many fishers are not aware of their rights to influence the 
decision-making process through voting, participating in meetings, and 
monitoring. Of those who are aware of their rights and responsibilities to 
the reserve, many have not taken advantage of them due to their fears and 
reservations.
In the short-term, the reserve has not strengthened the livelihoods of local 
people, principally because of the lack of monitoring as well as the lack of 
funds to invest in reserve management and infrastructure. Although the 
activities of fishers remained relatively unchanged with the implementation 
of the Utilisation Plan, external monitoring is essential in order to 
consolidate the reserve, build credibility in the reserve and garner support 
from seiners.
Health of the CPR
Table 8.2 analyses the changes in the strength of the common property 
management regimes that have managed access to marine resources on the 
Cape. It uses Ostrom's (1990) design principals to gauge the strength of the 
reserve during different periods (Pre-1960, Pre reserve, currently). It also 
attempts to gauge the potential for a robust regime supported by the 
RESEX in the future.
Although there is enormous potential for the reserve to meet its intended 
goals and to strengthen its ability to collectively manage the common-pool 
marine resources in A.C. the RESEX has so far realised little of this 
potential. In two areas, it has improved the situation. As mentioned 
previously, the reserve has made important strides in defining the 
boundaries of the common use area (even though it has not secured these
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boundaries), and it has also provided an improved forum for conflict 
resolution between and among gear groups.
Areas where the reserve has not been effective in strengthening the 
management regime are concern the monitoring and sanctioning process as 
well as fisher participation in decision-making. Almost no monitoring is 
taking place within the reserve. This is due largely to lack of funds and 
infrastructure as well as the absence of support from IBAMA. The weak 
monitoring system complicates the ability of AREMAC/IBAMA to sanction 
infractors and limits the legitimacy tha t these sanctions could have. 
Although there is enormous potential for collective choice arrangem ents in 
the RESEX, currently, fisher participation in the different dimensions of the 
reserve rem ains low. Using the typology chart presented in Chapter 3, 
current participation could be described as ‘functional participation’. Also, 
without changing the way votes are counted and calculated, it is very 
possible th a t one gear group will eventually dominate the decision-making 
process. This could have negative consequences for the beach seiners’ 
activities.
Table 8.2 A ssessm ent of A.C. Resource M anagem ent Regimes
Design
Principal
Pre-
1960
Pre-
Res
erve
Pote 
ntia 
1 for
As part of the Extractive Reserve
YES NO YES YES. With the creation of the RESEX
A.C. a three mile belt was created 
encompassing all existing 
artisanal/traditional fishing activities 
while making predatory fishing 
activities illegal. It has also clarified 
the internal spaces utilised by canoe 
fishers. Resource flow problems still 
exist between the beaches though not 
everyone is aware of or follows the 
rules regarding user rights within 
the reserve.
1. Clearly 
defined 
Boundaries
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Design
Principal
2. Congruence 
between 
appropriation 
and provision 
rules and 
local 
conditions
3. Collective - 
choice 
arrangem ents
4. Monitoring
5. Graduated 
Sanctions
6. Conflict- 
re solution 
mechanisms
Pre* Pote
Res ntia As part of the Extractive Reserve 
erve 1 for
NO YES NO. This situation has not improved 
since the creation of the reserve. 
There are a num ber of indicators tha t 
these rules and conditions are 
incongruent. Fishers do not feel tha t 
they earn enough to live on. Owners 
have sold their shares as too many 
days were added on some beaches 
leading to rent dissipation. In some 
cases this situation is getting even 
worse because the RESEX is 
encouraging and enabling new 
canoes to enter on all the beaches.
YES NO YES NO. Although there is great potential
for collective choice arrangem ents in 
the RESEX, currently, there is very 
little participation in the process. 
There is also a risk th a t those gear 
groups with the most fishers will 
dominate. It is also possible for the 
owners/middlemen (as they meet the 
conditions for membership) to hijack 
this process.
YES YES YES NO. Almost no monitoring is taking 
place within the reserve. This is due 
to lack of funds, infrastructure and 
personnel as well as lack of 
awareness of the rules.
YES NO YES NO. Although the Utilisation Plan 
does include the use of graduated 
sanctions, because the monitoring 
system is so ineffective, these cannot 
and have not been applied.
YES NO YES YES. The RESEX does create an 
im portant forum where different 
groups within the community can 
resolve their issues. Unfortunately, 
because the owners of the canoes do 
not recognise the authority of 
AREMAC or the decisions made at 
general assemblies, they are not a 
part of this im portant process.
Pre-
1960
YES
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Design
Principal
Pre-
1960
Pre-
Res
erve
Pote 
ntia 
1 for
As part of the Extractive Reserve
7. Minimal 
recognition of 
rights to 
organise
YES YES YES YES. Although the canoe fishers’ 
CPR was recognised by the local 
government and organisations 
related to fishing, the creation of the 
reserve has emphasised these rights.
Even given all their criticisms of the process and their complaints about 
leadership etc., 44 percent of canoe fishers interviewed felt th a t they had 
somehow benefited from the creation of the reserve. When asked about how 
they felt the RESEX would impact them in the future, 40 percent of beach 
seiners surveyed were hopeful tha t the reserve would bring positive changes 
to their livelihoods. This could suggest tha t seiners are aware tha t social 
change and resource conservation is a long process and tha t measurable 
results may not appear immediately.
Table 8.2 also gauges the possibility for the RESEX to become a robust 
regime in the future. With increased support from both fishers and the 
State, the RESEX A.C. could certainly strengthen in time in support of local 
livelihoods and resource conservation.
8.6 Summary & Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse the relationship between 
canoe fishers, their management systems and the RESEX A.C. The chapter 
began with a description of the conflicts and power struggles th a t emerged 
during the implementation stage of the reserve and the subsequent loss of 
support for this process. It then looked at how the beach seiner institutions 
and management regimes had been contemplated in the plan by looking at 
those articles in the utilization plan which pertain to this gear group. This 
analysis revealed the minimal attention tha t had been given to the internal
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weaknesses of this regime. Disappointingly, the analysis suggests that few 
changes have therefore been made to the beach seiners' management regime. 
In fact, data suggest that the institutions which manage this regime may 
have been weakened in some ways by the creation of the reserve as it is less 
clear now who has the authority to make, change and monitor these rules.
The chapter then explored the current levels of participation in reserve 
management including indicators such as attendance at reserve meetings, 
voting and monitoring. It also investigated the incentives for and 
deterrents to the beach seiners' ability to influence reserve decisions. This 
analysis revealed that both the quantity and quality of participation are low. 
The chapter also reviewed other relevant aspects of the reserve which 
influence the likelihood of long-term participation by canoe fishers. These 
aspects included the monitoring systems currently in place as the 
perceptions of leadership within the reserve.
The following chapter will conclude this thesis. It will summarise the main 
findings of the research and present the policy recommendations related to 
these findings. It will also provide recommendations for future research in 
this area.
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Chapter 9 Outcomes and Consequences- 
Potential for successful collaborative 
m anagem ent_____________________________
In the preceding chapters, the literature related to common property 
resource theory and environmental management was reviewed and data 
related to the interaction between the newly created marine RESEX and the 
beach seining community was analysed. The purpose of this process was to 
better understand under what circumstances extractive marine reserves in 
Brazil can be used as a conservation and development tool for supporting 
the traditional institutions and livelihoods of local resource users. 
Traditional resource governing institutions were analysed in order to 
determine the state of these institutions (weak/robust). Levels and types of 
participation and perceptions of the RESEX by this resource user 
community were explored. Finally, community-level factors that constrain 
or provide potential for long-term participatory conservation in this area 
were presented. This concluding chapter will present the main findings of 
the study along with implications for conservation practitioners.
The Extractive Reserve conservation category is one of the most seasoned 
examples of collaborative management in Brazil. The RESEX A.C. is the
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first maritime extractive reserve of many to be established in the Brazilian 
coastal zone. Therefore, lessons learned from early experiences may prove 
valuable when planning similar marine extractive reserves in Brazil.
In this study, the processes of change within the traditional beach seining 
community of Arraial do Cabo, Rio de Janeiro were examined through 
historical, economic and social investigation. This multi’dimensional 
analytical approach was necessary because traditional resource governing 
institutions are created and are affected by changes in each of these areas. 
Therefore, in order to gauge the success of the RESEX A.C. in achieving its 
social objective it is necessary to understand the complex interplay of 
ecological, social, structural, and organisational and contextual factors. The 
following paragraphs will present findings related to the different 
characteristics of the case study which constrain or support the
collaborative management process.
9.1 Physical and Technical Attributes
The physical and technical attributes of the RESEX A.C. provide
opportunities as well as constraints for successful collaborative
management. Because Arraial do Cabo is a cape which extends 40
kilometres into the ocean, it is largely isolated from the mainland and other 
fishing communities. As a result, small-scale fishers from neighbouring 
areas were not seriously affected by the creation of the reserve. The 
community fives in a small, compact area making communications between 
resource users easier, thereby facilitating management. Another factor that 
simplifies the creation and management of the RESEX is that all fishers 
included in this plan fish close to shore. This meant that reserve 
boundaries did not have to extend as far out to sea as would be necessary for 
other fishing communities whose livelihoods depend on resources beyond
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the continental shelf. .The fact that fishers fish close to shore also makes 
their activities easier to monitor.
The physical attributes of the resource itself complicate the relationship 
between seiners from different beaches. Because this group is dependent on 
a single flow of resources (migratory fish) that pass each beach (starting 
with Praia Grande), a subtractability problem exists. Canoe fishers are 
clearly aware of the stocks in the area at any given time. Therefore, fish 
caught by fishers on one beach will not be caught by fishers from another. 
This not only creates problems between beaches but among them as well. 
Because access days are managed, the canoe of the day will be given the 
opportunity to catch those shoals passing in the area. Depleting stocks have 
heightened awareness of this issue.
The single most important factor facilitating the creation and management 
of the reserve is related to the type of fishing technologies used by local 
fishers. Because all local fishers employ relatively sustainable methods, no 
local fishers were excluded by the creation of the reserve. In fact, local 
fishing methods did not have to change at all. Although small areas were 
designated as biological reserves within the extractive reserve, fishers 
largely recognised the need for these areas to recuperate. This situation 
made garnering support for the RESEX much easier than it would have 
been in a situation where there would have been 'winners' and 'losers'. 
Given the sustainable technology used in the area, no fishers lost out as a 
result of the creation of the reserve. This situation contributed, initially, to 
a sense of local pride and a conviction to keep predatory fishers, their 
common enemy, from fishing within the limits of the RESEX.
Even given these advantages, effective monitoring of the reserve has been
impossible due to the lack of local resources and the lack of State support.
As a result, local fishers do not feel that much change has taken place with
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the creation of the reserve. They continued fishing as they did before and 
the trawlers still trawl the area.
9.2 Local resource governing institutions
Clearly, the beach seining community enjoys a rich history of formal and 
informal resource management institutions. Access rights to the resource 
are clearly defined. Resource user numbers are known and controlled. 
Local identity has developed around these activities and rules and the daily 
rituals involved in this activity constantly reinforce them. Monitoring 
systems are embedded in this system of rotating access and use whereby 
each day's user has the incentive to protect their access rights. Collective 
choice arrangements were secured through ownership rights and 
responsibilities. In terms of the type of technology used and certain aspects 
of local culture, this group is fairly homogenous.
Research revealed, however, that although resource governing institutions 
still exist, they are no longer robust. On the surface, it appears that they are 
still intact since fishing continues largely unchanged. A closer look reveals 
that many of the rules are not being followed and that these institutions 
have been hijacked by a handful of wealthier individuals to serve their own 
purposes. Indications of this include the presence of deeply rooted conflicts 
within this community, hierarchical structures, and low levels of 
participation in these regimes. Marketing structures have become 
increasingly centralised along with decision-making. It appears that that 
the rules that have been maintained are those that benefit the powerful 
owners. Rules which are still adhered to are those that control access to the 
fishing grounds along with decision-making arrangements.
It should be noted, however, that although these institutions are weak at 
present, in the past they were much stronger. As depicted in Table 8.2,
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before 1950, the management regime of the canoe fishers met almost all of 
Ostrom’s conditions. The deterioration of local institutions is the result of a 
process of social change that has been instigated largely by government 
policies. External factors such as the establishment of the Alkalis industrial 
plant along with subsidies for industrial fishers contributed to a process of 
social change that has tested the resilience of local resource-governing 
institutions.
The creation of the extractive reserve has not yet managed to replace or 
redefine these institutions. In fact, although the existence of a 'traditional 
population1 warranted the creation of this conservation and development 
unit, seiners themselves do not seem to have been seriously involved in its 
design. Rather, assumptions were made about the quality of their 
institutions. The utilisation plan skates over their weaknesses and de facto 
supports the status quo. It does this by accepting the existing rule structure 
and practices and not offering an effective system of sanctions.
The RESEX A.C. has introduced a more democratic decision-making forum 
for regulating fishing activities and addressing the concerns of this 
community. However, the system is beyond the reach of many fishers who 
find themselves constrained by the middlemen and owners for whom they 
work. Fishers are afraid of losing an important part of their livelihood 
along with their position in society, by ‘sticking their necks out.’ These 
constraints are exacerbated by the way that non-secret voting is carried out. 
Other constraints relate to the characteristics of the people and community 
culture.
9.3 Community and culture
The characteristics of the community in Arraial do Cabo suggest that 
collective action among this group is constrained by a number of social
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factors. Chapter three discussed the importance of horizontal networks at 
the local level as an indicator of social capital. Communities with high levels 
of social capital are thought to be more likely to work together to resolve 
collective problems. According to a World Bank study (W.B. 1997b) local 
level indicators of social capital include factors such as the type and number 
of local associations and membership rates, as well as trust amongst 
community groups and government.
Numerous associations have been created since the onset of democratic rule 
in order to organize and represent fishers. Most of the organizations that 
emerged during this period were related to the beach seining community. 
Unfortunately, however, the quality of these associations is poor. This is 
indicated by small membership bases and low levels of participation. Until 
the creation of the RESEX and subsequently of AREMAC, none of these 
associations were active in any significant form. Although free-association 
has been legal since the signing of the new constitution in 1988, the State - 
sponsored fishing guild still enjoys the largest membership. Even so, 
membership levels in the Colonia are at an all-time low and few fishers feel 
that this organization represents their needs. Fisher participation in this 
organization is negligible. Associations created to represent canoe fishers 
have often been taken over by the local elite and membership has often been 
limited to fishers from Praia Grande.
Fishers' experiences with government have generally been negative. An 
example of this is their relationship with the Port Authority, which they 
view as a threat to their activities rather than a source of support. Fishers 
also hold a negative view of IBAMA, an organisation they feel is riddled 
with corruption and inefficiency. Apart from the creation of the RESEX, 
fishers feel largely abandoned by government at all levels. This view has 
not improved with the creation of the reserve since many feel that the
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reserve is an added responsibility placed on fishers without sufficient 
support from the government. Consequently, trust in government is low.
The different communities that practice beach seining use identical fishing 
methods and are bound by the same codes of conduct. All are aware of the 
depletion of stocks, a variable cited as important for creating incentives for 
collective action. They do have a wealth of local ecological knowledge. They 
also have existing management regimes ■ all of which are factors that could 
provide a strong base for collective action in defence of their activities and 
their resource base. Although these main conditions are met, other factors 
create significant barriers to collaborative management. Deeply rooted 
historical divisions within the canoe fishing community exist and cannot be 
underestimated. Data show that these issues are not limited to the 
relationship between beaches but occur among them as well.
Power relationships between buyers and suppliers have constrained 
participation. Negative social capital is manifested in the hierarchical 
structures which have come to control this activity, while a historical legacy 
of deep divisions within this gear group also complicates and constrains 
participation. It is essential to understand these relationships in order to 
mitigate against them and design appropriate management systems. 
Existing conflicts and hierarchies have hindered the ability of the beach 
seining community to articulate its needs within the reserve structure. As a 
result, the reserve has not significantly fortified local management 
institutions and has overlooked or not been able to deal with these obstacles 
to participation and empowerment. Currently, it is not apparent that local 
fishers are decisive players in the decision-making process. An indication of 
this lies in the low level and poor quality of their participation in reserve 
activities.
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9.4 Financial sustainability
Financial sustainability is an important element in the long-term 
sustainability of Extractive Reserves. The RESEX A.C., in this respect, 
seems to be well-positioned to achieve this over time. Tourist entrance fees 
and user fees from the companies that use the port could provide the income 
necessary for the reserve to operate effectively. It is questionable, however, 
to what extent these sources of income will be congruent to the goals of the 
reserve and to what degree secondary stakeholders, such as local 
government, will accept decisions made in the General Assembly.
Although the RESEX A.C. has significant earning potential, other 
Extractive Reserves established on the coastline may not be located in such 
touristically attractive areas and may not be able to garner the resources 
they need through these means. Mangroves, for example, provide the 
breeding grounds for fish that coastal fishers and offshore fishers alike 
depend on. These areas may not be easy to market in the same way. 
RESEX managers will need to be creative to ensure financial sustainability. 
For example, extractive reserves could be promoted through product 
marketing and extractive reserve labelling and/or eco-tourism.
Given the population, stocks and technology used, the need for incentives to 
participate is less than in areas in which fishers must alter their livelihood 
strategies significantly. In those cases, access to alternative income 
generating strategies, micro-credit, or the provision of social services such 
as improved access to health and education are essential. In A.C. they are 
important but it seems likely that, in the future, funds generated by the 
reserve will be allocated for these purposes. This ability to generate funds 
though 'sustainable tourism' is an opportunity on which only some Maritime 
Extractive Reserves will be able to capitalize.
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Experiences with similar projects in Amazonia may be able to offer some 
insight into how extractive reserves can achieve their social objective. The 
Mamiraua management plan, for example, directly addresses some of the 
social issues related to the reserve in a way that the RESEX A.C. has not. 
For example, Mamiraua looks at the health of the community as a whole 
instead of only looking at those individuals that interact directly with the 
resource. Not only do the environmental education and health components 
of this wetlands project provide incentives for cooperation, they also 
recognize that participatory conservation depends on support from all 
stakeholders. The RESEX A.C. could benefit from these experiences. 
Mamiraua, though, has the added advantage of linkages with national and 
international NGOs and governments which the RESEX A.C. does not.
In the short-term, financial resources are scarce and neither AREMAC nor 
IBAMA have the necessary funds to effectively carry out their mandates. 
As a result, fishers are wary about the RESEX serving as a vehicle for 
effective change. Fishers pay two reais a month (65 p) to the organisation, 
an amount that would not be insignificant if all fishers (approximately 
1,500) paid. Given current membership rates (230) and the fact that many 
fishers are not up-to-date with their payments means that this source of 
income, at present, does not assist the RESEX in meeting its financial 
needs.
9.5 Outcomes and consequences* Potential for successful
collaborative management
At different stages, the RESEX A.C. has demonstrated some characteristics 
from the entire spectrum of co-management arrangements. At no stage, 
however, has the contribution of either group (fishers or State) been ideal. 
The federal environmental organization, IBAMA, has not kept its part of the
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bargain. With only one representative on-site and no monitors, this group is 
clearly not able to meet its responsibilities. Furthermore, although fishers 
have participated to some degree, canoe fishers have not played a 
significant role in this process. The RESEX A.C. may best be characterized 
as a form of co-operative management arrangement in which both sides lack 
the capacity (funds, training, and experience) to support an efficient and 
effective system for collaborative resource governance. Greater fisher 
participation and more support from the federal government are necessary 
in order to achieve a more equitable and effective management system.
With the creation of the RESEX, fishers in Arraial, including the beach 
seiners have been given an enormous opportunity to control the resources 
on which they depend. While on the one hand this has the potential to 
empower local fishers (the extent of this empowerment may not be clear yet 
to them) it has also overburdened them with the responsibility associated 
with creating and managing this RESEX. Research suggests that, due to a 
number of social factors and financial constraints, the local community is 
not prepared to handle this responsibility on its own. As a result, local 
leadership is bending under the pressure. As one frustrated member of the 
directorate describes the situation, '[the government] has planted a seed and 
forgotten to water it.1
The establishment of an extractive reserve will cause change and disturb
the status quo. Because so little government support is available,
communities have been left more or less on their own to adapt to this new
situation. Extractive reserves in Brazil, by definition, are located in places
where traditional populations exist. Often, these groups have developed
informal institutions to manage their resources. There is no guarantee
though that these institutions are effective and up-to-date. Given the fact
that these areas have been affected by external factors (such as technology
change and State fisheries policies) it is likely that many of these
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institutions have disintegrated over time. Therefore, although local 
collective resource management regimes may have once offered sustainable, 
democratic and participatory structures, practitioners must be careful to 
assume that they are still robust.
9.6 Conclusions
The following is a list of the main conclusions drawn from this case study.
❖ Traditional resource management systems in Arraial do Cabo are in 
decline.
❖ Economic change, social change and historical factors have tested the 
resilience of these systems
❖ Ownership and marketing structures have become increasingly 
centralized.
❖ Weaknesses in these management systems have not been addressed 
in the RESEX Utilization Plan.
❖ In order for the RESEX to achieve its social objective it must address 
these weaknesses.
❖ Participation in the RESEX is low both in quantity and quality. 
Canoe fishers are clearly not decisive players in this process
❖ Low levels of social capital and the existence of negative social capital 
are constraining participation and the likelihood for collective action
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❖ Mistrust in government constrains the likelihood of collaborative 
management
❖ These issues are exacerbated by the fact that the state has not held 
up its part of the bargain, especially in terms of assistance with 
monitoring.
9.7 Policy Implications
Maritime Extrative Reserves are being created in significant numbers at 
both the state and federal levels. Although creating these areas may be 
relatively easy, the challenge lies in sustaining them over the long-term. 
Policy makers and conservation practictioners should bear in mind the 
following*
❖ Conservation practitioners should not assume that traditional 
resource management systems are just, equitable system and up-to- 
date. An assessment of the existence and health of these institutions 
should be undertaken before creating the Utilization Plan. 
Information on the state of these institutions is essential in order to 
design effective regimes to collaboratively manage natural resources.
❖ Communities may need to go through a process of social preparedness 
before 'receiving' these reserves. In A.C. this process should have 
involved bringing fishers together from different gear groups and/or 
beaches in order discuss and resolve common problems. This process 
should also include secondary stakeholders such as local government 
and fishing associations. Participatory research methods could guide 
this process and help ensure transparency.
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❖ Marketing structures should be analysed and an effort should be 
made to create more equitable systems and choice for fishers. 
Extractive reserves will not automatically change these structures. 
Inequitable marketing structures could affect the ability for the 
extractive reserve to secure local livelihoods. It might be useful to 
consider these structures before creating these areas.
❖ In order for government to build trust with fishing communities 
relationships of reciprocity need to be developed. This relationship 
will disintegrate quickly if parties do not hold up their promises. 
Brazilian small-scale fishers have historically lived outside the law. 
Few are registered with the Port Authority or IBAMA and few have 
participated in fishing associations. This lack of experience with 
government has left fishers sceptical and care should be taken to 
build a new relationship between the State and these groups.
❖ Fishing communities are unlikely to be able to take sole responsibility 
for these initiatives and will not succeed in long-term conservation 
and development goals without external assistance (i.e. Government, 
NGOs). There is a danger that communities will be overburdened 
with the responsibilities associated with these regimes. Therefore, it 
is essential that the State hold to its commitments.
❖ Clear guidelines for voting and financial management should be in 
place to ensure the legitimacy and transpareny of the organization.
Extractive Maritime Reserves are one of the first Federal-level policy
initiatives to directly address the needs of small-scale coastal fishers.
Extractive reserves in general represent the first conservation units in
Brazil which specifically involve local communities in their design and
management. These initiatives have enormous potential for conserving
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coastal areas and securing the livelihoods of coastal populations. This study 
suggests, however, that in order for these goals to be realized both parties 
must be willing and able to carry out their role in the process.
Suersrestions for farther research
♦> Given the innovative nature of extractive maritime reserves in Brazil, 
there are many areas in which further research would be timely and 
useful. The following recommendations for research are limited to 
extractive maritime reserves-
❖ Investigate the role of secondary stakeholders in this process. How 
can extractive reserves coexist in areas with a diverse and often 
conflicting economic base?
❖ Research the policy level factors that limit the States’ ability to 
participate in this collaborative management process in a more 
significant way. What can government do to improve its support for 
these initiatives?
❖ Explore the possibilities of creating this type of initiative in areas 
where fishers fish far from shore. In Brazil, this type of fishing takes 
place in the northeast where fishers are particularly vulnerable and 
have little alternative livelihood sources.
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Annex I- Ecological and Social Change in A.C.
Pre- Colonial 
- 1503
Colonial 
1503 - 1920
Modernisation 
1920 - 1988
Post-Modernisation 
1988 - present
1) Quality of 
stock
Although little data 
exists, given low 
population densities it 
is assumed that 
resource extraction 
was sustainable
Although greater 
pressure on fish stocks, 
continued low 
population densities 
and technological limits 
suggest extraction was 
within sustainable 
levels - terrestrial 
resources received more 
attention and use and 
specific resources were 
depleted- i.e., pau 
brasil, other hardwoods.
Industrial fishing 
fleets encouraged by 
national government.
Oral histories of local 
resource monitoring 
suggest that during 
this period, stocks 
and flows to the cape 
decreased 
substantially
High population 
growth and local 
pollution affect 
environmental 
quality.
Considerable change in 
fish stock availability. 
During this period, local 
efforts began in an attempt 
to buffer outside threats to 
depleting fish stocks.
2)Population 
trends and 
changes
Indigenous native 
populations varying 
in language and tribe 
and representing a 
diversity of cultures.
European immigrants 
begin to colonize area 
along with African 
slaves.
Immigrants from 
north-eastern brazil 
come to take 
advantage of work 
opportunities at
Fishers continue to come 
from other regions. 
Although there is still an 
increase in total 
population, younger
314
Pre-Colonial 
- 1503
Colonial 
1503 - 1920
Modernisation 
1920 - 1988
Post-Modernisation 
1988 - present
Oldest recorded are 
the sambaquianas 
(5,500 years ago). At 
the time of the 
colonial conquests, it 
was the Tamoio 
peoples which 
occupied the area. A 
population with 
origins in the Tupi- 
Guarani nation.
Alkalis along with 
skilled labourers from 
around the country 
and abroad.
Fishers from the 
north of the state 
move to Arraial to 
look for more fertile 
fishing grounds (also 
spurred by financial 
incentives offered by 
local politicians).
Veranistas buy homes 
in Arraial and are 
included in 
population statistics
residents leave to look for 
work opportunities in the 
state capital.
3) Religion Animist Introduction of 
Christianity
Predominately
Catholic
Introduction of variety of 
evangelical religions such 
as* Kingdom of God, 
Universal,
Note* animism is still 
practised in a somewhat
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Pre-Colonial 
- 1503
Colonial 
1503 - 1920
Modernisation 
1920 - 1988
Post-Modernisation 
1988 - present
concealed fashion and 
represents a mixture of 
African and indigenous 
beliefs.
4) Technology/ 
Resource use
Bows and arrows, 
hooks and line made 
from fish bones and a 
local plant variety 
called tucum also 
used for making nets 
and hammocks.
Boats- rafts made 
from tying 4 or 5 logs 
together
Housing- lived in 
communal huts made 
from wood and palm 
fronds.
Europeans brought 
iron tools with them - 
including, knives, 
hooks etc....
Family homes made 
from "pau a pique e 
barro" ■ sticks and 
mud.
Dug out canoes are 
only type of boat used 
during this period.
Cal was made from 
shells in wood kilns.
Transport done by 
man power and 
animal power
Resex imposes limits on 
types of technology used 
within a three nautical 
mile radius of the cape.
Terrestrial resources for 
fishing become decrease in 
importance with the 
availability of 
commercialised 
alternatives
5) Property Communal living Household becomes Private property, land Extractive reserve
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Pre-Colonial 
- 1503
Colonial 
1503 - 1920
Modernisation 
1920 - 1988
Post-Modernisation 
1988 - present
Rights arrangements primary social unit 
coupled with common 
property regimes 
develop/are modified 
Many owners for each 
canoe and net.
Fish sold at auctions 
on the beach. Catch 
went to highest 
bidder.
gains value - titling 
introduced.
Number of Canoe 
owners decreases and 
most of the few that 
remain become 
middlemen.
Wealth became more 
concentrated.
Means of production 
became concentrated 
during this period 
leaving it at the end 
in the hands of few.
redefining property rights 
in the local context
6) Social 
Change
Constant flux 
between two main 
tribes battling for 
control of the coast.
Arrival of Europeans.
Social organisation is 
fishing and 
intrinsically related to 
this activity.
Conflict between
Establishment of 
Alkalis bring 
urbanisation along 
with large numbers of 
immigrants looking 
for 'better 
opportunities'.
Conflict within canoe 
fishers, between them and 
other modalities as well as 
with outside fishers is 
prevalent.
Establishment of the 
reserve introduces
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Pre-Colonial 
- 1503
Colonial 
1503 - 1920
Modernisation 
1920 - 1988
Post-Modernisation 
1988 - present
Praia Grande and 
Praia dos Anjos 
develops
Abolition of slavery 
creates afro-Brazilian 
neighbourhood.
Women's role in 
fishing activities 
greatly reduced.
Wage labour 
introduces new social 
order and 'civilises' 
A.C.
Conflict between 
beaches peaks and 
begins to subside.
participatory decision­
making forums, altering 
former structure where 
canoe owners are 
responsible for this.
Time of extreme flux.
7) Economy Although
representing diversity 
of cultures, all native 
populations inhibiting 
this cape depended on 
fishing, hunting and 
gathering for their 
subsistence.
Extra fish salted 
and/or dried and sold 
in Rio markets as 
inexpensive 
alimentation for 
slaves.
Alkalis provides 
major boost to local 
economy.
Diversified- Although still 
important other 
alternatives to fishing 
develop. An d greater 
economic diversity ranging 
from eco-tourism and mass 
tourism to mining oil off 
the coast by Petrobras. 
Port continues to be an
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Pre “Colonial 
- 1503
Colonial 
1503 - 1920
Modernisation 
1920 - 1988
Post-Modernisation 
1988 - present
important income 
generator for the 
municipality.
8) Fisher 
Participation 
in informal 
institutions
High Medium Low Low but there is potential 
for increase
319
Exogenous influences on socio-ecological system
Pre “Colonial Colonial Modernisation Post-modernisation
Regional Inter-tribal wars 
between Tamoios and 
Goytacezes.
Emergence of Regional 
markets
Wage labour? Regional tourism, 
commerce, proximity 
to Rio de Janeiro/Sao 
Paulo markets
National Creation of Alkalis 
Support for industrial 
fishing
Extractive Reserve, 
Petrobras, Navy 
research
Global Discoveries, Church, 
'civilisation', trade and 
contact with many 
different groups going 
to Rio.
Extraction of natural 
resources for 
European market.
Japanese whaling 
industry
Pressures for 
protection of 
traditional
populations/sustainabl 
e extraction gain 
support from western 
governments, 
primarily as a result of 
activities/movements 
in Amazonia.
(categories adapted from Warren and Pinkston in Berkes and FoIke, 1998)
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Change in Gender roles
Pre ■ colonial Colonial Modernisation/
Industrialisation
Post- Modernisation
Role of Women Gathering, keeping 
the home.
Salted/processed fish, 
helped in net making 
'fiacao de tucum', and 
lace making 
(introduced by 
Portuguese women). 
Also responsible for 
child rearing and 
household needs such 
as water collection etc.
Reduced role of 
women in the out of 
home productive 
sphere largely as a 
result of the 
introduction of ice 
making technologies 
(and piped 
water/electricity). 
Many women 
complemented 
husbands activities 
with home vegetable 
gardens.
Urbanisation, high 
population growth and 
land speculation 
related to tourism 
development reduces 
quantity of land 
available for 
cultivation. Women 
look outside the home 
for work opportunities 
in local government, 
hospital, commerce, 
tourism etc....
Role of Men Hunting and fishing, 
wars/protection
Primarily fishing with 
some hunting...
Work for men 
continues outside of 
the home.
Work continues 
outside of the home, 
fishing becomes a 
male affair.
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Annex IT Timeline of Arraial do Cabo
3500 be-1500 Different groups of indigenous people inhabit the area - Sambaquinis 
to Tamoios
1503 Amerigo Vespucci arrives at the Porto do Forno
1583 1st light house in Latin America built on the island of Cabo Frio
1750
Saint Hilaire visits Arraial providing the first written documentation 
of life on the Cape
1830 Telegraph set up
1888 Abolition of Slavery
1900 Approximate date that Bacural comes to P. Grande (oldest canoe still 
in on the beach)
1921 Fishermen's Guild established
1945 first trawlers and motorised boats come to the area
1943 Alkalis established
1963 Japanese whaling industry set up in "Baleia" on P. dos Anjos
1971 IEAPM established for research and technology diffusion
1986 Free Association of Fishermen established
1983 Treaty signed by owners to regulate canoe fishing
1985 Municipality gains independence from Cabo Frio
1996 Municipality begins to sell itself as "Dive Capital of Brazil"
1995 FIPAC created - local government fishing office
1995 Highest catch in years - attributed to enforcement of industrial 
fishing activities by IBAMA and FIPAC.
1997 'Zangarejo' hooks introduced by "Japanese" for squid fishing, 
underwater lanterns come soon afterwards.
1997 Brazils first Maritime Extractive Reserve created.
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Annex III- Interview Progress Matrix
Case Study Background: Three years ago, Brazils first Maritime Extractive reserve was set up in Arraial do Cabo, 
RJ. Work is currently underway in over 20 other municipalities on the Brazilian coastline to set up similar 
initiatives. This research will look into the current levels of participation in the AC experience and what the 
potentials for future participation are by looking at the existence of social capital between canoe fishermen and the 
institutions in which they are involved.
Current Overall Research Question:
What is the current and potential role of the canoe fishermen in the CO-management of the Arraial do Cabo, RJ 
Maritime Extractive Marine Reserve?
Sample Group:
Local canoe fishermen who are considered the 'traditional population' of Arraial do Cabo. Although there are over 
1,500 fishermen in the municipality who use a variety of different methods to fish, the reserve has been created 
especially in order to protect the approximately 150 individuals that participate in this modality of fishing. There 
are three different physical locations where this type of fishing takes place and interviews and observations will be 
carried out at each.
Methodology and Timeline
Participant observation and informal discussions- consisted of a large part of what has been done so far. 
Stakeholders have been identified and informal discussions have been carried out with the majority of them. This 
time also consisted of observing day to day activities of the RESEX management along with meetings and general 
assemblies when they did occur. It also included accompanying local canoe fishermen on fishing trips which not only 
was helpful in understanding the type of work being done but allowed for a 7 hour period in which I could speak to 
canoe fishermen about different issues and listen to what they spoke about among each other. Information collected
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has been useful in designing interview questions. Will continue to a lesser degree during interview implementation 
phase but will restart in April.
Document collection - the majority of these have been collected so far although there are some basic documents 
which still need to be obtained.
Interviews - to be completed by April 1. Please see the attached interview matrix for list of interviewees and 
associated interview questions. All interviewees except two have been previously contacted and informal 
discussions have been carried out with them. The semi-structured interviews will build on these original 
discussions.
No- Approximately 15
Key Informant Groupings* local institution leaders, fishermen and canoe owners
The goal of this process is to collect first hand accounts from local institutions and key individuals on their 
perceptions of the reserve, current levels of participation in the reserve and other local institutions, relationship 
between those institutions and the reserve and some of the characteristics of the canoe fishing community that lend 
to our understanding about current levels of participation.
Expected Date of Fieldwork Completion* Early June
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
Fabio Fabiano
Reserve Manager and 
CNPT State 
Representative
Goals and 
Justification 
his role
his perspectives on
the role of the
fishermen
his perspectives on
local institutions -
human and social
capital
key person involved in 
reserve creation ■ 
although not a 
fishermen himself, he 
is considered the 
"chico mendes" of the
Main Observations’
Confirmed canoe fishing objective as 
well as some of the obstacles for their 
participation - lack of collaboration 
between beaches and low sense of 
trust between fishermen. He also 
mentioned the lack of faith in local 
representation that the fishermen 
have.
He spoke about the lack of 
institutional collaboration and blamed 
it on the fact that the other 
institutions were interested in getting 
involved up until the point that they 
realized that not only were they not 
going to be able to control it, they 
would actually loose power from its 
existence.
Other observations-
Background
1. What was the process that led to the 
creation of the reserve?
2. Why Arraial - what are the unique 
characteristics of the fishing community in 
Arraial that made it a good site to pilot such 
an initiative?
3. What gave you the idea?
IBAMA and the Reserve
1. What do you feel is your role in the startup 
and implementation of the reserve has been 
and will be?
2. What have been the biggest challenges in 
setting up and managing the reserve?
3. How have the existence of local institutions
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
process He was luckily very forthcoming - 1 
was afraid he would be in a bad 
mood... The interview was at my 
house and lasted approximately 1.5 
hours.
Quote* " the fishermen of arraial only 
know how to divide into separate 
groups - not how to come together to 
resolve their problems"
helped or hindered the creation of the 
reserve?
Canoe fishermen and the Reserve
1. What is the role of the canoe fishermen in 
this process?
2. How is this different from that of the other 
fishermen?
3. What efforts have been made to increase 
their participation in the reserve?
4. What do you think is needed to increase 
their participation in the reserve?
Recommendations
1. Do you feel that the fishermen are capable of 
managing the reserve? If not, what do you feel 
needs to be done or changed in order to make this 
possible.
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
2) Alexandre Cordeiro 
or Raphael Pinzon
Representatives of 
CNPT Brazilia
Goals
what is the role of 
fishermen in the 
reserve
policy on extractive
reserves
future plans
Was unavailable for interview. 
Multiple attempts were made to 
schedule an interview during his field 
visits as well as in Brasilia.
Policy Questions
1. What are the reasons behind the creation of 
Maritime extractive reserves? What are 
their objectives?
2. What has sparked this series of initiatives?
3. What is the process of reserve establishment 
- what is the role of CNPT in this process?
4. How do Extractive Maritime Reserves differ 
from those working on forest conservation?
5. On what grounds in relation to the 
characteristics of the fishing community are 
the project proposals evaluated - what is 
CNPT looking for?
6. If they do not meet these characteristics is 
tech assistance given to bring them up to 
par?
7. What sort of support is given to the reserve?
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
Role of fishermen
1. How does CNPT see the role of the 
fishermen in the implementation of the 
reserve?
2. What do they feel the level and type of 
participation in the reserve should be?
3. What do you feel needs to be done to 
increase participation in the process of the 
extractive reserve?
4. Incentives, local capacity building,
5. Future Policy/Plans
6. What are the future plans for setting up 
more maritime reserves in Brazil?
7. To what degree does CNPT feel that this is a 
type of conservation unit which can be 
repeated?
8. Have there been any evaluations done on the
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
one in Santa Catarina or Arraial?
9. Do they feel that doing this is important 
before setting up other reserves?
10. What do you feel are the lessons learned so 
far?
Ze Maria
President - Associacao 
da Reserva
Extrativista Maritima 
of Arraial do Cabo
Goals
Profile of institution 
and process of 
involvement in the 
reserve
Role of fishermen, 
how to increase level 
of participation in the
Main Observations-
Feels that local institutions do not 
represent the need of fishermen and 
that was why he recently formed the 
'commission of fishermen' to represent 
their needs at a meeting with the port 
authority.
In the beginning there wasn't even a 
representative of canoe fishing on the 
directory.
Thinks the reserve is a fishermen's 
dream but it won't be realized until 
local institutions start working 
together and are represented by 
fishermen themselves. Until then,
Background
1. What are the objectives of the AREMAC?
2. Approximately how many members does it 
have? Paying?
3. How would you describe the characteristics 
of its members (i.e., are they mainly from 
one modality of fishing?, are they younger, 
older, are they primarily from one 
neighborhood? etc....)
AREMAC and the Reserve
1. What was the process that led to the
creation and implementation of the reserve?
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
reserve
role of other local 
institutions
every group will be out for themselves 
and it wont work.
Says the reserve has to involve the 
entire community, not just fishermen. 
Says the middlemen here are strong 
because the local institutions are 
week and those institutions are week 
because the fishermen don't have 
union.
Sees Fabio Fabiano as a major 
obstacle for progress- he runs 
everything and doesn't share his 
space.
Talks about the owners of the beaches 
and how they still exist - the Mafia of 
canoe fishing, says that they keep 
their workers from participating in 
the reserve.
Other observations;
Tape was on pause throughout the 
majority of the interview, had to be 
redone - so a bit of the language might 
be strange. He was really kind about
2. What was the role of AREMAC in that 
process?
3. Did other fishing organizations have a role 
in this process?
4. How do you feel that other local fishing 
institutions can get involved to help support 
the process?
5. What are the obstacles in achieving this 
objective?
Canoe fishermen and the Reserve
1. Why do you think that it is important to 
protect canoe fishing in the area?
2. What do you think the role of the canoe 
fishermen in the reserve is and should be?
3. What efforts have been made to increase 
their participation in the reserve?
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
it and helpful.
4. What do you feel are the barriers for broader 
participation in the reserve?
5. What have been the biggest challenges to 
the associations ability to promote 
participation in reserve implementation?
Recommendations
1. What changes would you recommend to increase 
the effectiveness of the reserve?
Siles
Canoe Representative 
of the RE SEX
Goals
Perception of the 
reserve
Level of participation 
Degree of shared
Observations'-
good information on relationship 
between canoe fishers and other types 
of fishing.
Afterwards reinforced the power that 
the middlemen have in the area. Just 
the "owner of long beach" owns over 
20 canoes on long beach also owns 
over 20 boats and ice house. The 
owners are also the middlemen and
Background
1. In your opinion, why was the reserve 
created?
2. In relation to the canoe fishermen what are 
the objectives of the reserves?
Canoe fishermen and the reserve
1. To what degree do you feel that the canoe
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
sense of identity - 
social capital among 
fishermen
Justification
Not only is he the 
elected representative 
on the RESEX 
directory but he has 
also long been an 
activist for 
fishermen's rights in 
the area.
all fishers not just canoe fishers are 
under their thumb.
Said that during the hard seasons, the 
fishermen go to these middlemen for 
money or assistance then when 
summer comes around, they start the 
new season owing the middlemen 
money and favors which keeps them 
having to accept the prices that the 
middlemen offer.
Mentioned that these common themes 
would help unify the different fishing 
modalities.
There is less and less reason for 
people to be affiliated to the colonia. 
Said that the fishermen need 
incentive in the form of assistance in 
order to participate in the reserve. 
Praia do pontal - cocktail of users 
cause no one lives there.
Fish used to be auctioned off in the 
town auction where there were many 
buyers from all around. Now there 
are a handful of them.
fishermen are aware of the reserve and 
understand its purpose?
2. Do you feel that the Reserve represents the 
needs and concerns of the canoe fishing 
community?
3. What has been the role of the canoe 
fishermen in the creation and 
implementation of the reserve?
4. What do you feel those fishermen should 
have in the process of the reserve?
5. Do you feel that the current degree of 
participation is adequate?
6. What do you feel are the characteristics of 
the canoe fishermen are that are going to 
help or hinder the ability of the reserve to 
protect their interests?
7. What are the barriers to participation in the 
reserve? Why don't people participate more
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
Little by little the boats and nets 
began to be bought off by the 'beach 
owners' to the point where now there 
is a high concentration of ownership,. 
Says there are 30 associates of the 
reserve which are canoe members. 
Says the capitania just tries to 
difficult the lives of the fishermen, 
very beaurocratic and time consuming 
process to get properly registered - 
says that this is one of the reasons 
that they aren't.
NOTE- in a later conversation that I 
had with him he said that the reason 
the reserve was created was to 
strengthen the fishing community. 
That AC was chosen not because of its 
strength but because of its weakness.
than they do?
8. Do you feel that there is enough of a sense 
of common identity among canoe fishermen 
for them to guide the direction of the 
reserve? I.e., are they united enough?
9. If not, what are the things that you think 
divides them?
Local institutions and the Reserve
1. What role do you feel the other fishing 
institutions should play in the reserve? The 
colonia?
2. Do you feel that the Association has 
undermined the efforts of other local fishing 
organizations?
Recommendations
l) What changes would you suggest for the reserve 
which might encourage the participation of canoe 
fishermen and increase their voice in decision-
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
making?
Quinzinho
Associacao de 
Pescadores de Arraial 
do Cabo (APAC)
Goals
Institutional 
background 
perceptions of 
participation 
local institutions
Observations*
APAC is another institution in AC 
that sees the participation of its 
members measured in the amount 
they charge per month.
He was not very thoughtful in his 
responses. The interview is only 20 
minutes long. He didn't even seem to 
have read Rosanyas book.
Basically said he thought the reserve 
was great, just needed more 
monitoring.
He did agree that the middlemen and 
boat owners may inhibit canoe 
fishermen from participating in 
reserve meetings etc.
Background
1. What are the objectives of your institution?
2. Why and when was it created?
3. Approximately how many members does it 
have? Paying?
4. How would you describe the characteristics 
of its members (i.e., are they mainly from 
one modality of fishing?, are they younger, 
older etc....)
Local Institutions and the Reserve
1. How would you describe APAC's 
involvement in the process of the creation 
and implementation of the reserve?
2. How do you feel that other local fishing 
institutions can get involved to help support 
the process?
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
But besides that he said the sole 
reason for lack of participation is 
laziness and choice. He also felt that 
they should participate more to take 
advantage of what the reserve has to 
offer them.
The problems he cited were all from 
the perspective of Praia Grande.
There are very few members of APAC 
that are from Praia dos Anjos or 
Priainha.
Collective action - he mentioned the 
few occasions in which Praia Grande 
fishermen have acted collectively to 
protect their work-
With the surf problem and with the 
closing of an Alkalis tunnel which had 
Barrila spilling out of it and was 
getting in the way of their fishing. He 
also mentioned that long ago there are 
accounts of fishermen cutting trawler
3. What are the obstacles in achieving this 
objective?
Canoe fishermen and the Reserve
1. To what degree do you feel that the canoe 
fishermen are aware of the reserve and 
understand its purpose?
2. Do you feel that the Reserve represents the 
needs and concerns of the canoe fishing 
community?
3. What has been the role of the canoe 
fishermen in the creation and 
implementation of the reserve?
4. What role do you feel those fishermen should 
have had in that process?
5. Do you feel that the current degree of 
participation is adequate?
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
nets. These seem few and far 
between.
Says that an important incentive for 
the fishermen would be to increase 
monitoring. Says that when they see 
that the reserve is working they'll 
have more interest in getting 
involved.
He has been fishing for 23 years and 
APAC was started in 86
6. What do you feel are the characteristics of 
the canoe fishermen are that are going to 
help or hinder the ability of the reserve to 
protect their interests?
Or
7. What are the barriers to participation in the 
reserve? Why don't people participate more 
than they do?
8. Do you feel that there is enough of a sense 
of common identity among canoe fishermen 
for them to guide the direction of the 
reserve? I.e., are they united enough?
9. If not, what are the things that you think 
divides them?
Recommendations
l) What do you think needs to be done or changed 
in order to improve the effectiveness of the 
RESEX?
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
Fernando - Bifo 
ACRIMAC shell 
collector association
Goals
institutional 
background 
problems that they 
face
participation in the 
reserve
perceptions on local 
fishing institutions
Justification 
although they are not 
canoe fishermen, they 
are a fishing 
institution that 
represents one of the 
most marginalised 
fishing modalities and 
does not participate in 
the reserve.
Observations^
ACRIMAC has social and Inver- 
economic objectives.
Most of the interesting points of the 
interview were stated after the 
machine was turned off:
He says what is missing is union 
between institutions, that the people 
involved are self interested and have 
lost sight of the objectives of their 
institutions and who they represent. 
He mentioned the Colony as an 
example of this. Said that it’s the 
largest fishing organization that 
represents the least amount of people. 
But that it didn't stop there,
AREMAC has also made some 
mistakes in its stubbornness towards 
other institutions and entities - that 
since they have managed to gain some 
power within the community they are
Background
1. Quais sao os objetivos de ACRIMAC?
2. Porque e quando foi criado?
3. Aproximadamente quantos membros tern?
4. Qual e a forma de participacao deles? 
Pagando? Votando?
5. Sao todos colletores de marisco? Algums 
tambem pescam?
6. Quantos colletores de marisco tern em 
Arraial?
7. Quais sao os maiores problemas que os 
colletores enfrentam hoje em dia?
8. Exist algums pontos de conflito entre os 
colletores e os outros modalidades de pesca?
9. Ha quanto tempo e que os colletores estao 
realizando esta atividade em arraial?
10. E uma atividade tradicional? Artesenal?
Participacao Institucional
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
yielding it whenever possible and 
forgetting the importance of 
partnership and union in the process. 
Says that they are acting like 
dictators trying to impose their rule 
on everyone instead of realizing that 
they are there to help the fishermen... 
Said that the climate is one of conflict 
and argument. That they are now 
trying get Fabio Fabiano taken away 
and he was the one who started the 
reserve - the founder. Lack of 
dialogue between institutions, 
personal issues getting in the way. 
AREMAC's lack of flexibility, new 
ideas.
Cited the fact that Seu Manek pays 
himself rent in his own house.
Believes that they could do so much if 
they were united. Says he has tried 
but there has been little interest.
1. Como e que ACRIMAC participou na criacao 
da reserva?
2. Como e o involvimento dos colletores de 
mariscos nas atividades da reserva? Sao 
membros?
3. Como voce acha que devia ser a participacao 
de ACRIMAC nas atividades da reserva?
4. Voce acha que as atividades da reserva 
effeta o trabalho dos colletores?
Recommendacoes
1) 0  que voce acha que devia ser feito para fazer a 
reserva funcionar melhor
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
There are approximately 70 families 
involved in these activities and 30 of 
them are active members. He is 
compiling statistics with them about 
the areas used and how much is 
collected from each one each day so 
that they may manage the area more 
sustainably. Half of their dues go to 
the reserve and he said that their 
participation was high although I've 
seen very few there.
Other observations  ^Tape quality 
should be good except for the truck 
sounds. He was very forthcoming and 
believe that he was thoughtful and 
through in his answers.
Manek
President - Colonia de 
Pescadores
Goals
institutional
background
Main Observations:
not many canoe fishermen are 
members of the colonia anymore 
although it was set up in 1921 when 
there were only canoe fishermen 
around.
Not included in reserve process and
Background
1. What are the objectives of your institution?
2. Why and when was it created?
3. Approximately how many members does it 
have? Paying?
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
perceptions on reserve 
reasons for deciding 
not to participate 
views on canoe 
fishermen
feels excluded. Does not currently 
participate at all in the reserve 
Canoe fishermen protection is 
important for historical reasons. 
Feels the fishermen don't have vision 
and are not united.
Other observations- 
- was invited to participate in the 
meeting between fishermen and the 
Capitania but decided not to 
participate - said the organizers were 
interested in politics not fishermens 
rights.
4. How would you describe the characteristics 
of its members (ie, are they mainly from one 
modality of fishing?, are they younger, older 
etc...)
The Colonia and the Reserve
1. How would you describe the Colonias 
involvement in the process of the creation 
and implementation of the reserve?
2. Why has the Colonia opted out of 
participation in this process?
3. Do you feel that the existing organizations 
were overlooked when the reserve was 
created?
4. Do you work with and cooperate in any way 
with other local fishing organizations other 
than the reserve?
Canoe fishermen and the Reserve
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Name and 
Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
1. Do you think that it is important to protect 
canoe fishing in the area?
2. Do you feel that the reserve is the best 
mechanism for protecting their interests?
3. Why isn't their broad participation by 
fishermen in the Reserve?
Recommendations
1. What do you think needs to be done or changed 
on the policy level at the beneficiary level 
(fishermen) to overcome these obstacles?
Glaoco
(21) 625-6375 
or Cabo Frio FIPERJ 
rep at the Secretaria 
de Desenvolvimento 
Alcina - (24) 645-1405
Date: May 27, 2000: 11:00am 
Location: FIPERJ office in Niteroi 
Observations: came from Arraial at 
5>'30 to get there on time and Glauco 
was late, buy about an hour. Couldn't 
be angry, he was very charming 
young, enthusiastic and helpful. He 
represents an overworked and
Background
1. What is the mission of FIPERJ?
2. When and why was it established?
Fishing issues in Rio
1. What are the problems that fishing
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Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
FIPERJ - Fundacao 
Institute de Pesca do 
Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro
Goals
states perspective on 
Maritime extractive 
reserves.
States policies on 
traditional fishing 
populations
underfunded organization. They 
haven’t sat down and spoken about 
Extractive reserves as a state fishing 
policy and were not aware that so 
many were "in the works".
He made very clear that he didn’t 
think radicalism was the way forward 
(insinuating that Fabio Fabiano was a 
radical dictator.
He said that he was concerned that so 
many were being set up and that they 
had been left out of the loop as it 
were. Little connection between the 
federal level and the state level.
He reinforced the fact that artesenal 
fishers have been ignored by policy 
makers and that new initiatives are 
important but no blueprints = to be 
careful when deciding that one recipe 
serves for everything.
communities are faced with in rio?
2. Are there any specific issues related to canoe 
fishermen and other traditional populations 
in Rio?
3. Are there any policies related to traditional 
fishing populations at the state level?
FIPERJ and extractive reserves
1. What is the states position in relation to the 
introduction of maritime extractive 
reserves?
2. What is the states role in the 
implementation of these intitiatives?
3. Are you aware of the plans to implement 
other such initiatives in the state?
4. Do you feel that these initiatives will 
improve the livelihoods of local fishermen?
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Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
He made some interesting comments 
on the reasons why local fishermen 
aren't organized = unlike people 
working in agriculture.
Very accessible = if need be contact by 
internet: fiDeri@ii.com.br =
5. What do you think are the local level 
obstacles for the success of these initatitives 
- ie: community characteristics?
6. What do you feel are the policy level 
obstacles?
Recommendations
1. Do you have any recommendations of how these 
initiatives should be changed in order to make 
them more effective
Fishermens 
interviews - 2 from 
each fishing beach.
What about the net 
maker from Big Beach 
that fishes on Edilea? 
Goal
views on the reserve 
levels on participation 
reasons why
Edmilson/owner of Edileia 2/23 farol 
beach:
Post interview conversation: 
Reinforced the fact that within 
beaches there exists a lot of disunion.
I don't think he felt too comfortable 
saying that on tape. He said that 
before, they used to fish 2 boats at a 
time on the angel beaches now they 
only do one at a time because it 
caused so much conflict - he said when
Fishermens interview:
1. What beach do you fish on?
2. How many days do you have?
3. What members of your family do you fish 
with? Do they fish on other canoes?
4. How long have you been canoe fishing?
5. Have you ever been a part of a "companha" 
from another beach?
6. How many fishers are there that fish on 
your beach but are from another one?
7. Have you ever spent significant time fishing
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Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
Justification 
to get more developed 
answers than those 
which will come out of 
the questionnaire, 
"their" perceptions 
and if possible, see 
how the owners views 
differ from the 
workers views. From 
what I understand, 
the owners of the vast 
majority of the canoes 
do not participate in 
the reserve at all.
it was time to circle the fish, both 
would wait for the other to do it.
He said if one boat has a good day 
then the others will be jealous and 
exclude or even mistreat them. Said 
they can only get along if everyone is 
loosing or everyone is winning. If you 
go from a boat that did well one day to 
one that didn't get anything the next 
day this may be particularly so.
Other observations: He was very 
forthcoming, we sat and talked for an 
hour after the interview about fife, 
family, his time working for petrobras 
far from home listening to Roberto 
Carlos. He said he would quit his job 
at FIPAC if he felt he could live off of 
canoe fishing and that most of the 
other fishermen feel the same.
They are proud of what they do and 
are respected in the community for it.
using other methods? How long?
8. What are the biggest preoccupations of 
canoe fishers today?
Local Institutions
1. Are you associated with a fishing 
organization (s)?
2. Which ones?
3. Why did you or didn't you? What are the 
benefits of being associated?
4. What is the form of your participation? 
Paying, attending meetings, voting? Etc...
5. Do you believe that the local institutions 
represent the needs of the canoe fishing 
community?
Tell me a little about...
1. The relationship between canoe fishermen.
2. The relationship between beaches.
3. How their problems differ.
4. What conflicts exist between canoe 
fishermen from the same beach, between
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Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
Interview Notes/Summaries Questions
There seem to be many reasons other 
than making money that people 
participate in this activity. Tradition, 
culture, values, fun...
William-
Great examples as well as sensitivity 
for the relationship between trawler 
fishermen and canoe fishermen. Very 
forthcoming as well as excellent 
recommendations for how to 
encourage participation.
Seu Otto- Sat 20 of May, 10:30am
We did the interview sitting on a rock 
up above Praia Grande near the vigias 
hut. It was a chilly windy fall 
morning and we would have stayed 
longer had the weather been a bit 
different. He is an elderly man 
around 75 but absolutely full of 
energy. Like an old billy goat (with a
beaches?
5. Between modalities?
6. Do you consider the canoe fishermen from 
Arraial a united group of people?
7. Why don't they get together more to resolve 
common issues?
The Reserve:
1. Do you feel that things have changed since 
the reserve was created?
2. Why do you think that canoe fishermen don't 
participate more in reserve meetings?
3. How do other fishermen see the reserves 
activities?
4. What do you feel needs to be done for them 
to participate more?
5. For the reserve to improve?
Owners Interview
Background
1. What beach, how many boats do they have, 
when and how did they obtain them?
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Goals 
Justification
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bizzare passion for hunting 
songbirds!). He has some clear ideas 
as to why fishing organization in 
Arraial are weak, why they have 
never worked, why participation is 
low in the reserve (which he thinks is 
just a load of shit set up as a "cabide 
de empregos"). He talks a lot about 
the lack of trust between fishers and 
the reasons behind it.
Also mentioned are details on how he 
believes the "corrida' was set up and 
how relations between fishers have 
changed over the years - and how he 
thinks that now, fishers are at the 
command of the owners/middlemen 
and really have no hope for getting 
anywhere, (and that fishing policy has 
always helped to benefit the few and 
not the many)
One thing he mentioned when we first 
spoke, which isn't on tape is the pride
2. How many people work on your canoes on 
average?
Owners and the reserve
1. What are the biggest problems facing canoe 
fishing today?
2. Do you feel that the reserve is addressing 
these issues?
3. Have you participated in the establishment 
and implementation of the reserve since it 
started? If so how? Attended meetings, pay 
dues etc...
4. Have your workers participated?
5. How do they feel about their employees 
participating in the reserve? Do you 
encourage it?
6. Do they feel that the reserve is a threat to 
them? - ie, maybe they will start marketing
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Affiliation 
Goals 
Justification
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that fishermen have, he says one of 
the reasons that they don't get 
together to sell their fish elsewhere is 
because they are afriad of what the 
other fishers/people will think.
their own fish.
7. Do you think that the fishermen are capable 
of managing the reserve?
8. What do they think are the obstacles to the 
success of the reserve?
Commandante Guedes 
e Sgt.Pignaton
Capitania dos Portos 
Contact- 643.2774 - 
645.5074 
Interview Date-
Goals
Role of the P.A. in the 
reserve
implementation. 
Relationship between 
the reserve and the 
P-a.
Information on local
Main Observations- 
good criticisms 
recommendations
clarifies and explains capitanias role 
and IBAMA's role 
reinforced need to professionalize 
fishing - said artisanal fishing is stuck 
in the past, needs to be modernized.
Quote-' He hasn't found one person 
that has anything good to say about 
the reserve'.
Other^
Background
1. What exactly is the function of the P.A?
2. Information on Arraial do Cabo
3. How many registered fishermen are there? 
Why are some registered and some not? 
What are the advantages of registering, 
what are the costs?
4. What are the problems that the Capitania is 
facing in Arraial do Cabo?
5. Are there any issues which are specifically 
relevant to the canoe fishermen?
6. Have these issues changed since the
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fishing issues
Justification 
More of an 
informational 
interview in order to 
gather information on 
fishing and issues 
related to Arraial.
Surprisingly informative interview. 
Both in terms of facts and 
clarifications on fishing issues and as 
well as perceptions and 
recommendations regarding the 
reserve.
- had a petrobras paperweight on his 
desk
establishment of the reserve?
7. Capitania's relationship with the Reserve
8. How have they been involved in the 
establishment of the reserve?
9. What is the current relationship between 
the p.a. and the reserve?
10. What is your position on the creation of the 
reserve?
11. Do you think this is an effective mechanism 
to protect canoe fishermen?
12. Is the P.A. involved in fiscalization issues in 
regards to the reserve?
13. What are some of the challenges to effective 
enforcement of the reserve rules?
Recommendations
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1. What suggestions would you make to improve 
the reserves ability to protect the interests of local 
fishermen
Questionnaire Implementation’ Canoes selected
Name of 
Canoe
Fishing Grounds
Edileia Praia dos Anjos
Inhambu Praia dos Anjos
Prainha
Prainha
Siles Praia Grande
Quinzinho Praia Grande
Jozumel Pontal
Pontal
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Annex IV- Survey of canoe fishermen
000 Interviewer 001 Number
002 Date 003 Beach
004 Canoe 005 Boat owner
006 Net owner 007 Position
008 Age 009 Middleman
300 What beaches do you canoe fish on?
1 □ Praia Grande
2 □ Praia dos Anjos
3 □ Prainha
4 □ Praia do Pontal
How many days a week do you fish on-
301 Praia Grande □0 □1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
302 Praia dos Anjos □0 □1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
303 Prainha □0 □1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
304 Praia do Pontal □0 □1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
Are other members of your family canoe fishermen?
0. DYes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
If so do they work on the same beach as you?
0. DYes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
Do they work on the same canoe? 0. □ Yes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
200 How important is canoe fishing in its contribution to your 
income?
□ Not at all
□ Not very
□ Important
□ Very Important
Do you have another job or source of income?
0. DYes 1. □ No
202 How often have you missed a day of fishing to go to another job?
□ Never
□ Sometimes
□ Often
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Are you registered with-
203 Capitania 0 . □ Yes 1. □ No
IBAMA 0 . □ Yes 1. □ No
Reserva Extrativista 0 . □ Yes 1. □ No
Are you associated to any fishing organization?
0 . □ Yes 1. □ No
If yes, are you linked to:
Colonia de Pescadores 0. □ Yes 1. □ No
Associacao de Pescadores de Arraial do Cabo (APAC)
0. DYes 1. □ No
Associacao da Reserva Estrativista Maritima de AC (AREMAC)
0. DYes 1. □ No
Other___________
In the last year, have you participated in these organizations by-
paying dues 0 . □ Yes 1. □ No
voting 0 . □ Yes 1. □ No
attending meetings 0 . □ Yes 1. □ No
other ___________________
215 If yes what is an advantage of membership?
216 If not, why aren't you associated with any of them?
Participation In Reserve
Are you aware of the existence of an extractive marine reserve in 
Arraial?
0. DYes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
218 If yes what are the objectives of the reserve?
1 □ To protect biodiversity
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2 □ To support canoe fishermen
3 □ To support fishermen in general
88 □ Other
99 □ Don't know
219 Do you feel that your actions make a difference in meeting
those objectives?
0. DYes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
Are you aware that as a member of AREMAC you are entitled to a
vote in reserve meetings?
0. DYes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
221 Have you ever attended any meetings at the reserve
0. DYes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
222 If no, were you aware that they were taking place?
0. □ Yes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
223 If not, why didn't you participate?
1 □ Didn't know about the meeting
2 □ Agenda wasn't relevant
3 □ Don't feel that it would make a difference
4 □ Was fishing
5 □ Other job
88 □ other
224 If yes, when was the last time you attended?
□ In the last 6 months
2 □ Between 6-1 year ago
3 □ Over a year ago
225 Did you vote on something? 0. □ Yes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
Were the issues being discussed important to you?
0. DYes 1. □ No 99. □ N/A
308 Where did you find out about the meetings?
1 □ Another Canoe fisher
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2 □ Friends
3 □ Sound car
4 □ Newspaper
5 □ Family
88 □ O th e r___________________________
227 Do you feel tha t canoe fishing has received benefits from the 
existence of the reserve?
0. DYes 1. □ No 77. □ d/n
228 Do you think you will in the future?
0. DYes 1. □ No 77. □ d/n
Are you friends with canoe fishers from other beaches?
0. □ Yes 1. □ No
If yes, how many?
□ Very few
□ Some
□ Many
□ Most
Where do you have contact with canoe fishermen from other beaches?
Location 1 Never 2 Rarely 3 Often 4 Always
311 Bars
312 Fishermen's
meetings
313 Church
314 Family events
315 Political event
316 Sports
317 Parties
318 Other:
319 Are j^ou a member of a political party? 0. □ Yes 1. □ No
320 If yes, which one? ________________
If yes have you ever participated in campaign?
0. DYes 1. No
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